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A certain degree of judicial discretion with respect to procedural matters is fundamental 
to all dispute settlement. However, due process must be respected and protected at all 
times to maintain the legitimacy of the system.  In the international context, while 
national norms may be considered, there is generally very limited guidance on what steps 
a tribunal should take to ensure that flexible procedure effectively protects due process 
and what the principles of due process actually require.  The development of policy 
guidance around procedural mechanisms to protect due process for the international 
community to consider when reforming existing and establishing new international 
dispute settlement systems will provide needed support and practical options for the 
requirements of due process in the broader international context.  This work seeks to 
derive such policy options based upon a comparative analysis of three specifically 
selected international dispute settlement mechanisms, the World Trade Organization, the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and the UNCITRAL 
Rules.  These three mechanisms were selected based upon their international legitimacy 
but also based upon the differing subject matter they address to demonstrate that due 
process protection is fundamental, rises above specific subject matter and cuts across all 
types of international dispute settlement.   
 
This work focuses on issues surrounding the balancing of judicial discretion as 
well as procedural flexibility with the need to protect due process in the context of 
international dispute settlement.  This is done initially through an analysis of the history 
of judicial discretion, procedural flexibility and due process – where do they come from, 
how were they developed and why are they so important?  Particular attention is paid to 
the international context, recognizing the attractiveness of flexibility in international 
dispute settlement to parties but also the challenges related to due process protection 
internationally and why this differs from the application of due process protections on the 
national levels.  A set of requirements for the protection of due process in the 





settlement mechanisms – the World Trade Organization (WTO), the dispute settlement 
mechanism under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).   
 
With respect to each system’s approach to the protection of due process, the 
analysis seeks to identify strengths and also weaknesses within each system and then 
compares and contrasts the identified weaknesses across all three of the systems 
reviewed.  This exercise is intended to identify areas for improvement within each of the 
three systems but also to consider whether specific weaknesses identified are unique to a 
particular system or alternatively are commonly found in the world of international 
dispute settlement.  From this analysis and the weaknesses identified, policy options to 
protect due process are developed and then applied back to the three dispute settlement 
systems to determine whether weaknesses previously identified are addressed.   
  
Regarding the analysis of judicial discretion, this work defines judicial discretion 
and translates the concept to procedural flexibility in the context of international dispute 
settlement.  Fundamental to this analysis is the concept that a degree of procedural 
flexibility and judicial discretion is beneficial in the context of international dispute 
settlement. This is in fact considered attractive to potential parties as it enables 
procedures to be tailored to their specific needs.  However, unbridled discretion – 
discretion and procedural flexibility without clear guidance and limits from the rules of 
the dispute settlement mechanism upon which the decision maker can base decisions 
related to the exercise of their discretion, leaves eventual opinions and decisions 
vulnerable and without sufficient support.   
  
The work then traces the historical developments of the concepts of due process, 
why it is fundamentally important and also presents and highlights complexities 
surrounding the fact that there is no universal definition of due process.  Given that 
national jurisdictions find themselves grappling with the concept of due process, 





national legislative body.  For this reason international due process requirements were 
derived based upon an overview of relevant international jurisprudence in order to 
establish a framework within which the remainder of this work could be completed.  The 
international due process requirements include: 1) a tribunal must be independent and 
impartial, 2) the parties must be given adequate notice of the proceedings, and 3) the 
parties must be given adequate opportunity to be heard and present their case.  The 
analysis of the three international dispute settlement mechanisms is conducted against 
these three components.  
 
Regarding the development of policy guidance and proposed options for the 
international community to consider when strengthening existing or creating new dispute 
settlement systems to ensure the protection of due process in the international context, the 
goal is to provide the international community with practical and effective guidance and 
options to consider.  Based upon the analysis of how the three considered dispute 
settlement mechanisms address the protection of due process, the development of 
common rules relating to discovery in an effort to ensure that all evidence is made 
available to the decision maker is identified as the primary existing gap to be addressed. 
Additional policy options developed highlight the benefits of a clearly defined 
substantive appeals mechanism and also the practice of looking to past precedent in order 
to ground future decisions.  
 
A robust evidence base is necessary for solid decision making and moving 
towards the development of common rules related to discovery in international dispute 
settlement will be an effective means to ensure that all relevant evidence is available to 
the decision maker, ensuring further that the parties enjoy protection of their full right to 
be heard and present their case.  While the UNCITRAL and ICSID have appeal processes 
limited only to procedural issues, a formalized appeals mechanism that considers 
substantive issues, similar to that of the WTO, does not exist and would provide a needed 
relief option to parties suffering from an egregious substantive arbitral error and 
demonstrates more broadly the value of policy ensuring substantive appeals in all 





making within a dispute settlement mechanism, firmly grounded on principles of 
precedent, also protect a party’s right to be heard by enabling them to prepare and 
anticipate how to best frame and present their case, argumentation and supporting 
evidence.   
 
Considering that over the last fifty years there has been a steady increase in the 
number of developing countries and parties from developing countries participating in the 
international community and in international dispute settlement, these weaker and more 
inexperienced parties will be at a disadvantage as a result of the inherent complexities 
and uncertainties around due process protections linked to tensions between maintaining 
a degree of procedural flexibility and the need for parties to effectively be heard and 
present their case.  This further heightens the need to ensure the protection of due process 
in international dispute settlement and policy options for such protections of due process 
provide a good place from which to start.   
 
Without effective protection of due process in international dispute settlement, 
the international community runs the risk of international dispute settlement becoming an 
option only for the rich, powerful and experienced. The formalization of how exactly due 
process protection should be protected is new territory and parties from developing and 
least-developed countries should watch with particular attention as the policies and 
practices relating to due process protection in the international context are further 
developed and refined.  This will by no means be fast or simple; however, it is essential 
for this issue to be put on the agenda and discussed by all.  Perhaps the consideration of 
the due process protecting policies and their application can spark such a dialogue, thus 
making a valuable contribution to this process and to the overall legitimacy of 







JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND DUE PROCESS 
Chapter 1 Judicial Discretion 
A. What is judicial discretion? 
The exercise of judicial discretion forms the core of the institutional and social functions 
known as judgment.  Discretion can be simply defined as allowing the decision maker or 
official to choose from a number of legally permissible options provided by norms within 
the rule of law.  It allows the decision maker to select among different approaches to the 
interpretation of legal theory as they feel most appropriate and provides leeway to the 
decision maker when applying well-established law to disputed circumstances or fact.  
More broadly, from an appellate perspective, judicial discretion considers the degree of 
latitude or deference afforded to lower courts during situations of judicial review.1 For 
the purposes of this work, procedural discretion will be focused on. 
Discretion must be considered from an interdisciplinary perspective and given 
the growing body of national and international regulation, jurisprudence and academic 
writing available, the degree of discretion managed by the decision maker has increased 
significantly because there is simply more information that must be considered and 
interpreted throughout the adjudication process.  Over time, legal principles have 
emerged fine-tuning due process and in certain circumstances reducing procedural 
discretion, as an example WTO panels are bound by strict rules.  However other aspects 
of discretion, including standards of proof and burden of proof decisions, nevertheless 
remain.   
Facts can be interpreted differently by officials and different legitimate outcomes 
can result from the same situation which indicates the presence of discretion.  Different 
 
1 Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and Propriety of 






outcomes can arise because different weights are attached by individuals to the relevant 
factors or because different facts are emphasized, again pointing to the existence and 
importance of discretion – all rules require interpretation and all interpretative work 
involves the exercise of discretion.2  However, legal theory is more than the analysis and 
application of a tight framework of rules.  A legislature and a court system are complex 
institutions and are more than a rule or a collection of rules; nor are these and other basic 
legal phenomena reducible to a simple union of primary and secondary rules.3  As 
important as a tight framework of rules may be, they cannot be considered the only 
“atomic” particles out of which legal theory is built.4  In order to be functional, the law 
requires the incorporation and integration of non-formal resources in its interpretation 
and application.    
There is a link between the exercise of discretion and regulatory theory in the context 
of public administration discretion which has been described by Kenneth Culp Davis, the 
American legal academic, as a public official within an administrative agency having 
“discretion whenever the effective limits of his power leave him free to make a choice 
among possible courses of action or inaction.”5 Davis was particularly concerned with the 
arbitrary use of discretion.  
The exercise of discretion has the potential to lead to the development of new law, 
new precedents and new rules where before there were different ones in place or none at 
all.  In the context of international arbitration, the more the evidentiary procedural aspects 
of a particular mechanism are left to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal, without clear 
guidance presented in the dispute settlement rules, the more the system becomes 
vulnerable to unguided tribunal discretion which can quickly lead to violations of due 
process and in turn erode legitimacy.  While international dispute settlement mechanisms 
 
2 Robert Baldwin, “Why Rules Don’t Work” (1990) 53(3) Modern Law Review 321, 321-37. 
3 Robert S. Summers, Essays in Legal Theory (New York: Kluwer, 2000) at 95-98. 
4 Id.  
5 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Primary Inquiry (Springfield: University of 





differ in nature, it is essential for each to respect and protect due process.  Moreover, for 
any guidance on the use of judicial discretion to have meaning, the protection of due 
process must be a fundamental consideration.     
While leading international dispute settlement conventions and national law in most 
developed states permit parties to agree upon the arbitral procedures, subject only to 
mandatory due process requirements, how does one know when those due process 
requirements are met? Arbitration agreements will ordinarily provide simply for 
arbitration pursuant to a set of institutional rules, which supply only a broad procedural 
framework.  Filling in the considerable gaps in this framework is left to the subsequent 
agreement of the parties or, if they cannot agree as is often the case, the discretion of 
arbitral tribunal. The arbitrators' discretion to determine the procedure must be subject to 
the requirements of due process, particularly those related to the ability of the parties to 
be adequately heard and present their case.  However, in the context of international 
dispute settlement, while there is a fundamental understanding of what due process is, 
how can it be applied in a way to guide the exercise of a tribunal’s discretion while 
maintaining flexibility? 
Judicial discretion is not a new concept.  The legal history of the United States, 
particularly regarding American constitutional theory, has consistently maintained a close 
relationship between a legal system’s exercise of judicial discretion and basic concepts of 
legitimacy that form the foundation of that system.6  This dynamic is by no means unique 
to American jurisprudence and has influenced many of the most highly developed legal 
systems throughout the world.7  Further, this connection between legitimacy and the 
exercise of guided judicial discretion must also apply to international dispute settlement 
mechanisms.   
 
 
6 As implemented in State and Territory statutes, reprinted in Marcus S. Jacobs, Commercial Arbitration Law 
& Practice (Australia: Thomson Rueters Australia, 2008) at 532. 
7 Hans Smit & Vratislav Pechota et al, “The American Review of International Arbitration”  (1994) 2 Wld. 





Tension between judges’ creative approach and the legitimacy of doctrinal written 
law is common in any domestic legal system in which for their legitimacy norms rely on 
institutions or processes that lie beyond the reach of its highest court.8  In order to 
balance these tensions, it is necessary to develop boundaries that confine the use of 
discretion to prevent overreaching which would erode the essential legitimacy of the law.  
A significant amount of constitutional legal theory in the United States is devoted to the 
debate over whether norm-articulation is a judicial function that is legitimate.  Central to 
such discussions are issues related to constitutionalism.  That is, in a system devoted to 
democratic self-governance, how is it possible that unelected judges have the authority to 
strike down legislation created by the duly-elected legislature – the official voice of the 
majority population?9   
 
International jurisprudence does not face this concern as its jurists do not exercise 
judicial discretion so as to invalidate some foundational legitimizing text as such 
document does not exist.  While countries have national constitutions that are supreme 
domestically, there is not a single agreed upon international constitution containing 
written international law developed by a single set of elected international legislators.  In 
an international setting, a broad variety of customary law is heavily relied upon as are 
internationally negotiated treaties.  When set against the backdrop of the various legal 
traditions that exist throughout the world, the interpretation of international law and its’ 
intent rapidly becomes complex. 
B. Equity as justification for the exercise of judicial discretion 
Discretion left to the tribunal is not inherently negative but helps to bring about equitable 
results as it enables a consideration of the facts rather than the simple application of a 
fixed rule; however, unbridled discretion – discretion without clear guidance and limits 
from the rules of the dispute settlement mechanism upon which the tribunal can base 
 
8 Extra sources may include statutes enacted by an elected legislature, written constitutions, the proclamations 
of an absolute monarch.  In all cases, there is some tension when the judge, who is not a legislature, attempts 
to fill gaps in the law through the exercise of his own reasoning. 





decisions related to their discretion - leaves the eventual opinion without necessary 
support.  Equity underlying the exercise of judicial discretion goes a long way in 
providing justification; however, as there is no clear and fixed definition to what is 
equitable for every situation ambiguity remains.  Equity is however an essential 
component to the acceptability of any legal system and without the ability to rely upon 
equity, justice systems have the potential to abuse their authority and legitimacy may be 
undermined.   
Over time accepted equitable principles, or the common law maxims of equity, 
emerged as an addition to both Roman law and to the English common law based on the 
need to refine or correct the body of civil law through practice.  In Roman law equity was 
administered through the magistrates, advised by the judges, in issuing edicts 
supplementing or correcting the body of civil law.10  As an example, equity supplemented 
civil law by supporting the practice of granting remedies to persons who did not have 
rights of action ordinarily at civil law.  A widow of a man who dies intestate leaving no 
blood relatives was allowed through the application of the maxims of equity to claim her 
late husband’s property although she was not his heir.11   
Equity is not easy to define with specific particularity.  The Tribunal in the United 
States-Norway Arbitration in 1922 defined equity to include general principles of justice 
as distinguished from any particular system of jurisprudence or the municipal law of any 
State.12  Equity can further be considered as an aspect of fairness that is fundamental 
when seeking to do justice when considering the facts of a particular case.  Equity 
inherently implies fairness, equality, and impartiality where the law’s function is to 
ensure order and security in a certain context while taking into consideration several 
elements, including justice.  Equity essentially serves as an access port for religions, 
ethical moral and philosophical considerations when interpreting, completing and 
overruling the rigidity of the existing law.  Further, actions in an attempt to secure equity 
 
10 R P Meagher, J D Heydon & M J Leeming (eds) Meagher, Gummow and Lehane Equity 
Doctrines and remedies (Butterworths, 4th ed, 2002) at 978-80. 
11 Id.  
12 This was the definition of the phrase “law and equity” used by the Tribunal in the United States-





may be viewed as measures intended to reduce the gap between law and justice in a 
specific case.13 Equity is therefore a fundamental principle in any form of dispute 
settlement when seeking to deal with human conduct and the specific facts of a particular 
situation.  Equity and the exercise of judicial discretion are closely intertwined in that 
equity requires an active judicial role which is based upon the use of discretion in either 
completing or even altering existing law in the pursuit of justice and fairness.14 
With respect to providing a degree of justification for the exercise of judicial 
discretion, equity can be distinguished into three different types: 1) equity infra legem, 2) 
equity praeter legem, and 3) equity contra legem.15 Equity infra legem is the form of 
equity which constitutes a method of interpretation of the law in force or the equity used 
to adapt the law to the facts of an individual case.16 In contrast is equity praeter legem 
which is the form of equity used to justify the filling of gaps in the law, or more precisely 
used “not … with a view to filling a social gap in law, but … in order to remedy the 
insufficiencies of international law …”17 Equity contra legem is equity used in derogation 
from the law in an effort to remedy social inadequacies of the law.18 All three types of 
equity contribute to the justification of the exercise of judicial discretion and are part of 
the legal process, informing the law’s interpretation by taking recourse to objective 
factors and criteria, yet remaining short of formalization and dogmatism, in deciding 
individual cases.  Given its dependence on particular circumstances, equity continues to 
mean different things in different contexts.  Each circumstance must be assessed on its 
own merits.   However, the risk of subjectivism and legal uncertainty in the recourse to 
equity is apparent and amounts to a main argument in favour of per se rules and concerns 
 
13 Ruth Lapidoth, Equity in International Law, American Society of International Law, Vol. 81 
(April 8-11, 1987), pp. 138-147. 
14 Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for 
Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge University Press 2015.  
15 Vaughan Lowe, The Role of Equity in International Law, 4 AUYrBkIntLaw (1989) at 56. 
16 Lapidoth at 142. 
17 Taken from the separate judgment of Judge Ammoun in the Barcelona Traction case (Second 
Phase), ICJ Rep 1970, p 3. 
18 Taken from the separate judgment of Judge Ammouon in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 





around the potential for the unbridled use of discretion.  To what extend does the recourse 
to equity undermine predictability?       
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which mandates the 
sources of law to be applied by the Court was derived from Article 35 of the Statute of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice and was incorporated as follows: 
1. The court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
The understanding of the drafters of Article 38 seems to have been that equity itself was 
not an independent source of law because it was too vague a concept for universal 
acceptance as to its interpretation but that particular equitable principles, common law 
maxims of equity, as recognized within legal systems throughout the world might play a 
role as general principles of international law.19  While ‘maxims of equity’ would have 
been acceptable, Lord Phillimore opposed the inclusion of equity generally as a source of 
law on the basis that it would give the judge too much liberty, unless the technical 
meaning of equity as understood in English law was adopted.20 The framers did not offer 
clarification as to the meaning of ‘general principles’ and whether common law maxims 
of equity should be considered as a general principle of international law.  What emerged 
 
19 P van Dijk, ‘Equity: a Recognized Manifestation of International Law?’ in M Bos and W Heere 
(eds) International law and its Sources (Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1989) 1, 11. 





in the final text of Article 38 left a degree of vagueness but accommodated the common 
lawyers’ concern that the judge should not have a law creating role and the civil lawyers’ 
concern that there might occur a denial of justice because of a declaration of there being a 
lack of law to apply. 21 Despite evidence that the maxims of equity are applied broadly, 
the characterization of equity as a ‘general principle’ of law remains unclear and 
therefore places constraints on its actual application and operation.     
 
C. Rise of international dispute settlement 
Increased globalization of business and expansion of international trade have led to a 
paradigmatic shift in the way international disputes are resolved.  Over the last fifty 
years, hundreds of bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements have been drafted and 
various international conferences convened to address the variety of issues raised by 
world commerce and disputes arising from cross border trade.  As an example, cross-
border commercial disputes between private companies were most often resolved in the 
national courts of one party’s home country.  This approach tended to disfavor the other 
party where the partiality of judge’s toward the domestic party was often clear, or where 
the foreign party lacked a neutral forum.  Further, the resolution of cross-border disputes 
within one party’s national courts sometimes resulted in the inability to enforce these 
court’s awards abroad. This inherently problematic nature of resolving international 
business disputes domestically led to a search for a better approach.  In the subsequent 
decades, multi-national businesses began to realize that the global transformation of trade 
and economics needed a parallel transformation in the world’s dispute resolution systems.   
Often the procedural conduct of international dispute settlement proceedings is the 
main factor that leads parties to agree to submit their disputes to a particular international 
dispute settlement mechanism.  Generally, parties agree to submit their international 
disputes to a mechanism with the objective of obtaining fair and neutral procedures 
which are flexible, efficient, and capable of being tailored to the specific needs of their 
 
21 Clarence Wilfred Jenks, The prospects of international adjudication, law of international 





individual dispute.  Of particular interest to potential parties tends to be the fact that the 
dispute settlement proceeds without reference to the formalities and technicalities of 
procedural rules of national courts.22  
While leading international dispute settlement conventions and sometimes even 
national arbitration legislation address the content of the procedures that are used in 
international dispute settlement, they adopt the basic principle of national judicial non-
interference in the conduct of the international dispute settlement proceedings.23  This 
principle is essential in that it ensures that the case can proceed, pursuant to the 
agreement of the parties or under the direction of the tribunal, without the delays, second-
guessing, and other issues associated with national interlocutory judicial review of 
procedural decisions.24  
D. Tribunal discretion to determine arbitral procedures 
 
Leading international arbitration conventions confirm the tribunal's power, in the absence 
of agreement by the parties, to determine the arbitral procedures.  Article IV(4)(d) of the 
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 which considers 
 
22 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration – Second Edition, Three Volume Set 
(London: Wolters Kluwer, 2014) at 64-94.  (discussing parties' objectives upon entering 
international arbitration agreements). Not all international arbitrations are necessarily designed to 
achieve every one of these objectives. For example, arbitrations may be conducted in one party's 
home jurisdiction, pursuant to the domestic procedural rules of that jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in 
most instances, parties enter into international commercial arbitration agreements with the 
objective of achieving all or most of these ends. 
23 Ibid at 414 (noting that parties get to select their procedural law by agreement); Emmanuel 
Gaillard & Philippe Pinsolle, “Advocacy in International Commercial Arbitration: France” in R. 
Doak Bishop, The Art of Advocacy in International Arbitration (Juris, March 2004) at 133 
("International arbitration ... gives the parties and their counsels the widest possible range of 
options."); Georgios Petrochilos, Procedural Law in International Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) ("Modern law affords arbitrating parties and arbitral tribunals wide 
freedom to fashion the procedural rules of the proceedings."); Robert Pietrowski, “Evidence in 
International Arbitration” (2006)  22 Arb. Int'l 373, 374 ("The procedure of most international 
tribunals is characterized by an absence of restrictive rules governing the form, submission and 
admissibility of evidence."). 






the freedoms of the parties to organize the arbitration, provides that, where the parties 
have not agreed upon arbitral procedures, the tribunal may "establish directly or by 
reference to the rules and statutes of a permanent arbitral institution the rules of 
procedure to be followed by the arbitrator(s) ... ."25  
The Inter-American Convention also expressly recognizes the arbitral tribunal's 
procedural authority, although indirectly, providing in Article 3 that, "in the absence of 
an express agreement between the parties, the arbitration shall be conducted in 
accordance with the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration 
Commission."26 Further, Article 15 of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration 
Commission ("IACAC") Rules grants the arbitrators broad procedural authority, subject 
only to requirements of due process.27  
The New York Convention refers less directly to the arbitral tribunal's power to 
determine the arbitral procedures. The Convention makes no direct reference to the 
tribunal's authority to conduct the proceedings, it only indirectly acknowledges such 
powers in Articles V(1)(b) and (d).28 At the same time, Article II(3) of the Convention 
requires giving effect to the parties' agreement to arbitrate, an express or implied 
authorization to the arbitrators to conduct the arbitral proceedings as they deem best 
(absent contrary agreement by the parties on specific matters).29  
 
25 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961, art. IV(4)(d). 
26 Inter-American Convention, art. 3. 
27 Inter-Am. Commercial Arbitration Comm'n  R., art. 12(a) (2002), available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22093 ("Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct 
the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with 
equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of 
presenting his case."). 
28 New York Convention, arts. V(1)(b), V(1)(d) (stating that both Article V(1)(b) and V(1)(d) of 
the New York Convention provide grounds for non-recognition of an award that presuppose the 
tribunal's power to determine arbitral procedures in the absence of agreement by the parties). See 
also Born supra note 5 at 2737-77. 





Even where a tribunal's procedural authority is not expressly recognized in 
applicable international conventions, the internationally-recognized status of such 
authority over procedure is clear. An inherent characteristic of the international dispute 
settlement process is the tribunal's adjudicative role and responsibility for establishing 
and implementing the procedures necessary to resolve the parties' dispute. Submitting to 
a tribunal's procedural authority is an implicit part of the parties' agreement to arbitrate30 
and is an indispensable precondition for an effective arbitral process. Accordingly, just as 
Article II of the New York Convention, and equivalent provisions of other international 
arbitration conventions, guarantee the parties' procedural autonomy,31 these conventions 
also guarantee the tribunal's authority over the arbitral procedures (absent contrary 
agreement).  
 
30 Most institutional arbitration rules expressly provide the arbitral tribunal discretion to establish 
the arbitral procedures (absent agreement between the parties). See also Petrochilos supra note 6, 
at 450 (analyzing the arbitral tribunal's procedural discretion under international arbitration 
conventions). This authority forms part of the parties' arbitration agreement and is entitled to 
recognition under Article II of the Convention 





Consistent with the New York Convention, most developed national legal 
systems provide the dispute settlement tribunal with substantial discretion to establish the 
procedures in the absence of agreement between the parties, subject only to general due 
process requirements. Article 19(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, for example, 
provides that, where agreement has not been reached by the parties on dispute settlement 
procedures, "the arbitral tribunal may ... conduct the arbitration in such a manner as it 
considers appropriate."32 French, Swiss, and other civil law arbitration statutes are 
similar,33 as is contemporary arbitration legislation in much of Asia34 and Latin 
America.35  
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not provide any 
basic principles of arbitral procedure or procedural framework that the decision-makers 
might consider or that the parties may deviate from; as such, the Act effectively leaves all 
issues of procedure entirely to the parties and arbitrators.36  Although the FAA does not 
 
32 UNCITRAL, Model Law, art. 19(2). As discussed below, Article 19(2) limits the tribunal's 
powers by reference to the "provisions of this Law," which includes Article 18's requirements that 
the parties be treated "with equality" and be given a "full opportunity of presenting [their] cases." 
See also supra note 6. 
33 See, e.g., Federal Statute on Private International Law Dec. 18, 1987, RS 291, art. 182(2) 
(Switz.) ("If the parties have not determined the procedure, the Arbitral Tribunal shall determine it 
to the extent necessary, either directly or by reference to a statute or to rules of arbitration."); 
Decree No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], p. 1398, reprinted in N.C.P.C. arts. 1494, 1460 (Fr.) 
34 See, e.g., Arbitration Law, art. 26(2) (Japan) ("Failing such agreement [between the parties], the 
arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law, conduct the arbitral proceedings in 
such manner as it considers appropriate."); Arbitration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 39 (P.R.C.), translated at 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?id=710 (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) ("An arbitration 
tribunal shall hold oral hearings to hear a case. Whereas the parties concerned agree not to hold 
oral hearings, the arbitration tribunal may give the award based on the arbitration application, 
claims and counter-claims and other documents"); International Arbitration Act, § 3(1) (Sing.); 
Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, No. 341, art. 34C(1) (1990), available at 
http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/ord/341. 
35 See, e.g., Codigo de Comercio [Cod. Com] [Mexican Commercial Code], art. 1435(2) (Mex.); 
International Commercial Arbitration Law, R. No. 19.971, art. 19(2) (2004) (Chile). 





expressly address the subject, U.S. courts have uniformly held that arbitrators possess 
broad powers to determine arbitral procedures (absent agreement on such matters by the 
parties).37 As one U.S. court held: 
Unless a mode of conducting the proceedings has been prescribed by the 
arbitration agreement or submission, or regulated by statute, arbitrators have a 
general discretion as to the mode of conducting the proceedings and are not 
bound by formal rules of procedure and evidence, and the standard of review of 
arbitration procedures is merely whether a party to an arbitration has been denied 
a fundamentally fair hearing [the protection of due process].38  
Particularly after the 1996 Arbitration Act, English law39, and other common law 
jurisdictions,40 follow similarly.   
 The above demonstrates that international dispute settlement tribunals are 
empowered to and should use their discretion to fill in the gaps with respect to 
procedures, subject only to the requirement that a party’s due process be protected.  
However, there is little guidance linking international concepts of due process to what 
specific procedural aspects should be included in the adjudication of an international case 
to protect a party’s due process.  If judicial discretion is important to international dispute 
 
37 Berhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); D.E.I., Inc. v. Ohio and Vicinity 
Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 155 Fed. App'x 164, 170 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Arbitrators are not bound 
by formal rules of procedure and evidence, and the standard for judicial review of arbitration 
procedures is merely whether a party to arbitration has been denied a fundamentally fair hearing.") 
38 In re Turnkey Arbitration, 577 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (1991). 
39 Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 34(1) (Eng.) ("It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural 
and evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter."); ABB Attorney 
General v. Hochtief Airport GmbH, [2006] EWHC 388, P 67 (Comm.) (Eng.) ("It is not a ground 
for intervention that the court considers that it might have done things differently."); Petroships 
Pte Ltd of Singapore v. Petec Trading & Inv. Corp. of Vietnam (The Petro Ranger) [2001] 2 
EWHC 418, 419 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (award may be annulled under § 68(2)(a) only "where it can be said 
that what has happened is so far removed from what can reasonably be expected of the arbitral 
process, that the Court will take action"). 
40 Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C., c. 17, § 19(2) (1985) (Can.) ("Failing such agreement, the 
arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Code, conduct the arbitration in such manner 
as it considers appropriate. The power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal includes the power to 





settlement, grounded only by due process concerns, in the international context what are 
the components that make up due process? What specific procedures are necessary to 
ensure that due process is protected?     
 
E. American Originalist and Responsivist opposing views on  
exercising judicial discretion 
 
American constitutional scholars have attempted to address the use of judicial discretion 
and Christopher Tiedeman, writing over a century ago, developed the concept that judges 
should not have the ability to interpret the positions they hold to be drafters of 
constitutional law in a way that keeps the foundational law consistent with the 
“prevailing sense of right” of the nation.41  Considering “the present will of the people as 
the living source of law,” Tiedeman wrote that judges are “obliged, in construing the law, 
to follow, and give effect to, the present intentions and meaning of the people” be it with 
respect to the exercise of judicial discretion in interpreting the substance of the law or 
relating to the use of judicial discretion in the interpretation of procedural rules of law.42  
In this significant statement, Tiedeman pushes himself into the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty.  The counter-majoritian difficulty becomes an issue when judicial discretion 
and review empowers a Court to nullify the popular, yet unconstitutional, decisions of the 
legislature.  In presenting the concept that judges can strike down laws for 
unconstitutionality, Tiedeman attains justification in the claim that judges can discern the 
difference between the people’s “whim” and there genuine “will,” therefore striking 
down the former but affirming those of the latter.43   
 In line with Tiedman’s approach, former US Supreme Court Justice William 
Brennan agreed that constitutions should be “living documents” that are able to change 
 
41 Christopher G. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States (1890) at 49.  See 
also Jed Rubenfeld, “Reading the Constitution as Spoken” (March 1995) 104 Yale L.J. 55. 
42 Tiedman supra note 24 at 154. 






with the times “to cope with current problems and current needs.”44  This line of 
reasoning is based on the responsive school of US Constitutional thought.45  Justice 
Brennan continued to root the legitimacy of judicial review in the justices’ responsibility 
to shape the national ethos of the future, to “point toward a different path … [and] 
embody a community, although perhaps not yet arrived, striving for human dignity for 
all.”46    Responsivists view judicial discretion as the method to appropriately embrace the 
changing will of the people.  This flexible view, however, is but one side to this debate 
and grapples with the issue of constitutional self-government: even should the future be 
somehow predictable, how can judges justify ignoring the present?47 
 In contrast, the late US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia agreed with the 
originalist view, which sees judicial review of the present popular will as grounded in an 
appeal to some automatic consent of the “people” in the past, namely at the time when 
the original constitution was founded.  Originalists argue that any interpretation that 
moves away from the original meaning of the constitution at the time of its original 
ratification, no matter how slight, is nothing less than tyranny and is the imposition of 
judges’ personal views upon the independent rights of the people.48  According to 
originalists, the people enshrined their supreme will in the constitutional text and until 
this document is officially amended, it must constrain the policy-activism of judges in the 
same way it requires ordinary legislative acts not to cross the boundaries it sets up.49  
Originalists argue that the proper function of a constitutional court is to ensure that the 
sovereign will of the people is enforced as expressed in the ratified constitution, while 
 
44 William J. Brennan, “The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification” (1985) 
27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433, 438. 
45 Robert Post, “Theories of Constitutional Interpretation” (1991) 30 Representations 13, 19. 
46 Brennan, supra note 27 at 444. 
47 Ibid.   
48 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: Touchstone, 1990) 144-46, 252. 
49 Christopher A. Ford, “Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(C) and 





leaving anything else not expressly included therein to self-rule by the modern majority.50  
The modern and changing opinion of the people does not matter to originalists until the 
people of today feel motivated to take it upon themselves to formally amend their 
constitution or founding document.  However, it is not easy for originalists to escape the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty in that their emphasis upon the importance of majority 
self-government, which they feel is a result from judges’ imposition of value judgments, 
focuses inquiry on how the “plain meaning” of the constitution can be enforced against 
the will of today’s majority.  Amending the constitution is the singular way, according to 
originalists; however, constitutional amendment is difficult to attain.51  In the opinion of 
the originalists, judicial discretion should be extremely limited and not venture beyond 
the intent of the founding fathers until the Constitution is amended to reflect any 
necessary changes.     
 The ongoing American debates between originalists and responsivists 
demonstrate continuing challenges with the theoretical legitimacy of judicial review and 
the exercise of judicial discretion particularly in norm-articulation, within the scope of 
written constitutionalism.52  Moreover, disagreements with respect to the role of judicial 
discretion are not limited only to American constitutional law.  While the common law 
tradition does accept the judicial role in the elaboration of sub-constitutional legal 
norms,53 countries that follow a civil law approach such as France, are often challenged 
with a judge’s creative role in the legal system.54 Given the subjective nature around the 
exercise of judicial discretion, in common law or civil law jurisdictions, these challenges 
remain when issues relating to the interpretation of due process and procedure are 
encountered.  
 
50 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175-76 (1803), finding constitutional authority in authorship 
by the People; Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 308 (1795). 
51 Akhil Amar, “Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V” (1988) 55 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043, 1080-85. 
52 See cases in note 20. 
53 Debates between “legal realists” and “positivists” illustrate the struggle in common law 
countries over the propriety of a self-assertive judicial role in law-creation.  





F. A closer look at how judicial discretion works: The Barakian Model 
The work of Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak55 on the use of judicial 
discretion is interesting to consider at this point because it highlights inherent difficulties 
in applying judicial discretion and provides a framework against which to consider the 
actual thought process conducted when judges are confronted with situations where they 
must appropriately use their discretion.  The basic assumption of Barak’s 1989 
consideration of the application of judicial discretion is that from time to time judges and 
courts encounter what Barak considers to be a “hard case.”  In such situations “the judge 
is faced with a number of [outcome] possibilities, all of which are lawful within the 
context of the system”56 and he must use his discretion to determine the most appropriate 
solution.  In what Barak calls “easy” and even “intermediate” cases, there is a possibility 
for rules of law with long acceptance to be applied in a way that, “every lawyer who 
belongs to a legal community… will come to [a particular] conclusion – that only one 
lawful solution exists – such that if a judge were to decide otherwise, the community’s 
reaction would be that he was mistaken.”57  
 According to Barak, judicial discretion only exists because of the presence of 
“hard” cases58 and he defines discretion as “the power given to a person with authority to 
choose between two or more alternatives, when each of the alternatives is lawful.”59  Two 
or more equally legitimate holdings are presented by hard cases to the decision maker and 
no single option can be clearly held out as the correct answer under the law as understood 
 
55 Christopher A. Ford, “Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(C) and 
General Principles of Law,” (Fall 1994) 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 35 at 40. 
56 Aharon Barak, “Judicial Discretion Yadin Kaufmann trans, 1989” (2002) 116 Harv. L. Rev. 19.  
See also B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1931) Yale Law School, 165-67. 
57 Ibid at 39. 
58 Barak borrows the term “hard cases” from Ronald Dworkin, see Ronald Dworkin, “Taking 
Rights Seriously” (1977) 52 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1265 at 1268.  See Barak, supra note 39 at 28-33. 





up to that point in time.  These cases, while rare, do require and make possible the use of 
judicial discretion.60  According to Barak, judicial discretion therefore is: 
A legal condition in which the judge has the freedom to choose among a number 
of options.  Where judicial discretion exists, it is a though the law were saying, “I 
have determined the contents of the legal norm up to this point.  From here on, it 
is for you, the judge, to determine the contents of the legal norm, for I, the legal 
system, am now unable to tell you which solution to choose.”  It is as though the 
path of the law came to a junction, and the judge must decide – with no clear path 
and precise standard to guide him – which road to take.61    
 In order to find an answer to the question: “How is a judge properly to exercise 
judicial discretion?” Barak has developed a test to consider “objectivity.” Any judge must 
reasonably apply and interpret the use of discretion so as to reach the result most in line 
with the legal system’s values as a whole while balancing the conflicting values 
presented and formulating a new judicial policy by articulating a new norm.62  While the 
judge must obviously make this decision in isolation, this decision must be made on a 
basis that is separate and distinct from the judge’s own values.  According to Barak, a 
judge must transition himself away from his personal position as “the judge” to embrace 
the perspective of “the court,” a process which should enable him to determine the 
reasonable application of the standards of the legal community from a whole of society 
approach. 
For the judge to be able to determine values which accurately represent society, 
he must look to the members of the society to give him clues to identify values that are 
shared and truly representational, even if they are not in line with his own opinions.  He 
must not impose upon the society his subjective values, to the extent that they are 
inconsistent with the articles of faith of the society in which he lives.  When it comes 
time for the judge to weigh various values according to their instant utility, he should 
 
60 Ibid at 41-42. 






seek to do so according to what seems to him to be society’s fundamental approach.63  
While Barak’s approach to the consideration of the proper use of judicial discretion is 
innovative and useful, there remain four significant challenges that must be overcome 
before this approach can be successfully applied to any situation: 
1. The problem of stepping outside one’s self 
First, there is the difficulty of actually achieving the personal perspective 
required to properly perform judicial discretion.  While a judge’s objectivity and freedom 
from external influence is highly prized and protected by legal systems, the judge’s 
ability to step “outside himself” is particularly limited and challenging in that he cannot, 
in actuality, become another person.64  Admitting that complete success is impossible, 
Barak still finds value in the attempt: 
If the judge is not aware that judicial discretion exists, he will not make any 
conscious effort to distinguish between his own out-of-the-ordinary subjective 
feelings and the need to make an objective decision … Awareness of the exercise 
of discretion puts the judge on guard and makes it possible for him to cut himself 
off from those subjective factors that he should not take into account.65 
Should the judge be unable to attain the full nature of exercising discretionary judgment, 
the judge would be invited to impose his own substantive values upon the legal system … 
even unknowingly. 
2. The problem of identifying cases requiring discretion 
A challenge is posed when the task of determining which cases are genuinely hard is 
undertaken.  Mistaking an intermediate or easy case for a hard one would result in a 
significant error as a judge would undertake, unnecessarily, all the pitfalls of Barak’s 
objectivity analysis, and could likely reach an incorrect result.  Mistaking a hard case for 
 
63 Ibid at 125-126. 
64 The US Constitution in Article III provides for great independence of judges from political 
pressure by giving them life tenure and salary protection.  See US Const., art. III, 1. 





an easier one would be to decide a genuinely discretionary issue in simple ignorance and 
such a result might not do justice in the instant case.  The doctrine of equity may provide 
guidance here.  If the judge blindly and fully applies the law the result may be unjust.  All 
legal systems encounter the problem that rules and principles which were shaped in the 
past may no longer be suitable for achieving justice under changing conditions and moral 
and ethical attitudes and perceptions change as society evolves.  In the interest of 
ensuring an equitable outcome, the judge may wish to use discretion and in this manner 
use the flexibility which the law contains so as to lead to a just conclusion.    
In contrast, according to Barak, individuals, no matter how astute, “do not possess an 
instrument that lets us distinguish in a precise manner between a lawful possibility and an 
unlawful possibility” and Barak argues that there still exists, in these categories, “a solid 
nucleus of certainty… [around which] rotates the entire structure, with all its broad 
spectrum.”66  Barak’s formulation provides however a practical structure around which 
judges can frame their approach to an issue involving discretion.67  While a judge 
following the Barak model might easily continue on to make a mistake, nothing is 
perfect, a judge who is willfully unaware that hard cases requiring discretion even exist 
would fall short every time.  
3. The problem of finding the “fundamental” conception 
A substantial challenge is that of identifying the “fundamental conception” of the legal 
community.  This is consistent with the reasoning of Tiedeman that judges have the 
ability to determine and distinguish the genuine popular “will,” which a judge must obey, 
and transitory popular “whim,” which may be disregarded.68  On this point, Barak writes: 
The objective tests force the judge to give expression to the fundamental values 
of the society and not to its subjective values, to the extent the two are different.  
The objective element does not require the judge to give expression to the 
 
66 Ibid at 43. 
67 Ibid at 136-137. 





temporary and the fleeting.  He must give expression to the central and the basic.  
Thus, when a given society is not faithful to itself, the objective test does not 
mean the judge must give expression to the mood of the hour.  He must stand 
firm against this mood, while expressing the basic values of the society in which 
he lives.69 
But how can this be achieved? For a decision maker to “step outside” himself 
requires  significantly less than what would be required for that decision maker to “step 
outside” the immediate currents and scope of  his legal system in order to identify a 
greater scheme representing values perhaps contradicting those presently held and 
articulated through the voice of a community.  This is the case in part because of the need 
to make the distinction between values that are transient in nature from those values that 
are basic and considered “fundamental” to a society.  Any decision maker attempting to 
apply the guidelines of  Barak cannot simply “conduct a public opinion survey to 
ascertain the views of the legal community.  Each judge must make this decision for 
himself … [in order to] give expression to what appears to him to be the basic conception 
of the society (the community) in which he lives and acts.”70  This undertaking is 
extremely complex and challenging, particularly when considering a society in which the 
fundamental legal values change and develop over time. 
This particular issue creates the basis for the criticism presented by Justice Scalia and 
others about enabling courts to “speak before all others for [the people’s] constitutional 
ideals.”71  According to Scalia, “community” norm-articulation results in nothing more 
than judges imposing their personal values72 upon an unwilling and even unknowing 
society.73   
4. The problem of value sub-communities 
 
69 Barak, supra note 39 at 130. 
70 Ibid at 12. 
71 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992). 
72 Wells, supra note 37 at 251-252. 





Even in the event that the contours of the relevant legal community were able to be 
clearly articulated, in societies where values do develop and shift as time passes, a judge 
faces the possibility not simply that the values of the moment might traduce more 
fundamental values, but also that his community may lie somewhere along a continuum 
between one fundamental vision and the next.  This, Barak explains, demands particular 
care from the judge: 
The judge must not feed into his system values that have not yet matured nor 
values that are the subject of bitter controversy.  In this way one can ensure that 
the values of the legal system faithfully reflect the values of the society, and that 
only a mature change of the values of the society produces a change in the legal 
values.  Thereby the coherence of the legal system will be guaranteed, for new 
values that are channeled into the legal system have a way of being formulated 
slowly, through reciprocal relations and strong connections with the values that 
already exist in the system.74 
According to Barak a judge must be aware of the fundamental problems that lie at the 
basis of the exercise of judicial discretion.  Barak has identified three different types of 
awareness of the legal decision maker: 1) awareness of the existence of judicial 
discretion; 2) awareness of what it means to use judicial discretion; and 3) awareness of 
the need to formulate the purpose behind a legal norm created through judicial 
discretion.75 
Justice Barak's objectivity test requires that a  judge "give expression to what 
appears to him to be the basic conception of the society (the community) in which he 
lives and acts."76  This can cause great difficulty, however, when the legal community in 
question is not easily separated on a particular issue or where no clear values can be 
easily presented. 
 
74 Barak, supra note 39 at 151. 
75 Ibid at 136. 





 Each judge must seek to identify the boundaries of the community within which 
they are mandated to act as well as the characteristics of their community.  In the 
American legal system, these boundaries might be a particular state, a particular Federal 
Circuit, or the United States as a whole.  Though the boundaries of a particular 
community might be clear, greater difficulties are encountered as the defined community 
grows larger.  The greater and more diverse the population falling inside the community, 
the greater the likelihood diverging values on a particular issue.  It therefore becomes 
increasingly difficult for the judge to identify a basic conception capable of guiding his 
articulation of a new legal norm.   
 These problems become most acute in the setting of international dispute 
settlement.  The ICJ, for example, has a jurisdictional constituency encompassing 
virtually all of humanity and the value-diversity within its legal community can be 
extreme.77    
G. Enforcement of judicial discretion internationally  
A fundamental difference between domestic and international settings is the degree of 
influence the system provides to jurists to give force to their decisions.  Domestic courts 
are particularly advantaged in this respect because they have the luxury to rely on the 
state to utilize its police powers to enforce the law as proclaimed by the courts in their 
opinions.78 No such enforcement mechanism exists in the international context.    
With respect to judicial discretion, the concept that judges play a role in 
developing jurisprudence is widely accepted and were gaps should be found in settled 
law, it is for the court to fill those gaps.79  In Swiss law, for example, the judge is 
expected to provide law to cover such an eventuality as if he were the legislature80, while 
 
77 Christopher A. Ford, “Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(C) and 
General Principles of Law,” (Fall 1994) 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 35 at 81. 
78 Ibid at 54. 
79 International law attempts to deal with this problem by authorizing the ICJ to invoke general 
principles under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the Court. 





Austrian law authorizes recourse to the "national principles of justice,81" and Italian and 
Mexican law suggest turning to the general principles of the legal order of the state.82  
Further, these formal gap filling provisions are not uncommon in other jurisdictions and 
in common law jurisdictions, the law-creating role of the courts is well understood. 
These above-mentioned broad powers of the state to enforce the decisions of the 
domestic court are not available to international dispute settlement tribunals.  There are 
no government enforcers of international law and the international legal system has no 
monopoly or coercive power of the sort held by domestic governments.  In fact, actors in 
the international arena often find that they are forced to apply coercive powers 
themselves in a form of "self-help," rather than through any type of central authority on 
their behalf.83  In this environment, the international judge can only rely on persuasive 
power for the enforcement of his judgments and this places constraints upon his exercise 
of judicial discretion, and even upon the adjudication of intermediate and easy cases.   
An international tribunal, unable to rely upon a compelling institutional means of 
enforcing the law developed by it, faces significant challenges.  The law, in this 
international setting, will be followed only to the degree that the international judge can 
present his case so that it is logically and morally compelling.  Further, the judge must 
strive to make perceived disadvantages of non-compliance significantly substantial so 
that governments will not simply disregard the international dispute settlement decision.84  
While most nations do obey most international decisions most of the time, this limited 
enforceability makes the exercise of judicial discretion particularly delicate.   
 
81 Allgemeines Buergerliches  Gesetzbuch art. 7 (Aus.). 
82 Codice civile art. 12 (Italy); Codigo Civil para el Distrito Federal 19 (Mex.). Section 370ª of the 
Mexican Code also refers to such "general principles." 
83 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in the World Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
84 Thomas Franck, “The Power of Legitimacy and The Legitimacy of Power” (2006) 100 





Without a formalized legislature in the international context, international 
"statutory" law is very limited,85 and consists only of the body of written treaty and 
convention texts which nations of the world have been able to agree upon.  Customary 
international law, a normative source also explicitly endorsed by the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice,86 may provide useful guidance.  However, customary 
international law's ability to create generally applicable norms is constrained by the need 
not only to demonstrate a clear customary practice not reduced by non-observance, but by 
the possibility that "persistent objector" status could limit obligations upon any particular 
state.  Further, if customary law is to be taken as "evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law," international actors will decide to follow the rule because they believe it a 
legitimate and binding rule, and for no other reason.87   
Complicating the matter, Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ limits potential 
reliance upon judicial precedents that are international in scope.  In following this view, 
"judicial decisions" are relegated to the status of mere "subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law" and have no more importance than the mere opinions of 
legal scholars.88  In any event, Article 38 does still permit prior ICJ case law to constitute 
a formal "source of law."  More difficult to handle is Article 59 of the Statute of the 
Court, which explicitly provides that a decision of the ICJ "has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case."89  The clear terms of Article 59 
appear to "preclude the Court from adopting any doctrine similar to the Anglo-American 
doctrine of stare decisis."90  In applying general rules of law to particular cases, it is 
 
85 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 
B, 1179, 1187. 
86 Ibid at art. 38, 1(b) (authorizing recourse to international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law). 
87 Louis Henkin, et al., International Law: Cases and Materials: American Casebook , 2d ed. (London: 
Waterstones, 1978) 37-40. 
88 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat. 1055,1060, 3 
Bevans 1179, 1187. 
89 Ibid at art. 59 






inevitable that that the Court should perform a law-developing function.  Over the course 
of time, and because of the jurisdictional continuity of the ICJ, a sizable body of case-law 
has accumulated which is "a tangible contribution to the development and clarification of 
the rules and principles of international law."91           
          
I. Deriving customary and international law 
What are the general principles of international law?  When there is no provision in an 
international treaty or statute or any recognized customary principle of international law 
available for application in an international dispute, the general principles of law can be 
used to fill the gaps.   
Commonly, reference to the language of applicable multilateral or bilateral treaties or 
statutes is a way of resolving disputes under the rule of law.  Another method is by 
reference to custom, the practice of nations in a particular area forms customary 
international law and principles of law can be derived as such.   
In the municipal law systems of countries with a common law tradition, judges often 
look to the decisions from outside sources to fill the gaps of the law to be applied in the 
resolution of a particular case.  As an example, the state courts in the United States often 
cite the decisions of other state courts in the course of on opinion in a case, where the 
needed legal rule of the deciding state is absent or unclear.  Similarly, the United States 
Supreme Court has recently adopted the practice of using the decisions of courts of other 
countries and international courts for their persuasive value in clarifying unclear rules to 
be applied in a case.   
In civil law countries, as Professor Mark Janis of the University of Connecticut Law 
School notes in his An Introduction to International Law: 
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[L]awyers and judges in the civil law tradition are familiar with the problem of 
lacunae, gaps in the law, a concept based on the premise that only formal legislative 
institutions are empowered to make legal rules. 
Therefore, judges in civil law jurisdictions need statutory authority to fill in the gaps 
of the legislatively created legal rules and this relates back to the concept of equity as a 
general principle of law as discussed above.  Fortunately for the international judge or the 
domestic judge faced with applying international law in a particular case, Article 38(1) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides some guidance on how an 
international decision-maker should go about determining what international law to rely 
on by clarifying that a court should consider: 
1. International conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; 
2. International custom, evidenced of a general practice accepted as law; 
3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, 
4. Subject to some limitations, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.92   
 
This provision specifically authorizes, the sources of law to be applied by the court, 
treaties, customs and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.   
 
 The existence of a body of legal principles and rules that are common to all, or 
almost all legal systems, is supported by some observations made by C. Wilfred Jenks, in 
his book The Common Law of Mankind, published in 1958.93  Jenks observes that 
virtually all of the legal systems in the world, including those in Latin America, Islamic 
countries, African countries, countries within the former Soviet Block, India, China, and 
 
92 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, http://www.icj-
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Japan have been profoundly influenced in the course of their development by either the 
civil law or the common law.  The result is that many principles of law are common to 
these legal systems.  For example a quick review of respective tort or contract law yields 
much similarity.  Thus, the common law and civil law, which by themselves share 
common principles of law, provide the basic framework from which many general 
principles of law can be derived and used to fill the gap when there is no general 
principle of international law available for application in the resolution of a particular 
case.   
 
 The International Law Association Committee on the Formation of Customary 
International Law offers a working definition that is useful.  A rule of customary 
international law, they wrote: 
  
is one which is created and sustained by the consent and uniform practice of 
States and other subjects of international law in or impinging upon their 
international legal relations in circumstances which give rise to a legitimate 
expectation of similar conduct in the future.94  
 
The process of forming, maintaining, refining, and reforming custom is a continuous, 
dynamic process of deed and word, act and argument.95  Thus, the formation and 
application of customary norms cannot be sharply distinguished; likewise, no sharp 
distinction can be drawn between the validity and the effectiveness of customary norms.96  
This, however, creates a challenge for a theory of custom.  It must reconcile a robust 
notion of action in violation of customary norms with the recognition that each deviation 
contains “seeds of a new rule.”97  
 
94 Jonathan I. Charney, “Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law” (1998) 36 Colum. 
J. Transnat’l. L 65. 
95 Franck, supra note 67 at 420-33. 







Chapter 2   Due Process 
A. Origins of due process 
Due process has been described as the greatest contribution of law to modern civilization 
developed by the legal profession.98  With the advance of civilized societies and 
formalization of traditional customs, equity, fundamental fairness, human rights and the 
principles of notice and an opportunity to defend have taken their place as part of the “jus 
gentium,” to become later the law of nature.  Moving back in history, these concepts 
creating the foundation of what is known today as due process were familiar in traditional 
Jewish law.  Additionally, in ancient in Roman law, these concepts can be found 
underlying the conception of “justice” as “the steadfast and continued disposition to 
render to everyman his rights”.99  
While the origins of actual due process are far reaching, in practice, due process 
is largely an American concept.100  The right to due process is expressly provided by the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that: "no person shall be 
[...] deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law...."101  
The answer to the question of what process is due under the laws of the United 
States is very complex, as is evidenced by the large number of judicial rulings and legal 
literature generated on this subject.102  Moreover, with respect to the level of due process 
protection required, there are many possible degrees that may be considered appropriate 
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depending on the context of a given situation.103  In the Swiss constitution, for example, 
according to Article 29 of the Constitution considering General Procedural Guarantees, 
every person has the right in legal and administrative proceedings to be treated equally 
and have their case conducted fairly. Any government authority that is unable to handle a 
case equally and fairly commits a “denial of justice.”104 
B. There is no universal definition of due process 
Complicating the application of due process is the fact that there is not one fixed 
definition of due process.  It is essential to understand that due process can take different 
forms as there are different rules safeguarding procedural and substantive due process,105 
as well as what is referred to as "structural due process."106  The United States Supreme 
Court has held that due process, "unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”107 The Supreme Court 
has thus acknowledged the inherent flexibility of the concept and the necessity to take 
into consideration contextual specificities.108   
In the international context, this ambiguity complicates the effort to identify the 
components of due process and develop guidelines to assist a decision-maker in 
exercising his discretion, although we know that the respect of due process in 
international dispute settlement is fundamental.  Given the difficulties inherent in 
determining what process is due, not considering difficulties in defining what respecting 
 
103 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (New York: University Press, 2000) secs. 10-
7 – 10-19. 
104 Thomas Fleiner, Alexander Misic, et al., Swiss Constitutional Law, (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2005). 
105 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
106 Laurence H. Tribe, “Structural Due Process” (1975) 10 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 269 
(introducing the concept of structural due process as a category of constitutional limitations). 
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basic due process entails, it is understandable that the concept of due process is 
unfamiliar and particularly complex for non-American lawyers.109   
The abovementioned difficulties associated with the application and definition of 
what the protection of due process requires are not unique to the American legal system 
and also apply to similar concepts in other national legal systems. The principle of 
"natural justice" in the English common law system and the droit de la defence in the 
droit civil or droit administrative system are also not capable of conveying a generally 
acceptable, fixed meaning with respect to the effective protection of due process.   
Therefore, there is not a one size fits all concept of due process and the content of 
due process varies from legal system to legal system according to the political and 
cultural influences that condition each particular system, whether it national or 
international.110  
C. Procedure and due process in international dispute settlement 
An important issue for modern international dispute settlement is the need to balance the 
tension between the necessity to ensure due process protection and the private nature of 
arbitration.  This is equally important for private commercial arbitration and international 
interstate arbitration under public international law; although with respect to international 
interstate arbitration the situation might be more complex given the existence of 
international treaties agreed to in advance by states.  While international dispute 
 
109 Christopher Schreuer, International Civil Litigation-Preliminary Relief, Taking Evidence and 
Enforcing Judgments, Remarks at the Proceedings of the American Society of International 
Law/Nederlandse Vereniging voor Internationaal Recht ("ASIL/NVIR") Joint Conference held in 
The Hague, The Netherlands (July 4-6, 1991), in Contemporary International Law Issues: Sharing 
Pan-European and American Perspectives 99, 100 (Dean C. Alexander ed., 1992) [hereinafter 
Joint ASIL/NVIR Conference] (acknowledging that non-American lawyers have great difficulty 
comprehending the concept of due process and opining that non-American courts will not use the 
"uniquely American concept" in the way that the American courts do). See also Catherine 
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settlement must be agreed to by both parties, as explained above it is still subject to due 
process protection in order to maintain its legitimacy.111  Further, as procedural flexibility 
is important and much discretion is left to the tribunal, the protection of due process 
becomes all the more crucial as a foundation to ensure that discretion is not abused.   
To maintain legitimacy, international dispute settlement must ensure that disputes 
will not be resolved in accordance with the procedures of one party's home jurisdiction in 
a way that may favor one party over the other.112 This procedural neutrality is a 
fundamental requirement to international dispute settlement and must be protected to 
ensure basic equality of the parties.113  
No less important is procedural fairness and equity. In consenting to legitimate 
international dispute settlement, parties have a right to obtain fair and objective 
procedures guaranteeing both parties an equal opportunity to be heard.  Arbitrators are 
required to decide on the parties' dispute impartially and objectively, based upon the law 
and the evidence presented by the parties.114 This objective is presented in the terms of 
both international dispute settlement conventions and national arbitration legislation, both 
of which guarantee the parties' procedural rights.115   
 
111 Richard Garnett et al., A Practical Guide to International Commercial Arbitration (Dobbs 
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10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention] (permitting the 
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Arbitration art. 18 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL, Model Law] ("The parties shall be treated 
with equality ... ."). 
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International dispute settlement tribunals have the inherent responsibility to 
render a decision that is impartial and which stems from the application of judicial 
procedure in line with the protection of due process grounded in law and legal 
standards.116  The protection of due process through the protection of procedural 
neutrality and procedural fairness for the parties is “an inevitable and indispensable 
commitment of any judicial institution exercising judicial functions.”117  Due process 
requires the administration and application of laws equally and in accordance with 
established rules that do not violate fundamental principles, by a competent tribunal 
having jurisdiction over the proceeding and upon sufficient notice and hearing.118   
On a practical level, the domestic court, when determining whether to recognize 
a foreign dispute settlement decision, must first determine whether the parties were fairly 
afforded the arbitral process they had contracted for.  This necessitates the consideration 
of a series of queries: “was there an arbitration agreement? Were the arbitrators unbiased 
and honest? Did the loosing party have the opportunity to adequately develop and present 
its case? Does the outcome move against fundamental public policy?”119  In short, the 
considerations revolve around whether due process was effectively protected and 
recognized.   
The parties' freedom to agree upon the arbitral procedures, and the tribunal's 
discretion to adopt such procedures (absent contrary agreement), are subject to mandatory 
requirements of applicable national and international law.  In most cases applicable 
mandatory law imposes only very general requirements of protection of due process, 
notably the parties' ability to be adequately heard and to present their case.  Additionally, 
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there is little guidance available as to how applicable mandatory law envisages the 
implementation of the requirements of due process. 
Article 182(1) of the Swiss Law on Private International Law provides that "the 
parties may, directly or by reference to rules of arbitration, determine the arbitral 
procedure; they may also submit the arbitral procedure to a procedural law of their 
choice."120 Other arbitration legislation in developed jurisdictions is similar, including in 
England, 121 France,122 Germany,123 Belgium,124 Austria,125 Japan,126 Singapore,127 and 
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others.128 In the United States, the statutory text of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") is 
silent in this respect; however, judicial decisions uniformly confirm the parties' freedom 
to agree upon the arbitral procedures (subject to very limited requirements of due 
process).129  
In the Paris Cour d’appel, the parties' autonomy with regard to procedural matters has 
been affirmed as follows: 
It has been established that the arbitration in question ... is an international arbitration 
governed by the intentions of the parties. In this case, the rules of domestic law have 
a purely subsidiary role and apply only in the absence of a specific agreement by the 
 
arbitral proceedings. Provided, it shall not violate the provisions of this Law relating to public 
policy."). 
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federal law applies); Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 
2004) ("The FAA requires arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties'] 
agreement.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & 
Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Indeed, short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal 
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parties ... the rules of the [ICC] Court of Arbitration, which constitute the law of the 
parties, must be applied to the exclusion of all other laws.130  
In the United States, a court observed similarly that "parties may choose to be 
governed by whatever rules they wish regarding how an arbitration itself will be 
conducted."131 Another court opinion explained, more colorfully, that between competent 
parties, even procedures such as "flipping a coin, or, for that matter, arm wrestling" are 
enforceable.132 For their part, English authorities have upheld sui generis procedural 
mechanisms, such as selecting arbitrators by drawing names from a pool.133  
In contrast, it is virtually impossible to identify contemporary authority that denies or 
even questions the principle of the parties' procedural autonomy in international dispute 
settlement, particularly as related to commercial arbitration. At the same time, however, 
the parties' autonomy in all developed jurisdictions is subject to the limitations of 
mandatory national public policies and the protection of due process.134  
D. Due process and The New York Convention 
In the international context, the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) is 
“one of the most successful treaties in history,” having more than 140 agreeing to become 
parties through ratification, succession or accession.135  States that join up to the New 
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York Convention become automatically on notice that a pro-arbitration, including a pro-
enforcement of award, approach is normal and required.136   
The role of the New York Convention in “bringing about the uniform standard 
for the practice of international arbitration," the proper protection of due process and the 
“transformation of the judges’ initial attitude towards arbitrators from one of 
confrontation to one of cooperation” cannot be overstated.137  The requirements of the 
New York Convention, including those applicable to arbitration agreements and 
enforcement and recognition of arbitral awards that are foreign now constitute an 
essential component of arbitration law in all countries that have ratified it.138  Further, 
judicial decisions from all over the world which apply the New York Convention also 
contribute to its international harmonizing effect.139  “[A]ny national judge can consult 
[the International Council for Commercial Arbitration’s Yearbook on Arbitration] on 
how his colleagues apply the same treaty in other countries … The jurisprudence arising 
from the application of the New York Convention in local tribunals has unified the 
interpretation of its different criteria.”140  In the words of Pieter Sanders, “We are 
approaching a global system of arbitration” and one of the "main driving forces behind 
this development are the New York Convention 1958 and the Model Law of 
UNCITRAL.”141     
Much of the operative language of the New York Convention presents binding 
terms including article II which states “each Contracting State shall recognize an 
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agreement in writing” to arbitrate, while article III states “each Contracting State shall 
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon.”142  Any phrasing which could 
be interpreted to allow deviations from the general pro-enforcement position is presented 
in permissive, rather than mandatory, language.   The duty of a court to enforce and 
recognize decisions that are foreign under the New York Convention is limited only by 
those potential objections included in article V,143 which constitutes the only methods to 
claim a  challenge to the enforcement of a decision on either procedural or substantive 
grounds.  Further, article V provides protection against arbitral procedures executed 
under the discretion of the arbitral tribunal considered abusive by allowing courts to 
withhold their support to proceedings determined by them to lack the necessary integrity 
or present a violation of accepted public policy.144  
Universal international arbitration law does not exist, there are only national 
arbitration laws.  “It is only through developments in national laws that the diverging 
approaches to international arbitration [begin] to converge.”145  The success of the New 
York Convention, UNCITRAL Model Law and other international arbitration standards 
demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach.”146 
Improvement and harmonization of national laws remains a key factor in the 
facilitation of international arbitration because of the need for increasing uniformity and 
predictability of effective arbitral procedures to lower the risks to international commerce 
and to contribute to overall global economic relations.  It assists in curing the adverse 
effects of disparity between national laws in international cases, avoiding territorial 
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constraints and local peculiarities, and it provides for functioning and fairness of the 
arbitral process by a universal standard.147 
Despite its harmonizing effect, the New York Convention approaches due 
process as an overarching principle that should not be too precise but this results in it 
being a difficult concept to clearly define with certainty, and what exactly establishes the 
protection of due process is “not uniform across all the Contracting States.”148  The 
potential for there to be different approaches to the concepts of due process may have 
“significant consequences for arbitrations which are conducted in forums where the 
notions of due process differ substantially” from approaches taken by other Contracting 
States.149  Thus, while the protection of due process is essential to ensure the rights of 
parties are respected throughout the process of international dispute settlement and also to 
ensure legitimacy of the international dispute settlement system, clarity in what 
constitutes due process in light of the procedural flexibility and judicial discretion 
inherent in international dispute settlement is necessary. 
Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention clarifies that “recognition and 
enforcement of the award may be refused” with proof that “the party against whom the 
award is invoked was … unable to present his case.”150  However, it is not clear as to 
what it means for a party to present their case.  In some national jurisdictions, the ability 
to develop and mount one’s case is presented as a due process rule that is fundamental if 
not the most fundamental requirement; however, other national laws require “full 
opportunity” to present one’s case, while alternatively others require only the “reasonable 
opportunity.”151  There is no clear guidance in the New York Convention as to what is 
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actually required for a party to present their case and given the degree of procedural 
flexibility in international dispute settlement and the amount of judicial discretion, this 
lack of guidance on what is required for the proper protection of due process is 
particularly troubling.   
 Article V(1)(b) allows for refusal of enforcement of an award on the grounds that 
a party “was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator, or of the 
arbitration proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present [its] case.”152  This is an 
opportunity for a party to be heard when it was denied a fair hearing or due process, 
when, for instance, the tribunal failed to treat the parties equally.153  These defenses are 
intended precisely to safeguard the parties against injustice and to serve a function similar 
to that of due process guarantees in domestic litigation.154  The New York Convention, 
however, contains no clearly defined requirements for what constitutes proper notice and 
therefore provides no guidance to a tribunal attempting to use its discretion to protect this 
component of due process.   
 Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention explains “recognition and 
enforcement of the award may … be refused if the competent authority in the country 
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that … the recognition or enforcement 
of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”155  Complicating 
matters is the fact that there is no clear definition for the meaning of public policy in the 
language of the New York Convention, however the reasoning is that it is “the right of 
the State and its courts to exercise ultimate control over the arbitral process.”156  Further, 
public policy is an ever changing notion that adjusts over time to reflect a particular 
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society’s priorities.157    Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention clarifies that only 
public policy of the state where enforcement is to take place is relevant for consideration 
and foreign public policy is not commonly considered at all. 158   Further, objections based 
solely on public policy tend to be procedural in nature, typically addressing violations of 
due process, or substantive.159  Grounds that have been found to satisfy this provision 
range from harm to the enforcing countries’ national interests or to decisions “obnoxious 
to internationally accepted standards.”160  Such conduct is present where an award is 
tainted by fraud, corruption, involves criminal conduct, or some other internationally 
offensive act.161  Absence of due process or procedural fairness is arguably the most 
successful basis for impeaching the award using the public policy exception.162 
 From time to time there are situations where procedural public policy intersects 
with the due process requirements articulated in article V(1)(b) of the Convention.163  
Additionally, possible procedural public policy grounds include “fraud in the 
composition of the tribunal; breach of natural justice; lack of impartiality; lack of reasons 
in the award; manifest disregard for the law; manifest disregard of the facts; annulment at 
place of arbitration.”164  Irrespective of whether they are procedural or substantive in 
nature, objections based solely on public policy under the Convention “must be construed 
narrowly.”165            
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 Different opinions on the proper parameters of due process can be found in 
different jurisdictions and this lack of harmonization has the potential to lead to 
confusion in the enforcement of awards.  However, in considering presented objections to 
enforcement under article V(1)(b) of the Convention, courts are instructed to apply the 
standards of the jurisdiction from which the procedural law controlled the arbitration, that 
is, typically the law of the state where the dispute settlement took place.166 
E. Deriving international due process requirements 
For the purposes of this work it is important to derive due process requirements as due 
process is a fundamental requirement to any form of dispute settlement, be it international 
or domestic.  Oftentimes due process is viewed as a “hard rule of law, a kind of core or 
foundation for all other procedural rules, the violation or disregard of which will lead to 
unenforceability of the award of decision given.”167  At the foundation of any form of 
dispute settlement, the requirement to protect due process underlies the legitimacy of a 
mechanism and “cannot be contracted out.”168    
As has been explained above, while fixed, clearly defined components to or 
requirements of the protection of due process have not been developed, general principles 
of due process, considered basic precepts, underlying the adjudicative processes in the 
legal system of civilized States have been described in detail in relevant academic 
literature.169 Commonly described as "minimum procedural standards,"170 "principles of 
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judicial procedure,"171 and "fundamental procedural norms,"172 these concepts have been 
defined by reference to two essential and commonly shared objectives: 1) the requirement 
of impartiality of the adjudicative tribunal; and 2) the juridical equality between the 
parties in their capacity to litigate, or the right to be fairly heard.173   
As discussed above, the sources of due process principles are varied.  In the absence 
of any fully developed and internationally accepted theory of international procedural 
law, there is no universally accepted doctrine of international procedural principles.174   
According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice in 
determining how an international decision-maker should go about determining what 
international law to rely on, it is useful then to refer to the approach outlined in the New 
York Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and also those 
established international adjudicative bodies including the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities ("EC"). Although the EC Court of Justice has previously 
elaborated a catalogue of fundamental procedural rights based on a vertical reach into the 
legal systems of the EC Member States, it recently has opted to develop general 
principles of EC law by reaching horizontally into other international legal systems, such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), rather than to conduct the 
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more difficult exercise of performing a sufficiently extensive comparative study of the 
national legal systems of the EC Member States.175 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that everyone 
has the right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal cases.  A party to legal proceedings 
has the right to be heard by an independent, impartial tribunal, in public and within a 
reasonable amount of time.  Article 6 is not subject to any exceptions, though the 
procedural requirements of a fair trial may differ according to the circumstances.  
 
Article 6(1) applies to all situations, including public, private and administrative 
law.  Through a series of judgments, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted 
civil rights and obligations as including areas such as family law, employment law and 
commercial law.  The principles contained in Article 6(1) may also apply to certain cases 
involving the relationship between the individual and the state, especially disputes 
involving money and property.  Administrative decisions made by public bodies which 
are not courts or tribunals, such as a review by a local authority planning inspector, must 
be compliant with Article 6(1) unless there is a right of appeal to a court or tribunal that 
does comply with its requirements. 
 
As described above, Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention is also 
representative, permitting non-recognition of an award where "the party against whom 
the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or 
of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case."176  Article 
V(2)(b) of the Convention is also potentially applicable in cases of serious procedural 
unfairness, permitting non-recognition of arbitral awards for violations of local public 
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policy, including procedural public policies addressing the right to a fair trial and the 
protection of due process.177  
The European and Inter-American Conventions feature similar provisions. The 
application of mandatory standards of procedural fairness under these various 
international instruments has been referred to as "international procedural public 
policy.”178  However, details regarding what is required to meet mandatory standards of 
procedural fairness are not included in any of the above.  In general, provisions have been 
interpreted to afford the parties and dispute settlement tribunal substantial freedom to 
establish the arbitral procedures.179 Nonetheless, these provisions permit national courts 
to deny recognition to arbitral awards that are based upon fundamentally unfair, arbitrary, 
or unbalanced procedures that violate due process. 
It is essential therefore to develop a series of fundamental principles or requirements 
for the protection of due process that cut across a broad spectrum of countries’ domestic 
legislation as it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conduct an analysis to 
detect general procedural principles common to all national legal systems.   
For the purposes of this work in order to establish a foundation for the requirements 
of due process in the international context the formulation of the primary rules of the fair 
trial guarantee expressed in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
provide a very good articulation of the general principles or requirements of due process 
and is consistent with Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention, The International 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as fundamental concepts of equity as 
follows: 
1) a tribunal must be independent and impartial,180 
2) the parties must be given adequate notice of the proceedings,  
3) the parties must be given adequate opportunity to be heard and present their     
case,181 
F. Due process and public policy concerns 
While there is no official guidance with respect to how both developing and developed 
nations are expected to apply public policy exceptions,182 work towards the 
harmonization and explanation of national laws has been undertaken.  In July 2000, the 
International Law Association issued a Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement 
of International Awards ("ILA Interim Report"), which was intended to be considered in 
conjunction with the Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards ("ILA Final Report") issued in 2002.183  
Both these reports strive to provide a practical definition of public policy by referring 
to "violations of basic notions of morality and justice,” however, significantly the reports 
also also consider how public policy is applied in international agreements, treaties and 
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also legislation that is domestic.184 Domestic legislation vary to a degree, however "it 
appears that there is one universally accepted definition of public policy. It is clear that 
[it] reflects the fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, religious, and social 
standards of every state or extra-national community."185  
Article V(2)(b) in the Convention explains that the only public policy that is relevant 
for consideration is that of the state where enforcement is to take place.186 Thus, foreign 
public policy is not automatically relevant in enforcement proceedings, "notwithstanding 
the fact that private international lawyers increasingly discuss the issue of application (or 
taken into account) of foreign public policy in a favourable manner" in other contexts.187  
Further, objections based on public policy may be procedural, tending to relate to due 
process issues, or substantive.188  However, these types of objection that are based on 
public policy automatically provides grounds that are persuasive for overcoming the 
presumption of enforceability as presented in the Convention. 
When making the determination as to whether the New York Convention's 
exceptions regarding public policy to enforcement apply, courts must consider their 
domestic regulations, the law of the state considering enforcement.189 The scope and form 
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of all judicial review is limited and courts as well as commentators tend to be 
"unanimous" when making this point, explaining: 
The national judge excludes review of the substance of the arbitration decision. It 
must relate not to the evaluation made by the arbitrators of the rights of the 
parties, but rather to the solution given to the dispute, with the award being 
annulled only insofar as this solution runs counter to public policy.190  
Only in rare cases has the opposition of awards been successful at the stage of 
enforcement based solely on grounds of a violation of international public policy.191 As 
an example, England did not refuse enforcement of an arbitral award on the grounds of 
public policy until 1998.192 South Korea and Switzerland both use a narrow interpretation 
of public policy, but retain some focus on the interests and beliefs of the enforcing 
state.193 In the United States, the prevailing pro-arbitration policy also results in few 
challenges succeeding on the basis of the public policy exception.194 Other jurisdictions 
that have taken a narrow view of the public policy exception include Germany, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Russia, Italy and India.195 However, in contrast some 
jurisdictions - including Turkey, Japan, Vietnam and China - have been criticized for 
their broad use of the public policy exception.196  
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H.  The example of the Kadi case 
This case is related to economic sanctions against individuals and highlights the necessity 
to safeguard fundamental due process protections which were lacking on the level of 
international law in the context of the United Nations.  UN Security Council Resolution 
1267 (1999)197 established a “Sanctions Committee” responsible for designating the 
funds or other financial resources which all States must freeze in order to ensure that 
those funds or financial resources are not made available to, or for the benefit of, the 
Taliban or any undertaking owned or controlled  by the Taliban.  In Resolution 1333 
(2000),198 the UN Security Council instructed the Sanctions Committee to maintain an 
updated list of the individuals and entities designated as associated with Osama bin 
Laden, and held that States must freeze funds and other financial assets of these 
individuals and entities.  Mr. Kadi was identified as a possible supporter of Al-Qaida and 
was included in this updated list.  Therefore, he was singled out for sanctions, and in 
particular for an assets freeze.   
 
The EU implemented this UN Security Council Resolution through a regulation 
which Kadi then contested before the EU Courts.  In the initial case, the General Court 
(GC) refused to review the EU regulation because in its view this would have amounted 
to a review of the measure of the UN Security Council.  Nevertheless, the GC examined 
whether the Security Council had respected certain fundamental rights and the GC did 
not find any such infringement. 
 
In its judgment on appeal, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) pursued a 
different analysis.  It reviewed the lawfulness of the EU regulation implementing the 
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resolution.199  Its central argument was that the protection of fundamental rights form part 
of the very foundations of the Union legal order.200  Accordingly, all Union measures 
must be compatible with fundamental rights or equity.201  The Court reasoned that this 
does not amount to a review of the lawfulness of the Security Council measures.  The 
review of lawfulness in this situation would apply only to the Union act that gives effect 
to the international agreement at issue and not to the latter.202 
Having established that, the review for compliance with fundamental rights and 
equity was relatively simple.  Kadi had not been informed of the grounds for his inclusion 
in the list of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions.  Therefore he had not been 
able to seek judicial review of these grounds, and consequently his right to be heard as 
well as his right to effective judicial review203 and his right to property204 had all been 
infringed.  
 
With this opinion the Court held that “obligations imposed by an international 
agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC 
Treaty.”205  However, it is important to note that the ECJ did not establish a new 
hierarchal structure regarding the interplay between international law and European law.  
Rather, the Court emphasized the primacy of obligations under the UN Charter.  It also 
highlighted that the European review of lawfulness applies only to Community acts and 
never to acts of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, even if 
such a review were to be limited to examination of the compatibility of that resolution 
with jus cogens. Thus, at first the ECJ did not challenge the existing hierarchy of norms 
within the international legal order.  But at the same time, by emphasizing the rule of law 
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the Court stated that the judicial review also covers all Community acts, even if they are 
designed merely to give effect to resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council.   
 
In effect, this approach of reciprocal concessions only works if there is a way to 
implement UN Security Council resolutions in conformity with the fundamental rights of 
the EU.  If it would only be possible to put a resolution into effect by adopting a 
Community act which breaches fundamental rights – if there were a significant conflict 
between obligations arising under the UN Charter on the one hand and EU fundamental 
rights as “principles that form part of the very foundations of the Community legal 
order”206 on the other – EU fundamental rights would then prevail.   
 
Thus, the ECJ’s commitment to accept the primacy of UN Charter obligations 
and the integrity of UN Security Council resolutions ends when there is no discretion to 
implement such resolutions in a fundamental rights-friendly way.  Therefore, a lack of 
discretion would imply an obligation to give preference to fundamental rights even if this 
means a breach of UN Charter obligations which could in effect result in a “challenge to 
the primacy of that resolution in international law,” even if the ECJ explained the 
outcome differently.207 
 
The choice by the ECJ of a rather dualist approach in this particular context has 
to be understood as a reaction to a specific situation that may occur in multilevel systems.  
In such systems it is possible that the level of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed 
by a higher level does not attain the level of protection developed and considered 
indispensable by the lower level.  Refusing to accept the primacy of the higher level can 
be a proper means of responding to this deficiency.  The insufficient protection of 
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fundamental rights at the UN level therefore required the adoption of a dualist conception 
of the interplay of EU law and international law. 208 
 
The Court examined in detail the argument presented by the Commission that the 
Court must not intervene because Mr Kadi had had, through the re-examination 
procedure before the Sanctions Committee, an acceptable opportunity to be heard within 
the UN legal system.  The Court responded that such an immunity from EU jurisdiction 
“appears unjustified, for clearly that re-examination procedure does not offer the 
guarantees of judicial protection.”209   
 
This demonstrates that the Court did not follow a strictly dualist approach in its 
judgment.  The Court’s decision not, at least for the time being, to accord automatic 
precedence to Security Council measures is understandable, if not essential when 
considering a broader perspective.  Should the EU convey the impression of sacrificing 
basic constitutional guarantees by accepting the general primacy of Security Council 
measures, EU Member States, in particular their constitutional courts, would likely feel 
compelled to take safeguarding these guarantees into their own hands.  From an 
international perspective this would be counterproductive.  It would not only put into 
question the primacy of public international law within the EU legal order but also call 
into question the primacy of EU law over national law.210  This would undermine the 
whole concept of integration through law.  Also from this perspective Kadi would hardly 
have yielded a different outcome.   
 
The judgment of the ECJ in Kadi represents a strong commitment to fundamental 
rights and the European rule of law.  In the words of Advocate General Maduro, 
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“[M]easures which are incompatible with the observance of human rights … are not 
acceptable in the Community.”211 We must recognize that finding a proper balance 
between constitutional core values and effective international measures, particularly those 
against terrorism, is not an easy task.  The Kadi case demonstrates the importance placed 
on the protection of fundamental rights, particularly the right to a fair trial, the right to be 
heard and be afforded the opportunity to properly present one’s case.   
 
The role of equity is significant throughout the reasoning of the Kadi case as is 
the fundamental focus on due process protection.  While issues of direct effect and 
primacy of EU law over national law were significant considerations in this case, the 
invocation of equity in the opinion strengthened the decision.  Equity or fairness is used 
to buttress legal arguments and the exercise of discretion.  In the Kadi case, a decision 
based on technical legal rules was shown to be consistent with principles of justice and 
fairness.  Considered more broadly, it is in this manner that the flexibility which the law 
contains, and which was discussed above in the context of equity legem, praeter legem 
and contra legem, can be directed so as to lead to a just conclusion.  Taken further, 
reasoning in terms of equity has great potential to provide justification of the exercise of 
judicial discretion; however, the flexibility of the law is of little benefit unless there are 
criteria for choosing among the alternatives available and the role of due process 
protections continue to be essential. 
G. Due process and judicial discretion in the international context 
Innovation and flexibility are not only permitted in international dispute settlement, they 
are encouraged212 and many respected arbitrators and advocates have recognized that it is 
good practice to allow proceedings to be individually tailored to the needs of the 
parties.213  As the use of judicial discretion is essential to fill the gaps left by the inability 
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of the parties to reach agreement, subject only to ensuring the protection of due process, 
due process requirements therefore form the foundation for the proper use of judicial 
discretion in an international context.    
Given that there are no clearly accepted international guidelines on how to 
develop international dispute settlement procedures that are in line with due process 
requirements, nor clear guidance on what due process requirements actually require, 
looking at the currently accepted practice in internationally recognized dispute settlement 
mechanisms is as close as we can get to guidance in this area.  While with respect to 
interstate dispute settlement the World Trade Organization is rather precise and provides 
a reasonable guideline, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
and the UNCITRAL Rules, also consider due process in their own way which will be 
presented and considered in detail below.       
There has been a proliferation of international dispute settlement mechanisms but 
in and of itself this is not problematic.  In the aftermath of two World Wars, promoting 
non-violent settlement of disputes was the ideal of many people around the world.  
Indeed, Article 33 of the UN Charter requires resort to the peaceful settlement of disputes 
and sets forth various mechanisms that states might employ.   Differences in the types of 
tribunals available to solve international disputes demonstrate innovation on the part of 
states and private sectors and the coexistence of multiple and varied peaceful mechanisms 
for the settlement of disputes is theoretically good.   
Domestic courts, academics and commercial actors have supported international 
dispute settlement as the best mechanism for resolving cross-border disputes largely 





on enforcement of awards214, is much more efficient and reliable than domestic 
litigation.215 
Despite its tremendous growth and acceptance, international dispute settlement is 
not a panacea for cross-border dispute resolution.  Any even-handed description of 
international arbitration must acknowledge that certain challenges intrinsic to the process 
endure, including the need to make the process acceptable to all who seek to make use of 
it.  In its attempts to invite parties from all nations to the arbitral table and to provide a 
uniform method for resolving global disputes, international dispute settlement inherently 
risks ignoring certain cultural or legal traditions and thus marginalizing or even offending 
at least some participants.  The often subtle disparities among national cultures and 
different legal traditions of the disputants must be given special attention and handled 
with particular care to avoid the perception or actuality of unjust outcomes.  It is essential 
that each party rightly feel it is equitably participating in the process and often reaching 
this goal requires that inherent tensions be addressed and compromises reached.   
In this context, to test the connection between the exercise judicial discretion and 
policy options for the protection of due process, and in an effort to initiate the 
development of guidance for the use of judicial discretion, an analysis of the current 
practice of three distinct international dispute settlement mechanisms will be undertaken 
set against the backdrop of the above presented requirements for the protection of due 
process.  During this exercise areas for improvement with broader international 
application will be identified and developed for further consideration.     
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ICSID, UNCTRAL AND WTO SYSTEMS 
 
Chapter 3 Introduction to the ICSID, UNCITRAL and WTO Systems 
A. Three very different systems brought together 
As international trade grows, actors that previously tended to concentrate on domestic 
business have begun to advance their interests through the proliferation of cross-border 
transactions, resulting in an international business community that is sizeable in terms of 
numbers and transnational capacity.  Companies worldwide have expanded to locate their 
manufacturing and distribution centers, as well as their advertising, beyond their home 
country’s borders.  This increased communication and advances in technology, as well as 
institutional support for cross-border transactions, have created a substantial global 
business community that handles international transactions no differently from their 
domestic transactions.  The rapid expansion of cross-border commercial transactions has 
resulted in significant growth of cross-border disputes, and the need for culturally 
sensitive decision-makers possessing a familiarity with and expertise in international 
commerce to resolve these disputes.  However, private actors and industry are not the 
only stakeholders with interest in cross-border dispute settlement.  Countries themselves 
also have significant interests, on behalf of the private actors within their borders but also 
for their own benefits and positioning as well. 
        At this point, it would be reasonable to question the value of comparing such 
different international dispute settlement mechanisms; however, the differences between 
the WTO system and ICISD and UNCITRAL systems are what make the comparison so 
interesting.  If one pulls back to consider the broad spectrum of today’s international 
dispute settlement and the fact that irrespective of idiosyncrasies unique to a particular 
mechanism, all dispute settlement mechanisms are nonetheless held to the fundamental 





The mere fact that international dispute settlement is conducted requires 
protection of due process and therefore an analysis of how different systems approach 
this cross-cutting requirement becomes interesting.  Further, the fact that the WTO 
system has such a clearly defined set of rules and developed case law provides a useful 
point of reference when considering systems that leave much to the discretion of the 
parties or to the ad hoc tribunal.  Caution is advised here because while one might assume 
that clearly defined dispute settlement rules are the automatic solution to international 
due process protection, as we will see below, the clearly defined dispute settlement rules 
of the WTO do not entirely protect it from potential risks of due process violation.   
In the coming years, countries with an established international economic 
presence will likely increase their participation in cross-border transactions, just as the 
growth of the international economy will bring more emerging economies such as the 
BRICS countries into the fold.  As the world continues to get smaller, the importance and 
frequency of both private and public interests together in cross-border disputes will 
increase, and international dispute settlement forums will continue to be the first resort 
for parties seeking to resolve such disputes.  In this context and given the spectrum of 
interests involved, the preference for international dispute settlement will enhance 
cultivation of the process, as arbitrators, parties and their counsel seek to strengthen and 
develop the system to improve efficiency and outcomes. 
  When considering the variety international dispute settlement mechanisms 
available to those with a case, there is not a single approach to discretion but a wide 
spectrum of options.  While the WTO system is very structured, the ICSID and 
UNCITRAL mechanisms exemplify the approach that seeks to maximize flexibility and 
enable significant procedural tailoring to the preferences of the parties; however, when 
parties fail to agree significant discretion is left to the ad hoc tribunal members with little 
guidance from the mechanism dispute settlement rules on how best to exercise that 
discretion.  Case law could be useful to consult in this situation; however, given the 
emphasis placed on tailoring procedures to the intricacies of a particular dispute, cases 
more easily become differentiable.  Further, a clear mandate for the reliance on case law 





While this flexibility and tribunal discretion is in line with the current 
expectations associated with international dispute settlement today, ad hoc tribunals are 
forced to balance the value of flexibility with the need to protect due process but are left 
unclear as to what is procedurally required for the protection of due process.  Are there 
areas for systemic improvement?  Are there ways to adjust the rules of a particular 
mechanism to maintain the degree of discretion but provide support to ad hoc tribunals 
when attempting to use their discretion in a way that is more easily in line with due 
process?   
To this end, the below section will conduct a comparative analysis of three 
widely accepted international dispute settlement mechanisms: the ICSID, the 
UNICTRAL Rules and Model Law, and the World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement Understanding.  These three dispute settlement mechanisms have been 
selected because they each represent a different type of dispute settlement: private 
commercial arbitration, private to state investor disputes, and state to state dispute 
settlement.  Further, each dispute settlement mechanism is internationally accepted as 
legitimate, has rules to guide the settlement of disputes that are comparatively well 
developed but at the same time each takes a very different approach with respect to 
procedural due process.  Countries can participate in each system but also private 
interests, either directly or indirectly, are regularly considered as well.  Further, each 
mechanism relies on ad hoc decision-makers to adjudicate disputes.  This is an important 
consideration because these ad hoc decision-makers are required to exercise their 
discretion in line with the requirements to protect due process.  However, by nature of 
being ad hoc, these decision-makers may have limited experience in adjudicating 
international disputes, likely limited institutional knowledge and are not accustomed to 
working together.  Therefore this ad hoc model is more vulnerable to abuse of discretion 
than are permanently standing tribunals.   
The participation of countries in an international dispute settlement mechanism is 
of importance because public interest, general scrutiny, and the role of public policy are 
all heightened.  While the private sector can freely enter into binding narrowly construed 





the actions of governments and the mechanisms guiding the settlement of disputes 
between governments.   
 As explained above, while due process protection is at the foundation of all 
dispute settlement, be it national or international, in the international context while it is 
possible to distill three high-level requirements for the protection of due process, what is 
procedurally required to meet those due process requirements remains unclear.  For 
example, while it is a due process requirement for a party to have an opportunity to be 
heard and present their case, in practice what is sufficient opportunity for a party to be 
heard?  Are written submissions enough or should oral hearings be mandatory?  Should 
there be more than one round of oral hearings?  With respect to evidence production, to 
enable the decision-maker to make a decision, is there an obligation on the decision-
maker to ensure that all evidence, even evidence contrary to the position of a particular 
party, be brought out in the open and considered?  As a particular dispute settlement 
process progresses, to what degree of interaction between the parties and the decision-
maker is reasonable?  Should it be a closed system or are parties entitled to engage in a 
type of dialogue with the decision-maker throughout the adjudication process enabling 
them to witness the step-by-step analysis of the decision-maker, giving parties the 
opportunity to make strategic adjustments to their case before the final opinion is issued?  
What is the value of case law?  Should past precedent guide future decisions?  Is 
consistency valuable?  What about appeal mechanisms?  Should appellate processes 
consider substantive issues or is finality to the dispute more valuable and appeals should 
then be limited to situations of gross abuse?     
B. ICSID 
1. Subject matter  
The ICSID is an autonomous international organization with close links to the World 
Bank and provides facilities for the arbitration of investment disputes between State 





nationals of other State parties to the ICSID Convention.216  ICSID has its headquarters in 
Washington D.C. and more than 1,000 bilateral investment treaties provide for arbitration 
of disputes "between a State party to the [ICSID Convention] and nationals of the other 
State party" through the ICSID Convention.217  Further, in several instances, national and 
municipal law may require arbitration of specific disputes and specify arbitration under 
the ICSID Convention as an appropriate option.218   
ICSID arbitrations are of particular value because the dispute resolution takes 
place in a non-judicial non-national venue.  ICSID arbitrations resolve international 
investment disputes stemming from State conduct. Further, the ICSID system reaches 
beyond dispute resolution in that ICSID tribunals are frequently interpreting and 
clarifying international investment law and other aspects of international law.   
The jurisdiction of ICSID extents to (1) any legal dispute (2) arising directly out 
of an investment, (3) between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or 
agency of a Contracting State that has been designated to the Centre by the State) and (4) 
a national of another Contracting State, (5) which the parties to the dispute consent in 
writing to submit to the Centre.219 
The phrase "any legal dispute" refers to the fact that a claimant is required to 
present a supported legal claim on the basis of some legal right as an ICSID Tribunal 
cannot be convened to issue advisory opinions or fact-finding reports.  That the dispute 
must "aris[e] directly from an investment" refers to subject matter permissible of the 
dispute.  The term investment is not defined in the ICSID Convention and ICSID 
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tribunals have been left to assign meaning to the term on a case-by-case basis.220  In case 
law the term has been understood to apply to a flexible concept; however, ICSID’s 
subject matter jurisdiction is clearly limited.  ICSID was not designed to address disputes 
arising from ordinary sales contracts.221   
Disputes related to issues of jurisdiction but still arising out of an investment may 
be decided by the arbitration tribunal and appealed to an ad hoc committee created from 
the panel of arbitrators by the administrative council of the ICSID.222 
ICSID remains very small, staffed by about twelve lawyers, with the general 
counsel of the World Bank serving as its de facto part-time Secretary-General.223  In 
realistic terms, the responsibilities of the general counsel of the World Bank preclude the 
holder of that office from focusing exclusively on the responsibilities of the ICSID 
Secretary-General.  These responsibilities include among others, the screening of requests 
to commence arbitral proceedings, the authority to appoint the presiding arbitrator in 
cases where the parties are not able to reach agreement as well as the publication of 
dispute outcomes.224 
Consequently, ICSID has struggled in the past years to maintain an efficient and 
highly technical investor-state arbitration process.225  Moreover, various critics have 
questioned whether ICSID actually “has the financial backing, governmental support and 
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‘ICSID arbitration focused’ senior management required to fulfil its growing 
responsibilities.”226 
Although the ICSID Convention dictates the operations of ICSID, there are some 
aspects that are flexible, including financing mechanisms for ICSID.  Currently the 
World Bank provides the budget for ICSID largely as a matter of efficiency.227  While the 
exact funding mechanism provided by the Convention (requiring direct contributions 
from contracting state) may in practice be difficult to implement, there is some room for 
flexibility.228  Furthermore, the only clear limit to the Secretariat’s size, including 
administrative and legal staff, is the present budget of ICSID, which is rather small when 
compared to the budgets of the various components of the World Bank Group in general.   
The dramatic increase in arbitration under ICSID’s Rules and Regulations 
prompted ICSID to undertake a number of reforms to its rules in April 2006.229  The 
ICSID Convention can be amended only if all contracting states ratify the amendment 
and therefore not unforeseen that to date the convention has yet to be amended.230  In 
contrast, the ICSID Rules and Additional Facility and Arbitration Rules require only a 
decision of the administrative council.231  Amendments were adopted in 1984, 1999, and 
2002.232 
The 2006 amendments were the result of 18 months’ consultation with ICSID 
contracting states, the business community, civil society, arbitration experts and other 
arbitral institutions.  The amendments are intended to increase efficiency and 
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transparency in proceedings while bolstering confidence of parties, current and potential, 
in the arbitral process.233  The new amendments have enabled the rules to provide for 
preliminary procedures concerning provisional measures, expedited procedures for 
dismissal of unmeritorious claims, access of non-disputing parties to proceedings, 
additional disclosure requirements for arbitrators, and the rapid publication of awards.234   
2. Potential parties 
In order to file a case for ICSID dispute settlement, one party must be a 
Contracting State while the other party to the dispute is required to be a citizen of another 
Contracting State.  Therefore, citizens of States that are not a ratifying party to the ICSID 
Convention do not have the option of submitting disputes to ICSID dispute settlement 
mechanism.   
In the terms of natural persons, the requirement has been interpreted to mean that 
dual nationals (including the nationality of the host State) are not established to permit a 
national to bring a case against their own government.235 Recognizing that it is common 
for host States to require foreign investors to manage their operations through companies 
that are locally incorporated, the Convention provides that it is possible for parties to 
agree that such a company in light of the foreign control be treated as a national of 
another Contracting State for purposes of the Convention.236 
The ICSID Convention was not established for the purpose of adjudicating 
disputes between two State parties and the parties to any filed dispute must have 
previously agreed to submit their claim to the ICSID mechanism in writing.237  Further, 
any agreement to submit to dispute settlement under the ICSID must be construed simply 
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and in good faith.  Importantly, a parties' consent in writing is not required to be 
expressed in a single document.  Additionally, as soon as a party has issued consent it is 
not possible for either party to withdraw that consent unilaterally.238   
Under most bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and Chapter 11 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), investors are allowed to choose from three 
arbitral mechanisms to which to submit their claims: 1) the ICSID Convention, where 
both the respondent state and the claimant investor's home state have ratified the 
Convention; 2) the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or 3) ICSID's Additional Facility 
Rules (AF), where either, but not both, the claimant's home state or respondent state have 
ratified the Convention.  In some situations, the International Chamber of Commerce 
might also be an option.239  It is left up to the investor to choose.   
Multiple methods exist to guide the formulation of an agreement to submit a 
dispute to ICSID arbitration which include: (1) including at the time of drafting the 
contract a clause indicating agreement to submit resulting disputes to ICSID arbitration; 
(2) the rarely employed method of concluding an agreement to submit an existing dispute 
to ICSID arbitration; (3) the more common means of accepting a State's "offer" contained 
in legislation or a treaty to submit to ICSID arbitration.   
Given limitations in jurisdiction and other unique features of the ICSID system, it 
is important to note that the drafting of an acceptable ICSID arbitration clause has the 
potential to be complex and therefore an ICSID arbitration clause should not ideally be 
drafted from scratch without clear reference to the Centre's Model Clauses which can be 
found on the ICSID website.240  A Contracting State party to the ICSID Convention, by 
its nature, does not constitute consent by that State to automatically submit a dispute to 
the ICSID dispute settlement mechanism.  It is therefore required to obtain a State's 
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written consent.  Today, the most common way to refer a dispute to ICSID arbitration if 
for a foreign investor to accept, by filing a request for arbitration, the offer by a State 
contained in an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral investment protection 
treaties to submit covered disputes to ICSID arbitration.241 
In contractual relationships an express choice of law is always practical, 
particularly where parties agree to submit disputes to ICSID.  In the absence of clear 
choice of law indications, the ICSID Convention includes default provisions on the issue 
of governing law which provide: 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may 
be agreed by the parties.  In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall 
apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on 
the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.242      
The ICSID contains an Additional Facility which is intended for use by parties 
having long-term relationships of economic importance to the state party to the dispute 
and which involve the commitment of substantial resources on the part of either party.243  
It is important to note that the facility is not intended to service disputes which fall within 
the ICSID Convention or that are “ordinary commercial transaction” disputes.244  In order 
for parties to a contractual agreement to effectively ensure the use of the ICSID 
Additional Facility, ICSID’s Secretary-General is required to provide advanced approval 
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of an agreement considering its use.245  The facility has its own arbitration rules,246 which 
closely mirror those of the ICSID.247   
C. UNCITRAL 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976 were designed in the 1970s for use as a 
procedural template in ad hoc commercial international arbitrations between private 
parties. The intention of the UNCITRAL Working Group on International Arbitration 
that produced the first set of UNCITRAL Rules was to provide a neutral framework for 
the flexible and efficient resolution of disputes between parties from different 
jurisdictions.  
 
Since coming into force in 1976, the UNCITRAL Rules have gained widespread 
acceptance as the procedural benchmark for ad hoc international arbitration between 
private parties, evidence of which can be found in their regular incorporation in the 
dispute resolution clauses of cross-border contracts between private parties and even in 
negotiated investment treaties.  
 
In order to produce the new UNCITRAL Rules, the working group worked in 
close cooperation with interested inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organizations over eight sessions, from September 2006 to February 2010. The new 
UNCITRAL Rules were pre-released on 12 July 2010. The text of the new UNCITRAL 
Rules reflects a range of recent changes in relevant law and the implementation of dispute 
settlement that is international and between private parties. The modern prevalence of 
arbitration as a method of resolving international disputes, both in contractual and non-
contractual settings, has generated a number of rules and customs that were either absent 
or in their early stages of development when the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules were drafted. 
Many of these contemporary rules and practices are accounted for in the new 
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UNCITRAL Rules, as are some of the pervasive problems of modern international 
arbitration. 
 
1. Subject matter 
UNCITRAL Rules were developed to focus on commercial transactions between 
private parties and therefore private commercial arbitration, and were not specifically 
developed for the resolution of disputes involving investor-state claims, or to consider 
claims for breach of customary or international law – other international dispute 
settlement mechanisms exist for those purposes.248  From a procedural perspective, 
disputes in which a state is a party involve questions of law or public interest that are 
different from an arbitration between private commercial parties because there exists 
significantly more flexibility for private parties to specifically tailor their contracts while 
contracts involving state actors are bound to a certain degree by fundamental public 
policy that cannot be contracted out of.  This basic difference between state and 
commercial arbitrations has direct implications for the conduct of the arbitration.249  As 
an example, it may be necessary for specific procedural arrangements which could 
include separate phases on jurisdiction and admissibility before the submission of a 
statement of claim, amicus curiae briefs, and consolidation of claims and hearings.250    
Numerous ad hoc arbitrations are conducted every year under the Model 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,251 which have become “the most widely accepted set of 
procedures for . . . ad hoc arbitration proceedings.”252  The drafters of the UNCITRAL 
Rules  envisioned a potential conflict between different legal traditions in arbitration and 
attempted to soften possible effects by providing an option for dispute settlement that 
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aimed to be “culturally neutral”253 and flexible enough to enable parties to the dispute 
from different legal  backgrounds to feel relatively comfortable.  To this end, the 
UNCITRAL Rules have in effect established a universally applicable procedural format 
for the arbitral tribunal while eliminating the extremes of both Continental European and 
Anglo- American legal traditions.254     
According to the UNCITRAL Rules, much discretion is left to the individual 
arbitral tribunal which is able to “conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers 
appropriate.”255  This wide discretion is limited only by the explicit agreement of the 
parties and the mandatory requirement that each party is treated with equality and 
awarded an opportunity to be heard.256  Within its scope, the tribunal may order discovery 
of documents257, consider written witness statements instead of oral presentations258, 
appoint expert witnesses259, and determine the manner in which witnesses may be 
examined.260  These flexible provisions allow for the tailoring of the proceedings to the 
needs of a specific dispute.   
 The UNCITRAL Rules are used not only in ad hoc arbitration but they also assert 
influence over the procedures of a number of arbitration institutions.  The UNCITRAL 
Rules are applied by such diverse arbitration institutions as the Inter-American 
Commercial Arbitration Commission; Regional Centers of the Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Commission in Kuala Lumpur, Cairo and Nigeria; the Australian 
Arbitration Commission; the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center; and the 
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Singapore International Arbitration Center, to name only a few.  As a result, the 
UNCITRAL Rules have gained even wider acceptance as a model procedural code for 
conducting international arbitration and have contributed directly to the harmonization of 
international arbitration rules in general.261    
The UNCITRAL Rules cover notice requirements, representation of the parties, 
evidence, hearings, challenges of arbitrators, the location of arbitration, statements of 
claims, language, defenses, pleas to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, provisional remedies, 
experts, rule waivers, applicable law, settlement, interpretation of award and costs, 
among others.   Further, the UNCITRAL Rules provide that the parties shall determine an 
“appointing authority;” however, in the event that the parties are not able to reach 
agreement the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague will 
make the appropriate choice.262   
2. UNCITRAL Model Law 
In addition to the 1976 Model Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL has also developed 
the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.263  The intent behind the 
creation of the UNCITRAL Model Law was to provide a foundation and a set of rules 
that would be acceptable throughout the world and which could be progressively adopted 
by national legislators in situations relevant to international commercial arbitration.264  
The application of the Model Law is restricted to commercial matters and to international 
cases; however, the text could be an appropriate model if a country wanted to extend the 
coverage of the Model Law to certain non-commercial disputes.265   
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The drafters of the UNICTRAL Model Law focused on the expectations of 
parties as expressed in their arbitration which, prior to the drafting of the Model Law was 
oftentimes frustrated by mandatory provisions of applicable law applied by the tribunal to 
the arbitration proceedings.266  Among the objectives of the Model Law were to devise a 
fairly complete and generally acceptable set of non-mandatory provisions, closely 
patterned after, but at times distinguished from, UNCITRAL Rules.         
The UNCITRAL Model Law was created as a means to provide a potential 
solution to address the many disparities in national laws related to dispute settlement and 
is intended to complement the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.  In national laws based on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, the text tends to almost literally repeat a number of 
provisions in the New York Convention.267  The growing number of adoptions and 
adaptations of the Model Law leads to increasing predictability and uniformity in the 
application of the New York Convention – the core document of the entire modern 
system of international commercial arbitration. 
 
 The UNCITRAL working group that drafted the Model Law considered 
providing for assistance in taking evidence during foreign proceedings.  The vision was 
to create something similar to rules of discovery; however, the concept was abandoned, 
and assistance was limited to domestic proceedings, this was a facilitated agreement  
between those in favor of international assistance and those who considered any court 
assistance contrary to the private nature of arbitration.268  The middle ground – those in 
favor of assistance for domestic but not foreign proceedings – held that “[a]n acceptable 
system of international court assistance could not be established unilaterally through a 
model law since the principle of reciprocity and bilaterally or multilaterally accepted 
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procedural rules were essential conditions for the functioning of such a system.”269  
Therefore directly addressing the need for assistance in conducting discovery during 
international arbitration proceedings under the UNCITRAL was left for another time. 
 
 The Model Law does “establish a universal procedural format for the arbitral 
trial”270 while eliminating the extremes of both Continental and American legal traditions.  
It has even been noticed that by accepting the Model Law, a number of common law 
jurisdictions used it as a tool to “get away from their origins in this field.”271  It can be 
attributed to this reason that the Model Law does not contain strict rules regarding 
arbitration procedure, such as discovery, cross-examination, of documentary evidence.  
Instead, the Model Law provides for flexibility of proceedings which the parties or 
arbitrators can adjust to the needs of a particular dispute.  
 
Article 1(1) states that the Model Law relates to international commercial 
arbitration but is subject to all agreements in force between states or a state.  The 
geographic scope of the Model Law is determined by the place of arbitration under 
Article 1(2).  The Model Law applies if the place of arbitration is a Model Law state.  
Model Law Article 4 is patterned after Article 30 of the UNCITRAL Rules as it discusses 
objections to jurisdiction and clarifies that if a parties’ objection is not timely, it loses the 
right to claim that a provision of the Model Law or any clause of the arbitration 
agreement has not been complied with. 
 
 The Model Law defines an arbitration as international in Article 1(3) in that the 
parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of acceptance of the agreement, their 
business operations headquarters located in different States, or one of the following 
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places is located beyond the borders of the State in which the parties maintain business 
operations: 1) the venue of the arbitration if agreed to and articulated in the terms of the 
binding arbitration agreement; or (2) any other venue where a significant portion of the 
obligations of the commercial relationship is to be performed or the place with which the 
subject-matter of the dispute is most closely connected; or (3) agreement has been clearly 
reached by the parties that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more 
than one country. 
 The requirement for the arbitration agreement is stated in Article 7(2), but the 
definition of writing is broadened and adapted to modern commercial practices.  Article 8 
provides for the court to refer the parties to arbitration, unless the agreement is found null 
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.  Also, the Model Law allows 
arbitration to proceed concurrently as the issue is being considered by a court with 
national jurisdiction.  Article 9 sets forth the grounds for court-ordered interim measures. 
 
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 16 addresses the competence of the tribunal and 
states that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction.  Any claim contesting the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal must be raised no later than the submission of the 
statement of defense.272  Article 16 continues to explain that a party is not blocked from 
initiating this type of plea by the fact that they have appointed, or participated in the 
appointment of an arbitrator.  A claim that the Tribunal is mobbing beyond the scope of 
its authority must be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its 
authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings.273 
  
With respect to ruling on claims that the arbitral tribunal has exceeded its scope, 
under UNCTIRAL Model Law the tribunal has the power to decide on such a plea either 
as a preliminary question or in an opinion addressing the substantive aspects of the 
case.274  In the event that the tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it indeed has 
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jurisdiction, within thirty days any party may request an external court to review the 
matter.  During the time that this type of request is being considered, the arbitral tribunal 
has the authority to move forward with the arbitral proceedings and even issue an opinion 
addressing the merits of the case. 
 
As to the role of national courts in interpreting the awards from international 
arbitration proceedings carried out under the UNCITRAL Model Laws, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in Ontario Canada was asked to review UNCITRAL case number 509: 
Dalimpex ltd. v. Janicki; Agros Trading Spolka Z.O.O., the Court of Appeal was asked to 
review whether the arbitral tribunal moved beyond the scope of its mandate as outlined in 
the arbitration clause of a sales contract.  On the issue of the scope of the arbitration 
clause in question, the court strongly endorsed a limited role for courts in second 
guessing the determinations made by the Arbitral Tribunal.  The court found that this was 
consistent with UNCITRAL Model Law Articles 8(1) and 16.   
  
 The Ontario Court of Appeal went on to explain that in cases where the existence 
and interpretation of the arbitration clause is not clear, “it may be preferable to leave any 
issue related to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement” for the 
determination by the arbitral tribunal in the first instance under article 16 of the Model 
Law.275  The court further stated that this deferential treatment of the Arbitral Tribunal is 
consistent with the initial decision of the parties to submit to international arbitration in 
the first place and it is not for domestic courts to intervene into this contractual 




3. Potential Parties  
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Under the UNCITRAL Rules and the Model Law, it is possible for submission to 
arbitration to be ad hoc for a particular dispute; however, most commonly arbitration is 
established in advance through a general submission to arbitration clause included during 
the contracting phase although the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules no longer require the 
existence of a contract between the parties.  Further, nothing in the Rules limits their use 
to nationals of states that are member states of the United Nations.276  2010 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules Article 1, Scope of Application, clarifies that the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules apply where parties have agreed that disputes between them, 
contractual or not and in writing or not, shall be referred to UNICTRAL Arbitration and 
subject to modifications as agreed upon by the parties.   
  The very presence of a state as a party in a dispute heightens the degree of public 
interest because nationals and residents of that state have a vested interest in how the 
government acts during the arbitration and in the outcome of the arbitration.  Further, the 
existence of this public interest has direct implications for the conduct of the arbitration: 
good governance and accountability in a democratic society require that government 
activities be transparent and open to public participation.277  Further, many state 
arbitrations, particularly those arising under investment protection, involve direct 
allegations of government misconduct.  Therefore it is reasonable and expected for there 
to be a high level of public interest to understand the allegations, facts and outcome of the 
case.  
D. World Trade Organization 
WTO dispute settlement provides a particularly interesting system for analysis because 
the WTO is a member organization and only governments can become WTO Member 
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States. 278  Moreover, it is the only system so far with a fully developed appeal 
mechanism. The primary goal of WTO dispute settlement is to ensure national 
compliance with multilateral trade rules and specifically the WTO covered agreements.  
While technically the dispute settlement mechanism is open only to a WTO Member 
State to bring a claim against another WTO Member State for the violation of a WTO 
covered agreement, in practice oftentimes the interests that are raised are those of the 
business community.   In these situations, the private actors lobby their government to 
bring on their behalf before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body a claim that another 
Member State has violated a WTO covered agreement or series of agreements. 
 While private interests do tend to be considered in WTO dispute settlement, it is 
important to note that only those private interests that can reasonably be linked to the 
actions of a WTO Member State in violation of the WTO covered agreements are 
applicable in that only the WTO member State can choose to bring a claim.  WTO 
dispute settlement would not be appropriate for private interests related to the violation of 
a contractual relationship between two parties for example.  This is a very important 
point of distinction between WTO dispute settlement and dispute settlement within the 
ICSID and UNCITRAL systems.  UNCITRAL and ICSID dispute settlement 
mechanisms derive their authority in an ad hoc way from the specific voluntary consent 
of parties to place their disputes before one of these mechanisms.  Further, the ICSID and 
UNCITRAL do not have covered agreements and their dispute settlement systems focus 
solely on contract enforcement.  The parties must have entered into a contractual 
arrangement and have decided to voluntarily submit to this method of dispute settlement 
through the inclusion of an arbitration clause in the contractual agreement that forms the 
basis for the international dispute.   
In the WTO system, by virtue of being a member, Member States have already 
agreed to comply with the requirements of WTO covered agreements and have provided 
consent to submit themselves to WTO dispute settlement.  From a contractual 
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perspective, all Members of the WTO, upon becoming a member, have entered into a 
contract to abide by the WTO covered agreements and that contract contains a clearly 
defined dispute settlement mechanism.  Making the WTO system further unique is the 
fact that the procedural aspects of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism are articulated 
in very specific detail, leaving very limited flexibility for significant tailoring to the 
specificities of a particular dispute.         
1. Subject matter 
The power to settle international disputes with an authority that is binding 
distinguishes the WTO from most other intergovernmental institutions. The 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 
gives the WTO unprecedented power to resolve trade-related conflicts between Members 
and to assign penalties and compensation to parties involved.  Unlike the jurisdiction of 
other international State-to-State dispute settlement mechanisms, such as the International 
Court of Justice, the WTO jurisdiction is: 1) compulsory; 2) exclusive; and 3) only 
contentious.279 The jurisdiction of the WTO is compulsory because by virtue of 
membership in the WTO a Member has no choice but to accept the jurisdiction of the 
WTO dispute settlement system.280  Regarding exclusivity, Article 23.1 of the DSU 
states: 
When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other 
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an 
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they 
shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this 
Understanding.281  
Under this provision, a complaining member of the WTO is obliged to bring any dispute 
arising under the covered agreements to the WTO dispute settlement system.  This 
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obligation was further clarified by the panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act (2000) when 
it ruled that Article 23.1 of the DSU: 
Imposes on all Members [a requirement] to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral 
process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency.  
In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute 
settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of 
unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations.282 
Article 23.1 of the DSU ensures both the exclusivity of the WTO as related to other 
international dispute settlement systems and protects the multilateral system from 
unilateral conduct.283  With respect to contentious WTO jurisdiction, unlike the 
International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the 
WTO dispute settlement system has only contentious, and not advisory, jurisdiction.  In 
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses (1997), the Appellate Body held: 
Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not 
consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the 
Appellate Body to ‘make law’ by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO 
Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute.284  
Therefore, the WTO dispute settlement system can only be called upon to clarify WTO 
law in the context of an actual WTO Member dispute.285 
As dispute settlement under the GATT, at least in the beginning,  tended to be 
more negotiation-based, dispute resolution was characterized by the flexibility of 
procedures, the control of the dispute by the parties and the freedom to accept or reject 
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opinions and proposed settlements.286   These diplomatic solutions were favored by those 
Members who valued flexibility and looked upon international trade disputes as 
inherently political. Conversely, the WTO dispute settlement system is adjudication-
based and strives for legalistic, impartial and objective procedures which lead to 
heightened predictability and precise definitions of obligations and effective means of 
implementation.287    
The creation of the WTO DSU was a substantial step in the gradual shift from a 
diplomatic and power-based approach to the settlement of international disputes to a 
more legalistic, law-based approach.288   Dispute settlement procedures are central in the 
WTO's mechanisms designed to ensure the reduction of tariffs and nontariff barriers to 
trade as well as the elimination of discriminatory treatment in trade relations.  
 WTO dispute settlement is administered by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
Among its powers, the DSB has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and 
Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and 
recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under 
the WTO agreements. The dispute settlement system aims to resolve disputes by 
clarifying the rules of the multilateral trading system because the WTO cannot legislate 
or directly promulgate new rules or regulations without explicit Member consent. 
The DSB has jurisdiction over any dispute arising out of the WTO Agreements. 
If a Member State determines that another Member State is not complying with its WTO 
obligations, for example, by imposing tariffs or other trade restrictions, the aggrieved 
member state can bring the dispute to the DSB. The disputing parties are given up to 
sixty days to resolve the dispute through consultation.289 If the parties fail to reach a 
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resolution by diplomatic means at the end of this period, the DSB appoints a Panel of 
three (or in some cases five) arbitrators to review the case and issue a report.290 The 
report of the Panel is then adopted by the DSB, unless there is a consensus against 
adopting it.291 Officially the job of the Panel is to give recommendations, but because of 
the high threshold for rejecting a Panel's report (unanimity of members, including the 
losing state), the reports are extremely difficult to overturn. However, the Panel's report 
can be appealed in the Appellate Body. 
 
2. Potential parties 
The WTO system is for members only in that only a WTO Member State can 
bring another WTO Member State before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body for claimed 
violations of the WTO Agreements.  When the attempt to create an international trade 
organization in the late 1940s failed, the successfully-negotiated trade agreement, the 
GATT, was left without a well-defined institutional structure. Only a few clauses with 
regard to dispute settlement were contained in the original GATT, most of which 
centered around Article XXIII. The article states that a Member country may request 
consultations with another Member country should it consider that the other Member 
country’s trade measure may lead to the nullification or impairment of its own expected 
benefit. Despite the rather skeletal framework of Article XXIII, dispute settlement in the 
early stages of the GATT worked rather well, partially due to its small and homogenous 
membership.  Since its inception in 1947, the GATT evolved into a comprehensive 
framework of international trade laws as it exists today under the WTO. In 1995, the 
WTO was established following the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and 
the new dispute settlement procedures under the WTO altered several features of the 
previous GATT mechanism.    
While the diplomatic method of the GATT tended to be easier and less expensive 
for developed countries than for other WTO members, the strengthening of the dispute 
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settlement mechanism improved the situation of developing countries by better insulating 
them from the pressures of power politics.292   Developing countries commonly find 
themselves at a disadvantage during political bargaining because they often rely upon 
developed countries for aid, military assistance or technical transfers and are therefore 
afraid to "bite the hand that feeds them". A developing country also has a smaller impact 
on a developed country's economy because bilateral trade is more likely to be a greater 
percentage of the developing country's gross domestic product than that of the developed 
country's.293   The development of a neutral dispute settlement system under the WTO has 
helped to level the playing field by limiting the scope of debate to the legal merits of the 
specific case and therefore offers increased judicial protection to a developing or least 
developed country litigant against more powerful developed country adversaries.294     
E. Due process in the ICSID, UNCITRAL and the WTO 
While in general in their respective rules and case law the ICSID and UNCITRAL 
systems do not spend much time addressing procedural due process requirements but 
rather leave much to the discretion of the parties or the decision-makers with little 
guidance, in the WTO context due process has been the subject of significant 
consideration in both the Covered Agreements and respective case law which 
demonstrates the complexity often encountered when the principles of due process are 
applied to international settings. 
Application of the principles of due process falls within the jurisdiction of a 
WTO panel unless such principles are already incorporated in provisions of the DSU or 
other Covered Agreements. The DSU provides significant guidance to WTO Tribunals as 
to how dispute settlement proceedings should be conducted - therefore ensuring that the 
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case a Member is required to answer is clearly presented,295  that parties have sufficient 
opportunity to present their positions,296  and that WTO Tribunals appropriately address 
the arguments posed by Members.297  Of importance to note is that some constituent rules 
of due process are not explicitly covered in the DSU. Examples include the ability of a 
party to secure non-governmental representation or to raise a defense after it has made its 
first submission. Careful analysis by the panel of the application of due process is 
necessary to come to appropriate conclusions that ensure the protection of the rights of 
the parties. 
The application of due process depends largely on the forum in which it is 
applied.  In the international setting, there is no universally accepted approach to due 
process protection and in the WTO context it merely guides the way in which the panel 
exercises its functions in coming to factual and legal determinations under the Covered 
Agreements.298  Further, as case law of the Appellate Body has demonstrated, the DSU is 
predicated on WTO Tribunals acting in accordance with due process.  More broadly 
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speaking, international tribunals may be required to exercise their inherent jurisdiction to 
apply general principles of law that protect fundamental procedural norms consistent with 
due process protection.299  For example, Carlston states with respect to international 
tribunals: 
Express provisions are usually made in rules of procedure with a view to 
safeguarding fundamental procedural rights (due process) ... While observing the 
provisions of the instrument - which is the basic law for the tribunal - the tribunal 
is also expected to conform its operations to the basic procedural norms. 
Accordingly, the fundamental procedural norms, whether or not expressly 
provided for, comprise (1) "certain fundamental rules of procedure" (2) which are 
"inherent in the judicial process," and (3) generally recognized in all procedure. 
Under this line of reasoning, to maintain essential legitimacy, all international 
dispute settlement mechanisms  have the inherent power and obligation to observe the 
requirements of due process even without specific provisions empowering or requiring 
them to do so.300  For the purpose of the comparative analysis between the WTO, ICSID 
and UNCITRAL systems, it will then be taken as a given that they each have the 
obligation to respect due process protection and therefore the three requirements that 
compose due process protection as established above.  In the context of the WTO 
additional analysis of the exactly how due process fits into the WTO DSU is included in 
the rather expansive jurisprudence on the subject and provides interesting background 
particularly as comparable articulation is not present in the case law of either the 
UNCITRAL or ICSID systems.     
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F. Article 11 of the WTO DSU and due process 
Due to the robustness of relevant case law in this field, the WTO will continue to be 
referred to in order to exemplify one approach to the protection of due process in 
international dispute settlement.  In line with their judicial function, WTO panels have 
the obligation to conduct an "objective assessment" of the dispute they are considering. 
Article 11 of the DSU provides in relevant part that: 
a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings 
as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings 
provided for in the covered agreements.301 
While in some cases an application of this provision in the due process context 
appears to be reasonable, at times there seems to be a reluctance of WTO panels to 
embrace their inherent jurisdiction which has led to what can be described as some 
inappropriate interpretations of the "objective assessment" requirement. 
 
G. Wilful disregard by WTO panels to conduct an objective assessment results in due 
process violation 
The application of the “objective assessment” requirement under Article 11 may be 
interpreted so as to reasonably yield the same result of the proper application of 
principles of due process because fundamentally both are seeking to protect the basic 
rights of the parties, consistent with the three requirements of due process protection.  A 
particular example is the appeal in E.C. - Hormones, the European Communities made 
the claim that the initial panel "disregarded or distorted" evidence and therefore was 
 





unable to effectively conduct an objective assessment as required by Article 11.302  The 
E.C. argued that the panel failed to take into consideration opinions of identified experts, 
mischaracterized and even misquoted some statements.303  The Appellate Body analyzed 
that the Article 11 requirement that panels make an objective assessment of the facts 
presented includes "an obligation to consider the evidence presented to a panel and to 
make factual findings on the basis of that evidence."304  Any panel deliberately 
disregarding or willfully distorting or misrepresenting evidence fails to make an objective 
assessment, resulting in the denial of "fundamental fairness, ... due process of law or 
natural justice." 305 With respect to the current case, the Appellate Body determined that 
while the panel may have misinterpreted evidence, the presence of this misinterpretation 
alone does not rise to the level of arbitrarily ignoring or manifestly distorting evidence in 
violation of Article 11.306   
 The language from the Appellate Body in this case is important because it clearly 
links the requirement that a panel objectively consider the facts and evidence presented 
and the deliberate failure of a panel to do so with the violation of due process.  However, 
at this point the Appellate Body seems to be considering only willful or deliberate 
behavior of the panel.  What about a situation where the panel unknowingly makes a 
mistake?  
H. Due process protection is implicit in an objective assessment 
There is some debate as to how far beyond an objective assessment under Article 11 the 
panel analysis should proceed when considering applications of the due process concept 
and whether some panels or even the Appellate Body have exceeded the authority of the 
DSU.  In the Appellate Body case Chile - Price Band System, Chile presented a case that 
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the panel violated due process by holding that a measure violated a provision of the 
Covered Agreements not mentioned in Argentina's Request for Panel Establishment.307  
The Appellate Body presented and clarified that the relationship between due process and 
Article 11 is as follows: 
In making "an objective assessment of the matter before it" [as required by 
Article 11], a panel is ... duty bound to ensure that due process is respected. Due 
process is an obligation inherent in the WTO dispute settlement system. A panel 
will fail in the duty to respect due process if it makes a finding on a matter that is 
not before it, because it will thereby fail to accord to a party a fair right of 
response.308  
In this case, the Appellate Body seems to be putting the complete content of the 
principle of due process into Article 11, however at the same time into the requirement of 
an "objective assessment," or, at the least, into the text of the Covered Agreements. The 
reference to due process as an "obligation inherent in the WTO dispute settlement 
system," however, suggests, contrary to the Appellate Body's explicit reasoning, that 
panels must accord due process and that the Appellate Body may review the panel's 
conduct in this regard independently of Article 11 and its requirement of "objective 
assessment." Following this line of reasoning, the Appellate Body and panels may 
directly apply the principles of due process because the WTO dispute settlement system 
requires it both for legitimacy and to ensure that judicial process is maintained 
appropriately. 
The Appellate Body's view that due process is implicit in Article 11 seems to 
have been confirmed in the Canada - Hormones Suspension decision. In this case the 
Appellate Body was considering "the European Communities' claims that the panel failed 
to respect the principle of due process and, consequently, also failed to make an objective 
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assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU."309 The Appellate Body stated that 
it "has found that due process is required by Article 11 of the DSU"310 and quoted its 
statement to this effect in the U.S. – Gambling case as follows: "as part of their duties, 
under Article 11 of the DSU, to "make an objective assessment of the matter' before 
them, panels must ensure that the due process rights of parties to a dispute are 
respected."311  
In the earlier Canada - Hormones Suspension case, the Appellate Body provided 
the following explanation regarding the application of due process principles: 
The Appellate Body has previously found that the obligation to afford due 
process is "inherent in the WTO dispute settlement system"312 and it has 
described due process requirements as "fundamental to ensuring a fair and 
orderly conduct of dispute settlement proceedings".313  In our view, the protection 
of due process is an essential feature of a rules-based system of adjudication, 
such as that established under the DSU.314  Due process protection guarantees 
that the proceedings are conducted with fairness and impartiality, and that one 
party is not unfairly disadvantaged with respect to other parties in a dispute.315  
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Further, in agreeing in Canada - Hormones Suspension with the E.C. that the 
appointment of an expert who was not impartial would breach due process, the Appellate 
Body referred to "due process protection" 316  and "due process rights,"317 instead of the 
need for "objectivity." The Appellate Body held that the manner in which the panel had 
used the evidence of two experts was "not compatible with the due process obligations 
that are inherent in the WTO dispute settlement system."318  The Appellate Body 
determined that "the Panel infringed [on] the European Communities' due process 
rights."319  In U.S. – Gambling, the Appellate Body provided more detail with respect to 
due process and Article 11 when it clarified that the principle of due process "obliges a 
responding party to articulate its defense promptly and clearly" and may oblige a panel 
either to refuse to consider a defense to which "the complaining party had no meaningful 
opportunity to respond"320  or to adjust its timetables to allow additional time to 
respond.321   
In some cases, it seems that due process requirements have the potential to 
preclude the exercise of judicial economy. For example, in the appeal in E.C. - Sugar, the 
Appellate Body referred to the requirement in Article 11 of the DSU that panels "make 
such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving 
the rulings provided for in the covered agreements."322  Here, the Appellate Body found 
that the panel failed to comply with this requirement and therefore exercised 
inappropriate judicial economy because in not ruling on certain claims under Article 3 of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), the panel eliminated 
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317 Ibid at paras 480-81. 
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the potential for the complainants to obtain the special remedy under Article 4.7 of the 
ASCM available for successful claims under Article 3.323   
PART III 
ANALYSIS OF THE ICSID, UNCTRAL AND WTO SYSTEMS’ VARYING 
APPROACHES TO DUE PROCESS PROTECTION 
 
In an attempt to further develop what in practice is required to ensure the protection of 
due process in international dispute settlement, the below comparative analysis will 
examine the three dispute settlement mechanisms in light of the three requirements for 
due process protection as established above as a framework.  The three requirements for 
the protection of due process are as follows: 
1. The tribunal must be independent and impartial, 
2. The parties must be given adequate notice of the proceedings, and 
3. The parties must be given adequate opportunity to be heard and present their case 
 
The analysis will attempt to identify and compare how each mechanism’s dispute 
settlement rules procedurally address the requirements of due process, consider 
allowances for procedural flexibility, identify areas for improvement and then propose 
systematic alterations through the development of international due process protecting 
principles.   
Given that there are fundamental differences between each of the three 
mechanisms selected for comparison, a “one size fits all” solution will not be possible 
and the need to develop policy options becomes evident.  The proposed policy options for 
the protection of due process will seek to take lessons or effective practices from one of 
the considered mechanisms and suggest their application to another mechanism.  The 
policy options for the protection of due process are intended to rise above an individual 
 





dispute settlement mechanism and provide guidance from a broader perspective, 
presenting a bundle of basic concepts applicable to all forms of international dispute 
settlement.   
 
Chapter 4   The independent and impartial tribunal 
 
Questions about the professional qualifications of panel members and time, effort and 
control that can be expected from panelists serving in ad hoc, part-time capacity often 
arise.  While in WTO dispute settlement panel members are usually well-versed in 
relevant policy and procedures, and are generally persons who have reputations for good 
judgment among their fellow peers, many lack the legal training or experience to render 
professionally competent judgments on complex legal issues.  In ICSID dispute 
settlement, panelists are considered to be in their private capacity, typically international 
lawyers that are practicing or international law professors.  Difficulties arise because 
many government lawyers appointed as panelists may be handling international 
arbitration for the first time and have limited international litigation experience.  
Developing country parties may not have the resources to hire leading North American 
and European law firms with substantial experience and therefore find themselves at a 
disadvantage to their developed country counterparts.  This concern is relevant also to 
WTO and UNCITRAL dispute settlement.   
The ICSID Convention requires arbitrators to be persons “who may be relied 
upon to exercise independent judgment” and permits challenge of an award for 
“departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.”   Although litigants under the ICSID 
Convention might decide to waive impartiality as a matter of contract, in so doing they 
may well remove their dispute from the legal framework applicable to arbitration in 





While the WTO DSU does not structurally guarantee the independence of the 
potential panelists, in practice independence and conflict of interest is something closely 
considered by the parties and the Secretariat.  The ICSID Convention Article 14 requires 
a certification of independence be made by the arbitrator at the beginning of the 
proceedings.  In the UNCITRAL system, a party may challenge an arbitrator only if 
circumstances exist that give rise to concerns that are reasonable or if that arbitrator does 
not have specific qualifications which the parties had agreed to.   
In the situation of WTO dispute resolution, much legitimacy comes from the 
existence of the Appellate Body and the fact that Appellate Body members must be 
"individuals with recognized standing in the field of law and international trade, not 
affiliated with any government."  In the WTO appellate process, however, the WTO DSU 
does not address the issue of an Appellate Body member being a national of one of the 
disputing parties and commonly appointments tend to be political with the US, EU and 
China having what could practically be considered permanent representation.324  While 
this requirement does exist at the WTO panel level, it may not have been seen as 
necessary at the Appellate Body level due to the fact that the Appellate Body considers 
only issues of law and how it was applied to the current case.  Issues of fact are left to the 
panel to address.   
Arbitrator conflicts of interest typically can be captured in one of two categories: 
lack of independence and lack of impartiality.  In traditional usage, independence refers 
to the absence of improper connections, while impartiality addresses matters related to 
prejudgment.325 The common assumption is that an arbitrator in international dispute 
settlement must possess both impartiality and independence.   
 
Lack of independence derives from what might be considered problematic 
relationships between the arbitrator and one party or its legal representation.  Often these 
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result from financial dealings including business transactions and various investments, 
ties sentimental in nature (including friendships and family), or links of group 
identification (for example, shared nationality).  Potential arbitrators should decline 
appointment should they have doubts regarding their ability to act impartially or 
independently, or if facts exist such as to raise reasonable concerns on either side.   
 
Even if no special relationship or financial link exists with either side, a second 
category of concerns arise if an arbitrator appears to have prejudiced some matter.  An 
arbitrator might be technically independent but may still possess internal opinions which 
prejudice his ability to act impartiality which may include prejudice, bigotry, and 
discrimination among others.  
 
More subtle examples of prejudgement include the issuance of a procedural order 
that presumes contested facts on which evidence has not yet been heard.326  Another 
example could be a situation where an arbitrator might have written an article or 
delivered a speech taking a firm position on otherwise open questions that remain central 
and controversial in the dispute.327  
A. Is it possible for parties to wave arbitrator integrity? 
In the context of the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems, a question of particular importance 
is whether independence or impartiality may be waived by fully informed litigants.  As 
submission to WTO dispute settlement is not contractually based in the same sense as for 
the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems, this is not an issue in WTO dispute settlement.  In 
some instances the answer appears to be “yes” with some conditions at least with respect 
to independence.  The International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration (IBA Guidelines) contain a “Red List” of prohibited 
relationships that bifurcates into waivable and non-waivable relationships.  The former 
include the situation where an arbitrator would act for a litigant in the case, or is a 
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member of the same firm as counsel to one side.  The latter contains an arbitrator’s 
service as director in a corporation that is party to the case or as advisor to his or her 
appointing party.328  Independence therefore seems to lend itself to waiver up to the point 
where the litigant actually becomes the judge of his own case.   
 
Prejudgment is not the same thing as independence.  Although similar, 
prejudgment would act to impede the corner stone of the arbitral process, that being the 
presumption of a quasi-judicial function of deciding legal claims after weighing evidence 
and argument.329  The lack of independence may create an imperfect arbitration; however, 
the presence of prejudgment renders the process a sham formality at an unjustifiable 
social cost.   
B. Arbitrator bias 
Parties choose arbitrators with "shared nationality or legal, political, or economic 
outlook."330  Depending upon a particular arbitrator's view of his role in relation to the 
party selecting him, he may well believe that his function is not limited to that of 
independent arbiter of law and fact, but also that of advocate.  Under arbitral rules, 
arbitrators are to be disinterested and independent of the parties, there are no guidelines 
on what this actually means in practice.331  Party-appointed arbitrators may well have 
been interviewed prior to their selection,332 or may have had a personal or professional 
relationship with the appointing disputant, and therefore will hold some degree of 
gratitude for that side for the prestige and financial compensation that will accrue from 
sitting on an international arbitration panel. 
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The notion of adjudicator as advocate for one side is unseemly, particularly in 
international proceedings involving a state party.  Once the pleadings are closed, and the 
matter proceeds to hearing, investor-state arbitration takes on the essence of common law 
litigation, including adversariness.  In the WTO context, panels are composed of three 
persons unless the parties to the dispute agree, within ten days from the establishment of 
the panel, to a panel composed of five panellists.  The Secretariat proposes nominations 
for the panel to the parties to the dispute333 and potential candidates must meet certain 
requirements in terms of expertise and independence.   
C. Impartiality of the arbitral tribunal or panel members 
Impartial rulings made by independent tribunal members help ensure that no political or 
special interest groups prejudice rulings in favor of one party.334  The WTO DSU sets 
forth detailed provisions regarding the independence of the tribunals' composition and 
deliberations.335 The DSU thereby specifically ensures that the proceedings of the WTO 
dispute settlement system are free from any undue influence of interested parties or WTO 
political divisions.336 
Dispute settlement in the WTO, however, is not a process that is entrusted in 
totality to the adjudicators. It would be wrong to qualify it as a purely judicial process 
because while the actual procedures are judicial, all results must be adopted by the DSB 
making the WTO rather more a quasi-judicial mechanism or hybrid system.337  WTO 
panels are obliged to follow the Working Procedures set out in Appendix 3 of the DSU. 
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They are however entitled to exercise their discretion to make adjustments to the 
Working Procedures as they deem fit after consulting the parties to the dispute.  It is 
important that panel procedures provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality 
panel reports, while not unnecessarily delaying the panel process. As a general rule, the 
panel process should not exceed six months (in cases of urgency three months). In no 
case should the panel process exceed nine months.338 In practice, however, panel 
proceedings often times take longer. However, compared with other quasi-judicial 
procedures, WTO dispute settlement proceeds relatively fast. 
WTO panellists may be selected from an indicative list339 of governmental and 
non-governmental individuals nominated by WTO members, although other names can 
be considered as well.  The WTO Secretariat maintains this list and periodically updates 
it according to any modifications or additions submitted by WTO members.  When the 
WTO Secretariat proposes qualified individual nominations to be panellists, the parties 
are able to screen the views and experience of proposed panellists; however, parties must 
not oppose such nominations except for compelling reasons.  This is clearly articulated in 
Article 8.10 of the DSU “the Secretariat shall propose nominations for the panel to the 
parties to the dispute.  The parties to the dispute shall not oppose nominations except for 
compelling reasons.”  In practice, many Members make extensive use of this clause and 
oppose nominations frequently and in such situations there is no review regarding 
whether the reasons given are truly compelling.  Rather, the Secretariat simply proposes 
alternate names. 
As panels have to be established for a particular case, their members are selected 
ad hoc. The DSU tries to guarantee their independence, while they are performing their 
duties. However, the DSU contains absolutely no rules that guarantee structurally this 
independence.  If one considers that being appointed as a panellist is an honour and a 
personal distinction, it is therefore not surprising that a panel member might be interested 
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in being reappointed and serving again as a panellist. It is not impossible that a panellist 
could be influenced by this wish while serving on a given panel which may therefore 
affect his decision making process and potentially the entire panel process for that case. 
The independence of panels would be strengthened if they were assisted by staff 
working exclusively for them. The reality is different: Panels are assisted by officials of 
the WTO Secretariat.340 These officials (and the administrative units to which they 
belong) are not exclusively at the service of panels, but perform a variety of other duties. 
Panellists depend on the services rendered by these officials to varying degrees, due to 
their different professional training, experience, commitments and the specific subject 
matter of the case at hand. It is reasonable to assume that the influence of these WTO 
Secretariat officials on the work of individual panels has the potential to be 
considerable.341 If panels could rely on the assistance of a group of officials who would 
work exclusively for them and who were functionally detached from the rest of the WTO 
Secretariat the above concerns regarding inappropriate influence over the panel process 
would be removed.  The WTO Appellate Body's Secretariat provides a useful example of 
this total separation. 
 
Impartiality of ICSID arbitrators is of particular importance because of the 
flexible nature of dispute settlement under the ICSID and in light of the number of 
procedural aspects left to the interpretation of the individual arbitration panel.  The 
application of such aspects oftentimes has a direct link to the outcome of the case.  ICSID 
dispute settlement presumes a minimum level of impartiality in the arbitrator’s respect for 
the parties’ to be heard.342   The ICSID Convention requires arbitrators to be persons 
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“who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment” and permits challenge of an 
award for “departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.”343       
 
In ICSID investor-state arbitration, Article 14 of the ICSID Convention is of 
particular importance when considering issues related to impartiality.  Article 14 speaks 
of the individual’s ability to “exercise independent judgment.”344  This requirement is 
supplemented by a certification of independence made by the arbitrator at the beginning 
of the proceedings.345    
 
 As highlighted above the fact that while the rules of both the ICSID and the 
WTO dispute settlement systems do have impartiality requirements, structurally there is 
no mechanism to ensure that the decision-makers are actually impartial and capable of 
appropriately executing their duties.  To a certain degree this situation creates some 
systematic vulnerability for the potential violation of the first requirement of the 
protection of due process.  While attempts to address this vulnerability through decision-
maker disclosure and disqualification have been developed, issues surrounding the effect 
of potential gratitude a selected decision-maker may feel for being selected and potential 
impacts of this gratitude remain very real and difficult to quantify.   
D. Arbitrator disclosure and disqualification 
The expansion of disclosure requirements for potential arbitrators has increased in 
importance with the large number of new cases being registered by ICSID and the 
increased scope for potential conflicts of interest.  ICISD Convention Articles 14(1) and 
40(2) require all ICSID arbitrators to be persons of high moral character and recognized 
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon 
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to exercise independent judgement.  Rule 6 functions to better ensure arbitrator 
impartiality and independence.346   
 
ICSID Rule 6 requires the potential arbitrator to disclose, in addition to past or 
present relationships with the parties, any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to the arbitrator’s reliability for independent judgment.347  Under a former 
version of rule 6, it was only required for the arbitrator to disclose any past or present 
professional, business, and other relationships (if any) with either party.348  Moreover, the 
current Rule 6 extends the period of time over which disclosures must be made by 
requiring that the obligation continue throughout the entire proceeding rather than only 
being in effect at its initiation. 
 
Further, ICSID Arbitration Rule 6(2) requires each arbitrator, prior or during the 
Tribunal’s first session, to sign a declaration affirming that the individual will “judge 
fairly as between the parties, according to the applicable law” and attach a statement of 
past and present professional, business, and other relationships with the parties as well as 
any other circumstances that might cause the arbitrator’s reliability for independent 
judgement to be questioned by a party.349  In signing the declaration, the arbitrator 
assumes a continuing obligation to promptly notify ICSID of any such relationship that 
subsequently arises during the proceedings.350   
 
A party to the ICSID arbitration may propose disqualification of an arbitrator on 
account of any fact indicating a “manifest” inability to meet that standard.  Article 57 of 
the ICSID Convention provides that any party may request to a Tribunal or Commission 
the “disqualification of any of its members on account of any fact indicating a manifest 
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lack of the qualities required by paragraph (1) of Article 14.”351  Moreover, a party to an 
arbitration proceeding may request that an arbitrator be disqualified on the ground that he 
was “ineligible for appointment to the Tribunal under Section 2 of Chapter IV.352   
 
Should a dissatisfied party contest a single arbitrator’s fitness on an ICSID 
proceeding, the remaining arbitrators typically determine whether the individual lacks the 
capacity to exercise independent judgment.353  According to Article 58, the challenged 
arbitrator would first be given the opportunity to “furnish explanations.”354  In the event 
that the challenge relates to a majority of the arbitral tribunal, or if the remaining two 
members are divided equally, the disqualification decision will be left to the Chairman of 
the ICSID Administrative Council.355  This post is filled automatically by the President of 
the World Bank.356  Any review of the resulting award would be made by an ICSID-
appointed panel rather than national judges who might conduct their own review of 
independence and impartiality.357   
 
In the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 11, imposes a continuous 
duty of disclosure, under which arbitrators are required to disclose any circumstances 
likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence as and 
when they arise during the proceedings.  Articles 12 and 13 address challenging 
arbitrators if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to an arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence.    
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Article 10 of the UNCITRAL Model Law explains that the parties are free to 
determine the number of arbitrators; however, it further clarifies that in the absence of 
such an agreement, the number of arbitrators shall be three.  With respect to the 
appointment of arbitrators, Article 11 states that no person shall be precluded from being 
appointed an arbitrator by reason of their nationality, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties.  Further, the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrators.   
 
 Article 12 and 13 of the UNCITRAL Model Law address the grounds for 
challenging an arbitrator and the relevant procedure.  When a person is approached in 
connection with the possible appointment as an arbitrator, he is required to disclose any 
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or 
independence.  An arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise 
to concerns that are justifiable or if he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the 
parties.  A party is free to challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, only for reasons of 
which he has become aware after the appointment has been made.  Article 13(3) requires 
the prospective or appointed arbitrator to disclose all circumstances that might cause 
doubt on his impartiality or independence. 
E. Composition of arbitral tribunal or panel 
Because so many procedural aspects of ICSID dispute settlement are left to the discretion 
and interpretation of the individual arbitration panel, the composition of the ICSID 
arbitration panel is very important and highly defined by the ICSID Arbitration Rules.  
There are several unique aspects to composition of an ICSID arbitral tribunal.  First, 
before a party may appoint an arbitrator, the parties must agree on the number of 
arbitrators and how each will be appointed.358 Should the parties fail to reach agreement 
within 60 days after the initial filing of the arbitration Request; the traditional default 
rules relating to a three person tribunal are then applied.359   
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Under ICSID dispute settlement, after the number of arbitrators and method of 
their appointment is agreed by both parties involved in the case, parties are then free to 
appoint an arbitrator directly and are not limited to the Panel of Arbitrators maintained by 
the Centre.  However, there are some limitations regarding the nationality of arbitrators 
selected.  The ICSID Convention provides that unless all members of the Tribunal are 
appointed by agreement of the parties, the majority of arbitrators must be nationals of 
States other than the Contracting State party to the dispute and the Contracting State 
whose national is a party to the dispute.360  In other words, as explained in the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, a party is not allowed to appoint a co-national as an arbitrator.  This 
feature of ICSID arbitration was designed with the intent to create a non-political forum 
for dispute resolution. 
 
The relevant provisions of the ICSID Convention on the requirements and 
qualifications in respect of the selection of arbitrators for ICSID tribunals (first instance) 
and ad hoc annulment committees are found in articles 12-14, 39-40, and 52(3).  ICSID 
tribunal arbitrators may come either from the ICSID's Panel of Arbitrators as appointed 
by each of the contracting states, or from outside in which case they are required to 
possess the same qualities as those of the panel of arbitrators as set out in article 14(1):  
 
Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral 
character and recognized competence in the Fields of law, commerce, industry or 
finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment.   
 
Competence in the Field of law shall be of particular importance in the case of 
persons on the Panel of Arbitrators.  Under article 52(3), the three ad hoc annulment 
committee members are all to come from the panel of arbitrators, and are not to be 
nationals of either the disputing state party or of the state of the disputing investor.  
 





Besides these restrictions, the competence and moral character requirements are identical 
as between the two types of panels.361 
 
The most important players, the arbitrators, are private agents, typically 
practicing international lawyers or professors of international law.  The ICSID 
Convention itself leaves the selection to the parties, and, in the usual case where the 
arbitral tribunal is composed of three members, the chairman of the panel will be chosen 
either by consent of the disputants or the two-already selected arbitrators, or by another 
trusted agent such as the Secretary-General of the ICSID or the President of the 
International Court of Justice.362  Traditionally, the chairman cannot be a national of 
either party. 
 
Two problems are common to this type of approach.  First, the impression of 
each disputant that party-selected arbitrators are partial, and secondly a lack of assurance 
in advance that the president is an appropriate choice.  Investment treaties can easily 
avoid these problems by having the state parties select at the outset of ratification a roster 
of panellists who are third party nationals.  These persons could then be selected for 
service on specific claims at random to preside on panels, serve sole panellists, or even 
make up the entire three members of the panel.  Having the state parties choose a 
respected group of jurists in advance would could serve on multiple occasions, for a fixed 
period of time, would also help to add stability and consistency to a particular treaty’s 
jurisprudence 
 
While the ICSID Centre itself performs administrative functions, and has a list of 
arbitrators from subscribing parties, tribunals may consist of entirely non-listed panellists, 
and in practice, arbitrations proceed in very much the same manner as other "pure" ad 
hoc mechanisms such as those under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.  
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With respect to the WTO, there are concerns that the WTO panel procedure is in 
need of greater legal rigor than in the past to enable it to address the increased complexity 
of the cases being filed, to satisfy the more rigorous standards that are being applied to its 
decisions by the Appellate Body, and so that its decisions will have the requisite 
legitimacy needed to justify their automatically binding character. 363 The first issue that 
tends to be raised in connection with such concerns is the ad hoc, part-time nature of the 
panel itself, particularly as it relates to (a) the professional qualifications of the panel 
members and (b) the time, effort, and control that can be expected from panel members 
serving in an ad hoc, part-time capacity. 
The DSU contains detailed rules on the composition of panels and clarifies 
necessary steps and the role of the WTO Director General should parties fail to agree on 
the panel's composition. Under the GATT dispute settlement system, only government 
officials served on panels; however, today the WTO allows well-qualified non-
government individuals to serve on a panel and DSU Article 8.1 forbids a potential panel 
member from serving on a panel if he or she is a citizen of a Member-state party to the 
dispute, or a citizen of a third party, unless the parties agree otherwise.364        
Today's panel members are usually well-versed in WTO policy and procedures, 
and are generally persons who have a reputation for good judgment among their fellow 
diplomats. However, many lack the legal training or experience to render professionally 
competent judgments on complex legal issues. Since the early 1980s, the majority of 
panel members have tended to rely on the advice of the Secretariat's legal staff on such 
legal issues. While most panel members have insisted on exercising their own judgment 
at the end of the day, Secretariat legal advisors have exercised considerable influence 
over the process. 
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The degree of influence exercised by the WTO Secretariat has opened the door to 
critics which claim that Secretariat officials have no mandate to perform this quasi-
decision-making role and are not accountable to the government community because they 
take no visible responsibility for what is decided. The criticism is real however the effects 
are limited because the Appellate Body has the final responsibility for the outcome in 
most cases.   
In recent years, the WTO Secretariat has attempted to strengthen the capacities of 
panel members by repeatedly proposing a number of repeat panellists when suggesting 
possible panellists to the parties. Some of these repeat panellists can be considered legal 
experts while others are simply very well-respected diplomats who understand the 
dispute settlement process and have demonstrated good judgment in previous cases. The 
effort to increase the participation of this particular group of panel members has met with 
some success, while the inherent limitations of this strategy are real as there are limits to 
the number of cases repeat panellists can handle while maintaining their primary 
professional occupations. 
To further complicate matters, the demand for panel members has increased 
substantially over the years.  The considerable increase in the number of WTO cases has 
led to an overall increase in panel formation each year - from about seven panels per year 
at the end of the 1980s to about twelve per year at present. This means the WTO must 
staff thirty-six panels every three years, which in turn means 108 panel members have to 
be found every three years.  At the same time, the supply of panel members acceptable to 
governments is decreasing.  A major limitation on the supply of new panellists is the 
general rule against appointing nationals of a disputing party or nationals of other 
interested parties.  This rule excludes the rather large supply of qualified European 
Community and United States citizens from a very large number of panels. The recent 
expansion of the European Community has further reduced the remaining list of 
recognized neutrals available.365  These serious supply limitations have recently been 
compounded by the tendency of parties to object to panellist appointees.  The more 
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important WTO litigation becomes, the more sensitive government officials seem to be 
about potential allegations of careless panel selection or, perhaps, the more they try to 
improve a losing hand by manipulating panel selection.  
 
Many government lawyers may be handling investor-state arbitration for the first 
time.  They will unlikely even have litigation experience outside their own countries.  In 
either case, they will have little or no familiarity with the common law features that tend 
to govern the final stages of the oral proceedings, including oral submissions, questions 
from the panel, and witness examination.  This problem of little experience is further 
expanded when developing country parties are not able to hire leading North American 
and European law firms staffed with lawyers with ample experience, many of whom will 
professionally and personally know the presiding arbitrators.  Further, respondent host 
countries will be forced to rely on government officials from home as their key witnesses 
who will in turn be subject to cross examination during the oral hearing.  Other than what 
they may have seen on English-language television, these persons will likely have little 
familiarity with this and other litigation devises, all of which may come as quite a shock.  
In contrast, most senior officials from major companies, at least in the United States, will 
likely have been personally subject to some kind of interrogation during the course of 
their careers and will be much more at ease with the process and will thus be far more 
effective witnesses. 
F. Ad hoc nature undermines due process protection 
When considering what it takes to ensure independence and impartiality for a tribunal in 
an international dispute settlement context, the Statute of the ICJ is particularly useful to 
reference and provides an illustration of the practical ways in which the potential for 
impartiality and bias can be managed in the appointment of its judges, for example.366 
Article 2 of the ICJ Statute provides that "the Court shall be composed of a body of 
independent judges elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high 
moral character who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for 
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appointment to the highest judicial offices or are juriconsults of recognized competence 
in international law."367 Once elected, the judges' independence is protected by a nine-
year term,368 during which time the judges may not exercise any national political or 
administrative function or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature.369   
Furthermore, the collegiality of the judges, registrar, and staff, as well as the deliberate 
solemnity with which the Court's business is conducted, all contribute to counterbalance 
bias a judge might be prone to.370 As one legal scholar noted about the ICJ, "once elected 
the Court is granted every facility to maintain the proper degree of judicial 
independence."371   
Additionally, Article 20 of the ICJ Statute requires every member of the Court to 
make a solemn declaration that he will to the best of his ability exercise his powers 
"impartially and conscientiously" before taking up the duties of his position.372  It is 
important to note that with respect to contentious cases, the ICJ decides in accordance 
with international law, disputes of a legal nature that are submitted to it only by states and 
the jurisdiction is based upon the consent of the states to which it is open.  Judges of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) must be “persons of high moral character, impartiality 
and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective States for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices.”373  Judges on the International Tribunal for 
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the Law of the Sea (ITLoS), must be “persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness 
and integrity and of recognized competence in the field of the law of the sea.”374 
 When considering the stringent standards clearly applied by the ICJ, ICC and 
ITLoS to ensure impartiality and neutrality of its judges, the three tribunals considered 
above do not have safeguards that rise to a level similar.  One of the largest 
vulnerabilities comes from the ad hoc nature of these mechanisms.  The WTO, with the 
exception of the Appellate Body, the ICSID and UNCTRIAL dispute settlement 
mechanisms do not have permanently standing tribunals but instead create their panels on 
an as needed basis for the life of a particular case.  Concerns surrounding this process 
relate to the ability of the dispute settlement mechanism to ensure the impartiality and 
independence of the panelists considering the time, effort and control that can be 
expected from panel members serving in an ad hoc, part-time capacity.  Further cause for 
concern comes from the fact that under the ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules a lawyer may 
act as counsel in one case and as arbitrator in another case going forward at the same 
time. In no democratic country is a practicing lawyer permitted to be a member of the 
judiciary as well. Judges cannot create decisions that might in some way aid their firm’s 
clients or partners in another case. There would be no legitimacy in their decisions if they 
did. However, arbitrators appointed under the ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules currently 
suffer from no such constraints. 
 While each of the three mechanisms do require potential decision-makers to 
disclose potential conflicts of interest before the initiation of the case, and even during 
the adjudication of the case should they be discovered at that time, there is little clear 
guidance on enforcement of the disclosure requirement and how to proceed in the event 
that impartiality or bias is discovered.  We must recall that the WTO DSU does not 
structurally guarantee the independence of the potential panelists.  The ICSID 
Convention requires a certification of independence be made by the arbitrator at the 
beginning of the proceedings and in the UNCITRAL system an arbitrator may only be 
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challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to concerns that are justifiable or if they 
do not possess specific qualifications agreed to in advance by the parties.  To a certain 
extent this situation creates some serious vulnerabilities and opens the door to potential 
violation of the first requirement for the protection of due process.   
While it is clear that some attempts to address this vulnerability through decision-
maker disclosure and disqualification have been developed, issues surrounding the effect 
of potential gratitude a selected decision-maker may feel for being selected and potential 
impacts of this gratitude remain very real and difficult to quantify.  Returning to the ICJ, 
ICC and the ITLoS example, the issue of gratitude on the part of its judges is addressed 
through the establishment of a 9-year term during which the judges are essentially 
isolated as they are not entitled to engage in activities outside the scope of their 
engagement with the ICJ, ICC or ITLoS respectively. 
 While it is clear that in order to ensure the protection of due process it is essential 
for any dispute settlement mechanism to guarantee the independence and impartiality of 
the tribunal, there is no clear guidance on how to actually ensure this in practice and what 
impartiality and independence means in light of the ad hoc nature of the three considered 
international dispute settlement mechanisms.   
 
Chapter 5 Adequate notice of the proceedings 
 
Proper and timely notice is an essential component to assuring due process protection.  
While the method of service is not an inherently difficult concept, it does require that 
which is reasonable under the particular circumstances.  Proper and effective notice to a 
single individual may be easily accomplished; however, achieving proper and effective 
notice for a potential state party, with its many organs, may be substantially more 





The traditional manner of providing notice is through personal service - hand 
delivery of the summons to the defendant by a sheriff, marshal or someone similarly 
authorized by law.  However, the difficulties of personally serving international parties to 
an action has led to permissibility of substituted service rather than personal service.  
Substituted service includes leaving the process at the defendant's home, mailing the 
process to the defendant, or, under limited circumstances publishing the content of the 
summons in a newspaper.  Generally, when the name and address of an affected party are 
reasonably ascertainable, notice by mail or other means certain to ensure actual notice has 
become generally accepted practice. 
The need for effective notice is critical because international dispute settlement 
under the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems is based upon party consent, not obligation.  
The viability and enforceability of international dispute settlement outcomes, irrespective 
of the forum, presupposes genuine consent and thus effective and proper notice to all 
parties involved is essential in assuring effective consent.  In the WTO context, this is 
different because by being a member of the WTO the Member State has automatically 
provided consent to participate in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.     
The content of the notice is also important to the protection of due process.  Just 
as other aspects of due process, there is no set yardstick for determining whether the 
content of the notice is sufficient; however, notice should at least inform the recipient of 
the impending dispute in terms which the layman can understand.       
With respect to effective notice provided to parties, each of the dispute resolution 
mechanisms considered have a different approach.  The ICSID Convention, while 
detailing some aspects of procedure, delegates a great deal of interpretative power to the 
members of the panel of a particular case.  The UNCITRAL rules require that the 
complaining party provide adequate notice in a means that provides a record of its 
transmission and the arbitral proceedings shall begin on the date the notice is received by 
the respondent.  The WTO has a very developed approach for the initiation of the dispute 





A. Preparing the ICSID claim – proper registration 
Initiating ICSID arbitration is a process with two steps.  The claimant must first lodge a 
Request for Arbitration with the ICSID.  However, the arbitration will not be considered 
commenced until the Secretary-General registers the Request.  The Secretary-General's 
obligation to register Requests represents a "screening power" requiring the Secretary-
General to conduct a prima facie jurisdictional review of the claim submitted.  The ICSID 
Convention provides that the Secretary-General "shall register the request unless he finds, 
on the basis of the information contained in the Request that the dispute is manifestly 
outside the jurisdiction of the Centre."375  To this end, parties seeking to commence 
ICSID arbitration should pay particular attention to demonstrate that each element of 
jurisdiction is satisfied to ensure that the Request will be registered.  At this point it is 
important to note the use of the prima facie standard in ICSID dispute settlement.  Here, 
the prima facie standard is used in the initial jurisdictional screening process but does not 
reach down to the analysis of the merits of the case.  This approach to the prima facie 
standard is very different to the one used by the WTO which will be further discussed 
below.  
The ICSID Secretary-General's decision on registration is not appealable.  While 
potential respondents are able to argue against registration of the Request by the 
Secretary-General by presenting evidence against jurisdiction; however, any formal 
objections to jurisdiction must be left to the determination of an ICSID Tribunal.376   
Most investor-state proceedings, including those submitted to the ICSID, bear no 
resemblance to the genteel world of state-to-state dispute resolution before such bodies as 
the WTO where only government counsels are permitted to appear, and where fact-
finding plays a limited role.  Investor claims can regularly be hotly contested and as 
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aggressively litigated as any US-type domestic civil suit, with each side accusing the 
other of serious impropriety.377   
B. UNCITRAL notice requirements 
Article 2 of the UNCITRAL Rules does not specifically address service on states.  In 
practice, claimants initiating arbitrations against states serve Notices of Arbitration to the 
respondent state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the head of the government, other 
ministries, an ambassador of the respondent state, or autonomous state agencies.  This 
practice is rather confusing, incoherent and does not assist states in receiving notice of 
proceedings in a timely manner.  The Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Report 
proposed that article 2 be revised to clarify that a state is sufficiently notified of arbitral 
proceedings initiated against it if notice is delivered to an organ of that state, capable of 
receiving service, under its laws.378   
Pursuant to UNCITRAL article 3(1), the party initiating arbitration is required to 
give the other party a notice of arbitration and the notice is required to include the 
following: 
 (a) A demand that the dispute be referred to arbitration; 
 (b) The names and contact details of the parties; 
 (c) Identification of the arbitration agreement that is invoked; 
(d) Identification of any contract or other legal instrument out of or in relation to 
which the dispute arises or, in the absence of such a contract or instrument, a 
brief description of the relevant relationship; 
(e) A brief description of the claim and an indication of the amount involved, if 
any; 
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(f) The relief or remedy sought; 
(g) A proposal as to the number of arbitrators, language and place of arbitration, 
if the parties have not previously agreed to them. 
Interestingly, the revised 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules clarify in Article 
3(5) that the constitution of the arbitral tribunal shall not be hindered by any controversy 
regarding the sufficiency of the notice of arbitration.  Further, Article 3 does not require 
that the notice of arbitration be made known to the public and provides no additional 
information on the form of service or sufficiency of service, as long as a record of 
transmission of service is generated. 
 Article 4 requires that within 30 days of the receipt of the notice of arbitration, 
the respondent is required to communicate to the claimant a response which includes the 
following: 
 (a) The name and contact details of each respondent; 
 (b) A response to the information set forth in the notice of arbitration; 
 (c) Any plea that the arbitral tribunal to be constituted lacks jurisdiction; 
(d) A brief description of the counterclaims or claims for the purpose of a set-off, 
if any, including were relevant, an indication of the amounts involved, and the 
relief or remedy sought. 
C. WTO consultations 
The initial step to adjudicating a case before a WTO panel is for the complaining 
Member to bring a formal request for consultations.379  Consultations are intended to 
enable the parties to gather relevant information so that they can attempt to reach a 
mutually agreed solution and in practice many disputes are settled informally through 
negotiated settlements prior to even convening the required consultations.  In situations 
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where the parties are unable to agree consultations enable them to present accurate 
information to the panel.380  Through consultations, parties are informed of the existence 
of the potential dispute, exchange information, assess the merits of their positions, and 
work to narrow contested issues.381  
The DSU requires a Member to respond to a request for consultations within ten 
days, and the Member is further required to engage in consultations within thirty days. In 
the event that consultations after 60 days from the receipt of the request fail to yield 
outcomes that are mutually agreeable, Members may request the establishment of a panel 
to resolve the dispute. The consultation process is conducted without prejudice to the 
rights of any Member in relation to the panel process and DSU Article 4.6 explains that 
confidential information received during the consultation process cannot be used in the 
panel procedure as evidence against the other parties. 
Requests for consultations should be in writing and a copy should be provided to 
the DSB in addition to the relevant WTO councils and committees for each case.382  A 
Member State's request for consultations should specify the relevant WTO agreements 
and the particular articles under which consultations are sought.383  Article 4.4 of the 
DSU requires that a complaining party "give the reasons for the request, including 
identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the 
complaint."384  Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that the request for the establishment of a 
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panel indicate whether consultations have been held and identify the specific measures at 
issue.385  It is important to note that the relationship between Article 4.4 and 6.2 is not 
entirely clear. While it seems clear that there is an obvious and necessary connection 
between these two requirements, it is not clear however to what extent the two requests 
must be identical.386  
This analysis is important from a jurisdictional perspective, because it contributes 
to the explanation of how panels and the Appellate Body develop their terms of reference 
and the extent to which WTO decision makers will consider new claims.387 There is an 
important link between WTO adjudicators' initial analysis of what measures are to be 
covered in its jurisdiction at the time of the request for the establishment of the panel (in 
cases where these measures were not raised in the consultations) and their later analysis, 
regarding what measures are to constitute part of its jurisdiction during the course of 
proceedings (when measures are amended or withdrawn). The adjudicators' initial 
analysis typically relates to those measures not included in consultations but included in 
the request for the panel, while the latter analysis usually includes measures that were 
part of the consultations but arguably no longer part of the panel's terms of reference as 
they were either amended or withdrawn. 
In determining whether and on what basis to exclude or include particular 
measures within its jurisdiction (i.e. terms of reference), panels and the Appellate Body 
are required to address issues related to due process in both their initial and subsequent 
analyses.  The following cases illustrate how the panels and Appellate Body have tended 
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to deal with this initial analysis.  In Japan-Agricultural Products II, the requests for 
consultations used the phrase "including, but are not limited to" Articles 2, 4, 5 and 8, yet 
the Panel accepted the subsequent inclusion of Article 7 in the request for the 
establishment of the panel, even though the article was not listed in the consultation 
request (the language "not limited to" was apparently sufficient in that case).388  
A different question was posed in Brazil-Aircraft.389  Here there were no 
consultations about the specific measures at issue.390 The Panel held that the measure at 
issue that was neither included in the request for consultations nor in the actual 
discussions but included in the request for the panel was deemed to be within the Panel's 
jurisdiction. The Appellate Body, in affirming the Panel's decision, stated: 
We do not believe ... that Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, or paragraphs 1 to 4 of 
Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, require a precise and exact identity between the 
specific measures that were the subject of consultations and the specific measures 
identified in the request for the establishment of a panel.391  
In Brazil-Aircraft, both the panel and Appellate Body concluded that the 
measures in question were merely subsequent regulatory measures dealing with the same 
underlying subsidies which had been identified in the consultation request and which 
formed the actual subject matter of the consultations.392 The Panel stated: "we consider 
that the consultations and request for establishment relate to what is fundamentally the 
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same ‘dispute’, because they involve essentially the same issues."393 In this case the Panel 
never eliminated the requirement that there be a relationship between Article 4.4 and 6.2 
in substance since the measures at issue were in substance the same as those that had 
been included in the request for consultations and discussed at that time.   
The requirement that the request for establishment of the panel be strictly limited 
to the matters explicitly set forth in the request for consultations tends not to be strictly 
enforced by WTO adjudicators.394  First of all, Article 4.3 of the DSU allows for 
Members to request a panel if the respondent Member does not respond to the request for 
consultations or does not engage in consultations within a certain timeframe.395  This 
suggests that adjudication can go forward without consultations. The DSB has not found 
any prejudice to parties' rights from a lack of consultations to be harmful enough to 
justify impeding the litigation. This point was considered by the Appellate Body in 
Mexico-Corn Syrup where it noted that "the DSU has explicitly recognized circumstances 
where the absence of the consultations would not deprive the panel of its authority to 
consider the matter referred to it by the DSB."396  Further the notion that consultations are 
not necessary for the establishment of the panel is also acknowledged in Article 6.2 DSU, 
which states that the request for the establishment of the panel shall indicate whether 
consultations were held.397 Accordingly, Article 6.2 may be satisfied "by an express 
statement that no consultations were held" and therefore it "envisages the possibility that 
a panel may be validly established without being preceded by consultations."398  
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Opinions of panels and the Appellate Body have emphasized the importance of 
the inter-relatedness between the request for consultations, the consultations themselves, 
and the requests for the establishment of the panel.399 In particular, the Appellate Body 
has highlighted the importance of consultations in shaping the substance of the panel 
proceedings, emphasizing that the demands of due process implicit in the DSU make full 
disclosure of facts during consultations especially important. "The claims that are made 
and the facts that are established during consultations do much to shape the substance and 
scope of subsequent panel proceedings." 400 
The Appellate Body's view however, does not automatically eliminate the claim 
that the request for the establishment of the panel should not be strictly limited to the 
matters explicitly set forth in the request for consultations.  Indeed, the very fact that 
consultations can shape the panel proceedings should be reason to allow a more flexible 
approach to the requests for the establishment of the panel, which should be influenced 
by, and not limited by the previous consultations.401  
D. Request for establishment of a WTO panel 
The initiating Member's request for the establishment of a panel plays an important role 
in determining the subject matter jurisdiction of the panel as it is incorporated into its 
terms of reference.402  Importantly, the request for establishment of a panel fulfills the due 
process objective of placing the responding party and any potential third parties on notice 
regarding the claims at issue.403  
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The formal requirements of a request for the establishment of a panel are set out 
in Article 6.2 of the DSU and include the following:  
(a) a request must be in writing;  
(b) it must indicate whether consultations were held;  
(c) it must identify a specific measure at issue;  
(d) it must provide a brief legal basis for the complaint sufficient to 
present the problem clearly and invoke the pertinent legal 
provisions.404  
The "measure at issue" requirement refers to a law or regulation, or an action that 
applies to a law or regulation which is the subject of the dispute.405  The "legal basis for 
the complaint" or the "claim" together with the "measure at issue" make up the "matter" 
before the panel, which is referred to in the standard terms of reference set out in Article 
7.1 of the DSU.406  
With respect to the terms of reference of a panel, Article 7.1 of the DSU states 
that, unless the parties agree otherwise within twenty days from the establishment of the 
panel, a panel is given the following standard terms of reference: 
To examine in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered 
agreements cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by 
(name of the party) in document … and makes such findings as will assist the 
DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in 
that/those agreement(s).407 
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In determining claims WTO panels act similarly to international courts in that 
they function independently.408  WTO panels establish the scope of the dispute they are 
considering, analyse all the submitted evidence, apply the laws that are appropriate in a 
particular situation, apply relevant law to the facts, and develop an opinion.409  In short, 
WTO panels are judicial tribunals which are required to follow a clearly defined judicial 
process. This was articulated by the Appellate Body in its decision in the Mexico - Soft 
Drinks case.  The Appellate body explained: 
WTO panels have certain powers that are inherent in their adjudicative function. 
Notably, panels have the right to determine whether they have jurisdiction in a 
given case, as well as to determine the scope of their jurisdiction. In this regard, 
the Appellate Body has previously stated that "it is a widely accepted rule that an 
international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its 
own initiative, and to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes 
before it." Further, the Appellate Body has also explained that panels have "a 
margin of discretion to deal, always in accordance with due process, with specific 
situations that may arise in a particular case and that are not explicitly 
regulated."410  
In this statement, the Appellate Body has effectively acknowledged the inherent powers 
(or inherent jurisdiction)411 of the WTO panel, but also the panels' direct application of 
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the international legal "rule" of la competence de la competence.  While this ability of the 
panel is not explicitly provided for in the text of any of the WTO Covered Agreements,  
Article 1.1 of the DSU states, in relevant part: 
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought 
pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements 
listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as 
the ‘covered agreements’). 
The WTO dispute settlement system therefore has jurisdiction over disputes between 
WTO Members arising from the covered agreements which include the WTO Agreement, 
the GATT 1994 and all other multilateral agreements on trade in goods, the GATS, the 
TRIPS Agreement, the DSU and the plurilateral Agreement on Government 
Procurement.412 When considered in its entirety, the scope of WTO jurisdiction is very 
broad as it ranges from disputes over measures regarding customs duties, disputes 
regarding sanitary measures, disputes regarding subsidies, disputes regarding measures 
affecting market access for services, to disputes regarding intellectual property rights and 
respective enforcement measures.  
A panels' and the Appellate Body's "inherent ... adjudicative function" is real and 
WTO Tribunals are therefore judicial – irrespective of the fact that some features of 
WTO dispute settlement are not typical of other international dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  These features that are unique to WTO dispute settlement include the 
requirement that reports must be adopted by the Member States for them to become 
binding as well as the possibility of consensus not to adopt a report.413  These aspects do 
not impede the WTO from judicial legitimacy as these features do not limit the fact-
finding or decision making ability of WTO panels and the Appellate Body.  
 
itself. Parties have an appeal as of right (on points of law and legal interpretations) to the 
Appellate Body.” DSU art. 17.1. Like those of panels, the Appellate Body's reports are 
automatically adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) absent negative consensus, art. 
17.14. The DSB acts in a judicial manner in conducting hearings and in making its reports.  
412 Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, et al, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization, 3rd Edition (Cambridge University Press 2013) at p. 163. 





The Appellate Body's opinion in Mexico - Soft Drinks clarified the fact that 
inherent jurisdiction flows from the nature of the judicial function rather than the 
necessity for it to be clearly spelt out in the WTO Covered Agreements or included in 
specific provisions of the instruments establishing the court or tribunal (here the DSU and 
WTO Agreement). 
The scope of a panel's jurisdiction depends upon both the subject matter of the 
dispute and the parties to that dispute414 and the request for the establishment of the panel 
determines its jurisdiction.415  Any dispute as to what should or should not be included in 
the panel's jurisdiction is ultimately decided by a WTO adjudicator and not the DSB as 
the latter decides only whether the panel should be established in the first place.416  In the 
India – Patents case, the Appellate Body stated that "a panel has the discretion to 
determine the claims it must address in order to resolve the dispute between the parties - 
provided that those claims are within that panel's terms of reference." 417  The Appellate 
Body further clarified: 
A panel's terms of reference are important for two reasons. First, terms of 
reference fulfill an important due process objective - they give the parties and 
third parties sufficient information concerning the claims at issue in the dispute in 
order to allow them an opportunity to respond to the complainant's case. Second, 
they establish the jurisdiction of the panel by defining the precise claims at issue 
in the dispute.418  
WTO jurisprudence has considered the question of the required level of 
specificity in a panel request for adequate identification of both the measure and the 
claim at issue.  In the Japan – Film case, Japan claimed that eight measures listed in the 
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panel request were inadmissible as they were only mentioned for the first time in the 
United States' first written submission to the Panel.419  The Panel disagreed, stating that 
Article 6.2 requirements are met when a measure is a subsidiary of or so closely related 
to another measure specifically identified so that the responding party can reasonably 
have had adequate notice of the claims asserted by the complaining party.420  This 
opinion is limited, however. In Indonesia - Autos, the Panel held that a loan, not 
identified in the panel request, was not within its terms of reference, despite the fact that 
it was one aspect of the larger program which was at issue before the Panel.421  
With respect to the claim or legal basis of the complaint, the Appellate Body has 
stated that the phrase "including but not limited to" is not sufficient to meet the 
complainant's burden to identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief 
summary of the legal basis of the complaint to present the problem clearly, as required by 
Article 6.2 of the DSU.422  Further, while it is necessary for the panel request to identify 
the provisions that constitute the basis of the Member's claims, simply listing the 
provisions also may not be sufficient.423  It is important that this be determined on a case-
by-case basis, taking "into account whether the ability of the respondent to defend itself 
was prejudiced, given the actual course of the panel proceedings, by the fact that the 
panel request simply listed provisions claimed to have been violated." 424 
In the EC-Bed Linen case, when faced with a failure in the request for a panel to 
list a specific treaty article alleged to have been violated, the Panel held that claims based 
 
419 Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 394, at 97, citing Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting 
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10.2 [hereinafter Japan-Film]. 
420 Ibid at 98 (citing Japan-Film, supra note 50, at para. 10.8). 
421 Ibid at 98 (citing Panel Report, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 
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on that article were outside its terms of reference, even if the omission was 
unintentional.425  It apparently was of no interest to the Panel that the article had been 
listed in the request for consultations, discussed in consultations, and covered in the 
complaining party's first written submission.426  The Panel argued that a "failure to state a 
claim in even the most minimal sense, by listing the treaty Articles alleged to be violated, 
cannot be cured by reference to subsequent submissions."427   
While the general rule is that a party asserting a particular claim carries the 
burden of proof,428 a party invoking an exception to justify action that would otherwise be 
inconsistent with its WTO obligations shifts the burden on to itself.429  The question 
therefore becomes whether proving or disproving prejudice in these cases (where the 
adjudicator has ruled that the complaining party's request is not sufficient) should be 
viewed as a general rule or an exception. There is room to argue that it is an exception 
because it is the complaining party that has not complied correctly with DSU procedures 
yet still wants to maintain its claim. In such cases, it would be unfair, as well as a waste 
of scarce judicial resources, to ask the responding party to prove prejudice in the face of 
the possibility that the claim itself may not stand. 
Despite this suggestion, however, the Panel in United States-Shrimp broadly 
interpreted the terms of reference and placed the burden of proof on the responding 
party.430  Malaysia argued in favor of expanding the jurisdiction of the panel by asking it 
to review the United States' action in relation to relevant GATT articles, in addition to the 
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rulings and recommendations of the DSB. In holding that it was fully entitled to address 
all Malaysia's claims under the above GATT articles, the Panel noted that the United 
States did not argue that Malaysia's claims were insufficiently specific or that its request 
for the establishment of an Article 21.5 panel otherwise failed to meet the requirements 
of Article 6.2 of the DSU.431  Citing the Appellate Body's decision in Canada-Aircrafts 
(21.5), it stated: 
[A] panel [under Article 21.5] is not confined to examining the measures taken to 
comply from the perspective of the claims, arguments and factual circumstances 
that related to the measure that was subject to the original proceedings. [...] 
Article 21.5 proceedings involve, in principle, not the original measure, but 
rather a new and different measure which was not before the original panel. [...] 
It is natural, therefore, that the claims, arguments and factual circumstances 
which are pertinent to the "measures to comply" will not, necessarily be the same 
as those which were pertinent in the original dispute.432  
This decision clarifies that, at least in Article 21.5 proceedings, the jurisdiction of 
the panel may not be limited to the terms of reference of the original panel.  Given that 
the United States was the responding party, and thus Malaysia, as the complaining party, 
was arguing for this exception, the burden of proving that the terms of reference were 
pleaded with sufficient specificity and that they complied with the panel's original terms 
of reference should have been Malaysia’s.433   
In general, with respect to ensuring the proper protection of due process related 
to effective notice, the WTO system provides a good example of a system that ensures 
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the provision of proper notice because for a complaining party to initiate dispute 
settlement it must first bring a formal request for consultations and then a request for the 
establishment of a panel.  As explained above, the initiating Member's request for the 
establishment of a panel plays an important role in determining the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the panel as it is incorporated into its terms of reference.  Importantly, the 
request for the establishment of a panel fulfills the due process objective of placing the 
responding party and any potential third parties on official notice regarding the existence 
of a dispute and the claims at issue.   
Under the WTO system, by virtue of being a member, Member States have 
already agreed to comply with the requirements of WTO dispute settlement, the basic 
principles employed by the WTO system and the fact that the mechanism is clearly 
defined with little flexibility is important and makes the WTO unique.  While flexibility 
in international dispute settlement is important, flexibility with respect to providing 
proper and effective notice to potential parties that a dispute exists may not be necessary 
and in fact may serve to undermine the legitimacy of the particular system itself.  A 
system that does not properly ensure the protection of due process from the very 
beginning may call into question the value of the outcomes of its dispute settlement 
process.   
Chapter 6     The right to be heard 
 
Procedural requirements for the proper protection of the right to be heard requirement of 
due process in international dispute settlement vary widely depending upon the tribunal 
but also upon the basis for the mechanism’s authority.  Adjudicating a case based on the 
UNCITRAL system is completely voluntary and based upon a contractual agreement 
between the parties, which can be states or individuals, and the parties’ providing specific 
consent to resolving their dispute in accordance with the UNCITRAL system.  The 
ICISD system is also voluntary and only open to Contracting States of the ICSID 
Convention and to nationals of States that are also members of the ICSID Convention.  





both parties.  In contrast to the UNCITRAL and ICSID systems, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System is only open to WTO Member States, not individuals, and consent to 
submitting a case to the WTO Dispute Settlement System is automatic and based upon 
the membership of a State to the WTO.        
 
Of the tribunals considered, the UNCITRAL dispute settlement process is the 
most flexible and delegates the most to the discretion of the tribunal itself.  The arbitral 
Tribunal is basically free to conduct the arbitration in any manner it considers appropriate 
and specific procedure tends to differ greatly from case to case.  A large degree of 
discretion is conferred upon the parties themselves or, if they fail to agree, to the 
decision-makers, in determining the rules of procedure.  Autonomy of the parties in 
determining the rules of procedure of their arbitration is of particular importance as it 
allows the parties to select or tailor the rules according to their specific wishes or needs.  
The UNCITRAL Rules do require the Tribunal to respect a specific formulation of due 
process and the decision-maker’s discretion is limited through the requirement that the 
Tribunal must ensure that parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the 
proceedings each party is given a full opportunity to be heard and present their case.  The 
UNCITRAL rules do not provide specific guidance as to what appropriate procedural due 
process requires or what it means for a party to be given a full opportunity to be heard 
and to present their case. 
 
ICSID investor-state arbitration allows for significant discretion on the part of the 
arbitrators but requires that as early as possible after the constitution of the Tribunal, the 
president of the Tribunal to begin the process of determining the views of the parties 
regarding procedure.  Typically the parties meet with the President to discuss issues 
related to procedure and the parties and the tribunal have substantial discretion with 
respect to procedure including: number and sequence of pleadings, whether to hold oral 
hearings, etc.   
 
In contrast to the UNCITRAL and ICSID systems, the WTO panel process is 





there is little flexibility with respect to the procedure and all evidence in the case is 
submitted and evaluated before any interim findings of fact, applicable law, or WTO 
violations are made by the panel.  Like any tribunal of first instance, WTO panels make 
findings of fact, applicable law, and, applying such law to the facts, violations of law.  
A. General procedure 
1. ICSID and general procedure 
The ICSID Arbitration Rules lay out a dispute settlement procedure based upon 
that typically found in international tribunals involving State parties.  In short, after the 
Request for Arbitration is registered, there is no requisite "answer" to be filed by the 
respondent.  Rather ICSID Arbitration Rule 20 establishes a preliminary procedural 
conference between the parties and the tribunal.434  The claimant will then file a 
Memorial which normally includes all the documentary and other evidence upon which it 
will rely.   
Next, the respondent will file a Counter-Memorial, again, together with all 
supporting evidence; and where the Tribunal determines necessary, a Reply and 
Rejoinder may follow.435  Following this "written phase" of the proceeding, there will be 
an "oral phase," or hearing.436 
 Chapter III of the ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, addresses general 
procedural provisions and states that the Tribunal shall have the power to make orders as 
necessary to conduct the proceeding.437  Rule 20, Preliminary Procedural Consultation, 
addresses procedural issues relevant to the initial stages of the dispute settlement process.  
Rule 20 requires that as early as possible after the constitution of the Tribunal, its 
President will begin the process of determining the views of the parties regarding 
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procedure.  Typically the parties meet with the President to discuss issues which include 
but are not limited to:  
  (a) the language to be used in the proceedings; 
(b) the number and sequence of the pleadings and the time limits within 
which they are to be filed; 
(c) the number of copies desired by each party of instruments filed by the 
other; 
  (d) the possibility of dispensing with the written or the oral procedure; 
(e) the manner in which the record of the hearings shall be kept. 
Rule 20 further clarifies that during the proceedings that follow, the Tribunal 
shall apply any preliminary agreement between the parties on procedural matters 
obtained during the procedural consultation, except as otherwise provided in the 
Convention. 
 In addition to the preliminary procedural consultation, it is possible to hold an 
official Pre-hearing Conference at the request of the Secretary-General or at the 
discretion of the President of the Tribunal.  This conference between the Tribunal and the 
parties may be held to arrange for an exchange of information and the stipulation of 
uncontested facts in order to expedite the proceedings.438   
 Rule 23 addresses copies of instruments and clarifies that except as otherwise 
provided by the Tribunal after consultation with the parties and the Secretary-General, 
every request, pleading, application, written observation, supporting documentation, or 
other instrument shall be filed in the form of a signed original with the number of copies 
agreed upon by the parties during Preliminary Procedural Consultation.   
 





 With respect to the inclusion of supporting documentation, Rule 24 stipulates that 
it ordinarily shall be filed together with the instrument to which it directly relates.  
Additionally, the filing of supporting documentation shall be within the time limit fixed 
for the filing of such instrument.439  Rule 25 allows for the correction of accidental errors 
to any instrument or supporting document with the consent of either the parties or the 
Tribunal and allows approved corrections to be made at any time before the final award is 
rendered.    
 Time limits are set by Rule 26 which states that where required, time limits shall 
be fixed by the Tribunal.  Moreover, the Tribunal has the power to extend any time limit 
that it has fixed and any step taken after expiration of the applicable time limit shall be 
disregarded unless the Tribunal, in special circumstances and providing support for the 
decision, decides otherwise.440 
Rule 41 paragraph (5), grants to the tribunal the discretion to dismiss all or part 
of a claim, on the merits and at the request of a party, on an expedited basis.441  In the US 
judicial system, this would be tantamount to a summary judgment.  To obtain expedited 
dismissal, it is necessary for a party to file an objection that a claim is manifestly without 
merit.  In order to obtain expedited review, this objection must be filed within 30 days of 
the creation of the tribunal and before the tribunal’s first session.  Additionally, notable is 
the fact that the denial by the tribunal of a party’s request does not prejudice other 
objections that party might be compelled to make at a later time.442   
Published ICSID awards vary in terms of their structure, detail and presentation 
of factual and substantive issues.  Some awards, even ones that are entered after a full 
evidentiary hearing on the merits, are relatively short and concise.443  Awards tend to 
provide a brief recitation of the procedural history and the facts, and then apply the facts 
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to the law.  In certain instances, however, factual details are not included (presumably for 
confidentiality reasons).  In some respects, ICSID awards resemble US judicial decisions 
in their approach and style. 
ICSID awards have begun to increasingly cite to other ICSID awards and 
decisions of other international tribunals.444  It is important to note that the current trend 
of ICSID awards citing the decisions of other international tribunals does not mean that a 
formal system of precedent is in place, in which one tribunal is duty bound to follow the 
holding of another tribunal.445  Instead, Tribunals are more likely seeking guidance from 
decisions of other Tribunals in analysing applicable legal issues as well as in determining 
aspects of procedure because so much is left to the discretion of the individual arbitration 
tribunal.446  In addition, it is rather difficult to draw any precedent based guidance from 
published ICSID awards because for every award ruling on a particular issue in a 
particular way, there is another award handling a similar issue differently.   
2. UNCITRAL and general procedure  
Article 17, General Provisions, explains that subject to the 2010 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the arbitral Tribunal is free to “conduct the arbitration in such a 
manner as it considers appropriate.”  The Rules do require the Tribunal to respect a form 
of due process in that Article 15(1) provides for the limitation of the Tribunal’s discretion 
through the requirement that the Tribunal ensure that “parties are treated with equality 
and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of 
presenting their case.”447  Further, Article 17 explains that the arbitral tribunal, in 
exercising its discretion, “shall conduct the proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary delay 
and expense and to provide a fair and efficient process for resolving the parties’ dispute.   
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The UNCITRAL Rules do not provide specific guidance as to what appropriate 
procedural due process requires in particular circumstances.  The principles of equal 
treatment and opportunity to be heard have been invoked under UNCITRAL Article 
17(1) before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, for example, in a variety of circumstances that 
are illustrative, including the enforcement of filing or document production deadlines, the 
conduct of hearings, the translation of documents and the testimony of witnesses.448 
 
UNCITRAL Rules Article 33(2) authorizes the president of the arbitration to 
decide questions of procedure on his own only "when there is no majority or when the 
arbitral Tribunal so authorizes and subject to review by the Tribunal."449  However, 
Article 33(2) does not define what constitutes a procedural issue, subject to unilateral 
determination by the chairman, as opposed to substantive issue, requiring a majority 
decision of the Tribunal.  These distinctions are left to the general discretion of the 
tribunal and tend to differ greatly from case to case.    
 
With respect to the waiver of rules, according to Article 32 of the  2010 
UNICTRAL Rules, a party who knows that any provision or requirement of the Rules has 
not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without promptly stating his 
objection to such non-compliance, shall be deemed to have waived his right to object. 
 
Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law addresses the equal treatment of 
parties which is a mandatory provision as well as the full opportunity to present their 
case; however, no specific guidance is provided as to what is procedurally required to 
ensure that parties are given the full opportunity to present their case.  A large degree of 
discretion is conferred upon the parties or, if they fail to agree, to the arbitrators, in 
determining the rules of procedure which are covered in Article 19.  The parties’ freedom 
is restricted only by mandatory provisions.  It is important to note that the power 
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conferred on the arbitral tribunal expressly includes the power to determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.450 
 
 Autonomy of the parties in determining the rules of procedure of their arbitration 
is of particular importance as it allows the parties to select or tailor the rules according to 
their specific wishes or needs.  This freedom is unimpeded by traditional and possibly 
conflicting domestic regulations.  This in turn substantially reduces the chances of 
surprise or frustration on the part of a party unfamiliar with domestic black letter law.  
Further, under the UNCITRAL Model Law, the Tribunal is given the discretion to tailor 
the conduct of the proceedings to the specific features of the case without being 
constrained by traditional local law of the State, including any domestic law relating to 
the admissibility of evidence.  
 
 The place of arbitration (UNCITRAL Model Law Article 20) is an important 
factor in that it directly affects the determining of applicable national law, and for the 
purpose of setting aside, recognizing or enforcing arbitral decisions.  Article 20 and 31(3) 
outline the procedure of designating the place of arbitration and for rendering the award 
at the place so designated legal. 
 
 UNICTRAL Model Law Article 23 addresses statements of claim and defense in 
that within a period of time agreed by the Tribunal, the claim shall state: (1) the facts 
supporting his claim; (2) the points at issue; and (3) the relief or remedy sought.  The 
respondent shall be required to state his defense in respect of these particulars, unless the 
parties have agreed otherwise as to the required elements of such statements.  With 
respect to the submission of evidence, the parties are invited to submit with their 
statements all documents they consider to be relevant or may add a reference to the 
documents or other evidence they plan on submitting in the future.451  Unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, either party may amend or supplement his claim or defense during 
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the course of the arbitral proceedings, unless the arbitral tribunal considers it 
inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to potential delay.452 
 
3. WTO and general procedure453  
When a WTO Member believes that another Member has taken an action that 
impairs benefits accruing to it, both directly or indirectly, under the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, it may request consultations to resolve the conflict through informal 
negotiations. The consultations procedures is a mandatory first step to the WTO dispute 
settlement process and is codified and further developed by the DSU. The DSU requires 
written requests for consultations clearly stating reasons for the request, the legal basis 
for the complaint and an explanation of the measures in question.454  
WTO Consultations aim at assisting disputing Members to reach a mutually-
agreed solution; however, consultations must be conducted in good faith before resorting 
to further action available to Members under the DSU.455   Additionally, the consultation 
process provides potential parties to a dispute the opportunity to discuss and exchange 
relevant information and opinions, all of which are intended to enable the panel process 
to flow as smoothly as possible.     
WTO panelists hear and consider evidence and then provide the DSB with a 
report which recommends a course of action within six months.  Interestingly, in practice, 
the WTO panel will request both parties to the case to comment on the report prior to 
submission to the DSB where the DSB either adopts the report or decides by consensus 
not to accept it.  Alternatively, if one of the parties involved decides to appeal the 
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decision, the report will not be considered for adoption until the completion of the appeal 
by the WTO Appellate Body. An Appellate Body report is adopted unconditionally 
unless the DSB votes by consensus not to accept its findings within 30 days of circulation 
to the membership.  As stipulated in DSU Article 11, a WTO panel is required to make 
an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the 
facts of the case and the applicability of, and conformity with, the covered agreements.  
B. Written procedure 
1. ICSID and written procedure  
Chapter IV of the ICSID Convention addresses written procedures.  Rule 29 states that in 
the absence of a specific agreement between the parties, the proceeding shall be 
comprised of two phases: a written procedure followed by an oral one.  As soon as the 
Tribunal is established, the Secretary-General shall transmit to each tribunal member a 
copy of the request for the proceeding, all supporting documentation, notice of the 
registration and any communication received from either party in response to any 
document filed.456 
 In addition to the initial request for the arbitration, Rule 31 dictates that the 
written procedure consists of the following pleadings to be filed within the time limits set 
by the Tribunal: 
  (a) a memorial by the requesting party; 
  (b) a counter-memorial by the other party. 
Only if the parties agree or the Tribunal deems necessary a reply by the requesting party 
and a rejoinder by the other party may also be filed within specific time limits which are 
set by the Tribunal.457  Rule 31 (3) explains that a memorial consists of: 
  (a)  a statement of the relevant facts; 
  (b)  a statement of the law;  
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  (c)  and the submissions. 
A counter memorial, reply or rejoinder shall contain: 
  (a)   an admission or denial of the facts stated in the previous pleading; 
  (b)   any additional facts, if necessary; 
(c) observations concerning the statement of law in the previous 
pleading; 
(d) a statement of law in answer;  
(e) the submissions.  
  
2. UNCITRAL and written procedure  
Articles 20 to 22 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules provide for statement of claim 
and defense submissions.  Statements submitted under these articles tend to be of a 
skeletal nature and frequently do not include the evidentiary material or legal 
argumentation required for a full understanding of the claims and defenses.458  The 
Tribunal is therefore required to request for additional information. 
 
With respect to the statement of the claim, Article 20 of the 2010 Arbitration 
Rules requires that the claimant communicate its statement of claim in writing to the 
respondent and to each of the arbitrators within a period of time to be determined by the 
tribunal.  The claimant has the option to elect that the notice of arbitration be treated as 
the statement of claim provided that the notice of arbitration complies with all 
requirements.  The statement of claim is required to include the following under Article 
20(2) of the 2010 Arbitration Rules: 
 
(a) The names and contact details of the parties; 
(b) A statement of the facts supporting the claim; 
 (c) The points at issue; 
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 (d) The relief or remedy sought; 
 (e) The legal grounds or arguments supporting the claim. 
 
Further, the statement of claim should, as much as possible, include all 
documents and other evidence relied upon by the claimant, or contain references to them.  
However, in practice parties rarely provide detailed information at the early stages of the 
arbitration. 
 
Article 21 of the 2010 UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules addresses the requisite 
statement of defense from the respondent and explains that within a period of time to be 
determined by the Tribunal, “the respondent shall communicate his statement of defense 
in writing to the claimant and to each of the arbitrators.”459  According to Article 21, it is 
requisite for the statement of defense to reply specifically to the same particulars as are 
required in the statement of claim.  Further, the respondent may annex to this statement 
the documents upon which they intend to rely for the defense or may add a reference to 
the documents or other evidence intended to be submitted at a later time.   
 
 In the statement of defense it is also possible for the respondent to present a 
counter-claim arising out of the same contract or set of facts.  In the event that a counter-
claim is presented, the same requirements which guide the sufficiency of the initial claim 
apply to potential counter-claims as well.460   
 
With respect to amendments, 2010 UNCITRAL Article 22 prescribes that either 
party may amend or supplement their claim or defense during the course of proceedings, 
“unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment having 
regard to the delay in making it or prejudice to the other party or any other 
circumstances.”461  Article 22 indicates, however, that a claim may not be amended in 
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such a way as to allow it to fall outside the scope of the arbitration clause or separate 
arbitration agreement which sets the scope for the proceedings.      
 
UNCITRAL Rules Article 24 authorizes the Tribunal to decide whether to 
require that the parties provide written statements in addition to the statements of claim 
and defense and shall fix the periods of time for communicating such statements.  Article 
25 clarifies that the time periods should be 45 days unless the arbitral tribunal decides to 
extend the time if it considers that an extension is justified.  As described above, the 
propensity for parties to submit initial submissions lacking in detail causes the Tribunal 
to request additional written statements often.   
 
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 24 specifically presents guidance with respect to 
hearings and written proceedings.  Subject to any contrary agreement by the parties, “the 
arbitral tribunal shall decide whether to hold oral hearings for the presentation of 
evidence or for oral argument, or whether the proceedings shall be conducted on the basis 
of documents and other materials.”462  However, unless the parties have mutually agreed 
to have no hearings, the arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings at an appropriate stage 
of the proceedings, if so requested by a party.  Of important note is the fact that Article 
24(1) addresses only the general entitlement of a party to oral hearings, as an alternative 
to proceedings conducted entirely on the basis of documents and other materials.  This 
article does not provide guidance on procedural aspects of the oral hearing including the 
length, number or timing of oral hearings.     
 
 The arbitral proceedings may continue in the absence of a party, provided that 
proper notice has been given.  Model Law Article 25 contains a default rule on the 









(a) The claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim in accordance with 
article 23(1), the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings; 
(b) The respondent fails to communicate his statement of defense in accordance 
with article 23(1), the arbitral tribunal shall continue the proceedings without 
treating such a failure in itself as an admission of the claimant’s allegations; 
(c) Any party fails to appear at a hearing or to produce documentary evidence 
the arbitral tribunal may continue to proceedings and make the award on the 
evidence before it.463 
 
As it is not uncommon for one of the parties to an international arbitration 
proceeding to have little interest in cooperating or expediting matters, provisions which 
enable the Tribunal to continue with adjudicating the case without a party’s participation 
provide international arbitration under the UNCITRAL Model Law necessary 
effectiveness while at the same time respecting the limits or fundamental requirements 
for procedural justice and due process.  
 
Article 26 addresses the tribunal-appointed experts, though on a less detailed 
basis than in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.  The Model Law explains that unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal is free to appoint one or more experts to 
report to it on specific issues to be determined by the arbitral tribunal.  Further, the 
arbitral tribunal may require a party to give to the expert any relevant information or to 
produce, or to provide access to, any relevant documents, goods, or other property for his 
inspection.464  Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, if any party so requests or if the 
arbitral tribunal considers it necessary, the expert shall, after delivery of his written or 
oral report, participate in a hearing where the parties have the opportunity to pose 
questions to him and to present expert witnesses of their own in order to testify on the 
points at issue.  
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3. WTO and written procedure  
The WTO panel process consists of two sets of submissions, two sets of 
rebuttals, two oral hearings, with accompanying questions and answers throughout, 
before the panel makes its interim report to the parties.465   Thus, all evidence in the case 
is submitted and evaluated before any interim findings of fact, applicable law, or WTO 
violations are made by the panel.  Further, the WTO panel is empowered to develop any 
additional procedures it reasonably determines to be necessary for the adjudication of the 
case.  
According to the WTO DSU, each party is required to submit to the Secretariat 
for immediate transmission to the panel and the other party or parties to the dispute, 
written submissions in which they present the facts of the case and their arguments.  The 
complaining party is required to submit its first submission before the responding party 
unless the panel decides that the parties should submit their first submissions 
simultaneously.  Each party’s written submissions, including any comments on the 
descriptive part of the report and responses to questions put by the panel are made 
available to the other party or parties of the case.   
C. Production of Evidence  
The ICSID and UNCITRAL rules lack detailed evidentiary standards and leave much to 
the individual tribunal to interpret on a case by case basis.  The guiding principle for both 
dispute settlement mechanisms is: the Tribunal shall be the judge of the admissibility of 
any evidence adduced and of its probative value. 
 
ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration function as an ad hoc process.  As 
demonstrated above, the ICSID and UNCTIRAL rules are quite flexible and the tribunal 
has considerable discretion to organize the proceedings as they deem appropriate.  There 
are no precise guidelines for those details in ICSID and UNCTIRAL dispute settlement 
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most similar to US-based Law and Motions issues of standard national civil courts.  
While the tribunal will apply general principles of law, all the ICSID and UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules associated with the different evidentiary mechanisms speak in very 
general terms, reserve near-complete discretion to the arbitral panel, and fail to set out 
clear and firm procedural requirements backed up by the threat of sanction in the event of 
noncompliance.  Further, an UNCITRAL tribunal is allowed to continue with the dispute 
settlement process even in the event that a party refuses to participate.  
 
1. UNCITRAL and production of evidence  
It is important to note that the UNCITRAL working group that drafted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law considered providing for assistance in taking evidence during 
dispute settlement proceedings.  The vision was actually to create something similar to 
rules of discovery; however, the concept was eventually abandoned and no guidance 
developed in favour of maintaining the free and flexible nature of this dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
 
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 25(6) grants the Tribunal broad authority with 
respect to the admissibility of evidence offered in that the tribunal “shall determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence offered.”466  This is the 
extent of the guidance from the UNCITRAL Rules; however, this broad flexibility is 
consistent with the traditional flexibility granted to arbitral tribunals in admitting 
evidence in international arbitrations. 
 
In the UNCITRAL case Walter Bau Ag (in liquidation) (Claimant) v. The 
Kingdom of Thailand (Respondent), the request for arbitration was filed on 21 September 
2005 but due to disagreement among the parties the arbitral terms of reference were not 
adopted by the tribunal until 20 July 2006 and accepted by the parties until 10 Aug 2006.  
The oral hearings took place during October 2008, but it was not until 1 July 2009 that 
the award was issued.   
 






This case addressed investment issues under the 1965 treaty between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Thailand.  The Terms of Reference developed 
by the parties to guide the scope of the arbitration identified that the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules “except as excluded, supplemented or varied by agreement of the 
parties, the relevant provisions (if any) of the treaty and/or such specific orders or 
instructions of the Tribunal are to be the applicable procedural rules” 467 of the arbitration.   
  
 For the most part, the adjudication of this case proceeded as usual with relevant 
submissions made by both parties and a series of oral hearings and the presentation of 
detailed expert witness testimony and cross examination.  However, while the tribunal 
was in deliberations and before the issuance of the award, the Chairman of the Tribunal 
received a letter from a firm of lawyers purporting to write on behalf of the Respondent 
advising that the Claimant had initiated an ICC arbitration against the Respondent at an 
earlier time but related to the same subject matter.  The letter stated that the Respondent 
believed that the Claimant had proceeded with the current arbitration hearing in bad faith 
and had violated its obligations under the said agreement by seeking two separate forums 
at the same time.  The letter further explained that the Kingdom of Thailand “strongly 
believes that it would be fair and equitable that the Tribunal take into consideration the 
above information.”468 
  
 The Chairman acknowledged the receipt of the letter but pointed out that the 
Tribunal had received no advice from the Respondent’s attorneys of record.  The 
Chairman continued to explain that the Tribunal was due to confer within a few days and 
that the time for receiving further evidence had long since passed.  Further, the Chairman 
opinioned that the letter came nowhere close to the proper application to admit further 
evidence and invited the counsel on record for both parties to file submissions.  Within 
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days the Claimant submitted a detailed brief; however, the Respondent’s counsel of 
record submitted nothing further.  On 28 April 2009 the Tribunal decided not to take any 
action on the letter submitted and further explained that it would ignore it when 
considering its Award.  The reasoning of the Tribunal was summarized as follows: 
 
1. The letter was submitted by a law firm that was not of record representing 
the Respondent. 
2. Contrary to the assertion of the law firm purporting to represent the 
Respondent, the letter was one of the many documents before the Tribunal at 
the substantive hearing.  No reference was made to the document during the 
hearing.  The Tribunal was not asked to examine its terms and no 
submissions were made that referenced this specific document.  There were 
literally thousands of documents placed before the Tribunal and if any one 
document had been of particular significance, then the Tribunal considers 
that counsel would have referred to it either at the hearing or in post-hearing 
submissions. 
3. This Tribunal is not in any position to comment on the issues that will fall to 
be considered by ICC arbitrations. 
4. The hearing of evidence in the instant arbitration closed on 17 October 2008.  
Very strong grounds would be needed for the Tribunal even to consider, let 
alone grant, an application to call further evidence at a stage when the issue 
of award is imminent.  This is especially so when the evidence sought to be 
addressed was before the Tribunal at the time of the substantive hearing and 
not referenced in any way. 
5. Accordingly, the Tribunal will proceed to consider the claim on the merits 
unaffected by the letter.469 
 
This case exemplifies the types of procedural issues regularly considered by a 
Tribunal applying UNCITRAL Arbitration rules and also the UNCITRAL Model Law.  It 
 





is important to note that the analysis tends to address specific issues of the particular case 
at hand, rather than looking at the legal aspects of the law applied to the case.   
 
The fact that decisions and issues considered by the Tribunal are so case specific 
highlights the difficulty in reconciling case law and extracting any type of precedence 
from such adjudication.  Further, note should be taken of the complex issues related to 
party participation and the willingness of a party to participate in the arbitration process.  
In national courts, for example, issues related to a party’s representation by counsel, 
particularly the change of counsel of record, would be essential to address clearly before 
substantive issues can be considered in something similar to a Law and Motions 
proceedings.  In any event, the parties are required to formally notify the court of such 
changes.  In contrast, there is no such clear requirement under UNCITRAL arbitration 
and therefore the Tribunal is forced to devote substantial time to the processing of issues 
that tend to be more administrative in nature.     
 
Up to this point in ICSID, WTO  and UNCITRAL dispute settlement, all written 
evidence has been produced by the parties on a voluntary basis.  There are no clear and 
firm mandates governing ICSID, WTO and UNCITRAL arbitrators and parties insofar as 
their rights and duties with respect to ensuring that documents that may be unfavourable 
to a party's position are presented for consideration by the Tribunal.  Matters of 
production are left entirely to the discretion of the Tribunal and the Tribunal has no clear 
powers of document compulsion, particularly with respect to relevant documents, the 
existence of which might not be known to the Tribunal.   
D. Compelling the production of evidence 
1. ICSID and compelling the production of evidence  
ICSID Arbitration Rule 33 explains that within the time limits fixed by the Tribunal, each 
party shall be required to communicate to the Secretary-General, for the transmission to 





intends to produce and that which it intends to request the Tribunal to call for.470  Further, 
the party must clearly indicate the points to which evidence will be directed.  Rule 34(2) 
enables the Tribunal, if it deems necessary at any stage of the proceedings, to call upon 
the parties to produce documents, witnesses and experts.  Further, the Tribunal may visit 
any place connected with the dispute or conduct inquiries there. 
 
Rule 34(3) states that parties shall cooperate with the Tribunal in the production 
of the evidence and in the other measures associated with the Tribunal's request for the 
production of evidence.  In the event that a party fails to produce requested evidence, 
Rule 34(3) enables the Tribunal to take formal note of the failure of a party to comply 
with its obligations to provide evidence in response to the explicit request of the Tribunal 
in light of any reasons given for such failure.   
 
The ICSID Tribunal does have the clear mandate to direct production of specific 
evidence and if it desires it may reasonably include an admonition that the failure to 
produce may lead to the appropriate adverse inference.  With respect to further details 
defining what the drafters of the ICSID Arbitration Rules intended by "formal note" or 
even specifically allowing the Tribunal the explicit power to make adverse inferences in 
response to the failure of a party to produce requested evidence, the rules are silent.  
Further, whether or not (and how and when) documents are called upon by the arbitrators 
to be produced will usually depend on the president's background and expertise related to 
the particular topic at hand. 
 
The result of this procedural flexibility in document production is endless 
haggling over the scope of requests and orders to produce as ICSID arbitrators have no 
formal power of compulsion to order document inspection.  This is further compounded 
with the fact that under ICSID dispute resolution there exists no formal participant-based 
discovery or deposition process to allow individual parties to ferret out the existence or 
nonexistence of classes of documents held by the other side, there is no reasonable degree 
 





of assurance that all relevant materials have been disclosed by all sides.  Parties are able 
to simply omit documents or alternatively deny the existence of essential documents, and 
unless the denial is patently untenable, the documents will remain undisclosed, at no cost 
to the concealing side.  
2. UNCITRAL and compelling the production of evidence  
The 2010 UNCITRAL Rules do not contain a provision that clearly empowers the 
Tribunal to force a party to produce evidence or additional information.  The closest the 
2010 UNICTRAL Rules come to providing for discovery and the compelling of 
production is in the third paragraph of Article 27 - listed under "Evidence."  Article 27(1) 
states that each party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support its 
claim or defense.  This implies that the parties will have the obligation to provide all 
relevant evidence.  Interestingly, there is no explicit requirement that a party present 
evidence adverse to his position.    
 
The Tribunal’s discovery of actual adverse evidence to a party’s position is 
authorized only under 2010 UNCITRAL Rules Article 27(3) which empowers the 
tribunal, at any time during the arbitral proceedings, to “require the parties to produce 
documents, exhibits or other evidence,” in addition to that presented in support of their 
claims, within such a period of time as determined reasonable by the tribunal.471  Further, 
Article 27(4) clarifies that the arbitral tribunal shall have the power to “determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and the weight of the evidence offered.”   
 
In theory, Article 27(3) should provide the UNCITRAL Tribunal with the power 
to compel parties to produce evidence in their possession, including that which is adverse 
to their position; however, there is no clarification as to what the repercussions would be 
if a party refuses to produce such evidence or to even admit that such evidence exists.  
Further, there are no guidelines directing the level of particularity in the Tribunal’s 
request for additional information. 
 






 Of important note is the fact that Article 27 does not distinguish between 
evidence intended for use at the hearing and the discovery of general information, which 
might include that which "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence."472  The Tribunal, nevertheless, may find sufficient authority to 
compel disclosure of specific information under the provisions governing the Tribunal's 
general authority over the proceedings.473   
 
It is difficult to extract clear precedence from the UNCITRAL case law on this 
point because there is no consistency in arbitration clauses subjecting the parties to 
arbitration or the interpretation of applicable law by the Tribunal.  Each case tends to 
create a unique situation of its own and much is left to the discretion of the Tribunal.  
With respect to the details surrounding the Tribunal’s power to compel production, 
procedures and practices differ widely as to the conditions under which the arbitral 
tribunal may require a party to produce documents.  Therefore, the arbitral tribunal might 
consider it useful, when the agreed arbitration rules do not provide specific conditions, to 
clarify to the parties from the beginning, the manner in which it intends to proceed with 
respect to production.  However, the ad hoc nature of this further contributes to diverging 
case law.   
 
The UNCITRAL Rules enable the arbitral tribunal to establish time-limits for the 
production of documents if deemed necessary.  If the requested party duly invited to 
produce documentary evidence fails to do so within the established period of time, 
without demonstrating sufficient cause for such failure, the arbitral tribunal is free to 
draw its conclusions from the failure and may make the award on the evidence before it.    
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Article 30 addresses a party’s default and identifies specific instances of 
noncompliance which include a party’s failure to submit a statement of claim or defense; 
to appear at the hearing or to produce evidence requested or ordered by the Tribunal.  
Further, this article provides that the Tribunal may proceed with the arbitration 
notwithstanding the defaulting party’s failure to participate in the proceedings.  It is 
important to note, however, that this rule does not authorize the Tribunal to issue any 
award on default.  The practical effect of this rule is that if a party fails to submit a 
statement of defense, the Tribunal must nevertheless proceed to a hearing and invite the 
defaulting party to that hearing; if the defaulting party also fails to appear at the hearing 
or fails to produce evidence at the hearing, the Tribunal must nevertheless proceed to 
hear the claimant’s evidence. 
 
In practice, an alternative method for the UNCITRAL Tribunal to attempt to 
compel the production of evidence is through the appointment of an expert to research 
and present a report on specific points at issue.  Under 2010 UNCITRAL Rules Article 
29, the arbitral tribunal may, after consultation with the parties, appoint one or more 
experts to report to it, in writing, on specific issues to be determined and further 
communicated by the tribunal.474  Further, according to Article 29, the parties to the 
arbitration proceedings are required to give to the expert “any relevant information or 
produce for his inspection any relevant documents or goods that he may require of 
them.”475  Additionally, any dispute that may arise between a party and the expert as to 
the relevance of the required information or production shall be addressed directly by the 
arbitral tribunal.   
It is important to note here that this could be seen as a method for the tribunal to 
compel production of evidence.  Rather than always directly requesting the parties to 
produce information to the tribunal itself, the tribunal could retain the services of an 
expert and then draft the terms of reference in such a way as to empower the expert to 
collect all known and even unknown relevant information as an agent of the tribunal. 
 







Once the expert has gathered all necessary information, the expert then generates 
a report which is submitted to the tribunal and then shared with the parties.  The parties 
then have the opportunity to express, in writing, their opinion of the report and a party 
has the right to examine directly any evidence relied upon by the expert in developing his 
report.  At the request of either party, after submitting his report, the expert may be heard 
at a hearing where the parties shall have the opportunity to be present and to interrogate 
the expert.  At this hearing, each party may present their own expert witness in order to 
testify on points of issue.   
 
3. WTO and compelling the production of evidence  
WTO panel proceedings usually involve a struggle to develop the necessary information 
and legal understanding to decide the case properly. Parties to a WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding tend to be very happy to present the panel with all the information favourable 
to its side.  However this changes when it comes to presenting any information that can 
help the other side. In ordinary civil litigation the adverse party usually manages to 
present the contrary side of the case. The same is true in WTO litigation, but the panel 
process has certain limitations in that regard. Governments do not have powers of 
discovery to obtain information from opposing parties, and so often they can only offer 
undocumented opinions. Likewise, panels themselves do not have the time or the 
procedural expertise to conduct long hearings with witnesses.  
The most effective way to develop the facts is to obtain the parties' agreement to 
them. This usually requires questioning by the panel to fill in the gaps.  What complicates 
matters is that questions tend to focus on those facts and issues that the party being 
questioned would often prefer not to answer fairly and fully. Full development of the 
legal side of the case often requires similar questioning, just as judges in civil litigation 
find it valuable to sharpen their understanding of legal issues by probing apparent weak 
points in each party's legal arguments. To be effective, such factual and legal questioning 
requires a good foundation in the submissions of the parties, careful preparation of those 





are established, the more time the panel will have to refine its understanding, and the 
more opportunity it will have to cover missing ground. In a time-limited proceeding, 
saving time is a very important consideration. 
The present panel procedure is not structured in a way that allows panels to 
develop cases in a very aggressive manner. The Secretariat officials have an outline of a 
schedule and a process they lay before the parties, but the process, which is based on 
traditional practice, is not very efficient. 
 
Although the WTO DSU grants panels broad authority to seek information, it is 
silent on what to do if a party fails to provide the panel with the information specifically 
requested.  In the situation where a party fails to comply with a panel's request for 
information, the panel should draw adverse inferences with regard to the missing 
information; however, clear guidance on this is scarce and a review of relevant WTO 
case law is necessary.  
  
 The panel in the Turkey--Textiles case used its authority to seek information by 
submitting a series of questions to the EU, a WTO Member but neither a party nor third 
party to the specific dispute at hand.  In Canada--Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, the panel concluded that the DSU permitted it to seek information from 
Canada with regard to defenses it had not raised and information from Brazil with regard 
to matters on which it had not established a prima facie case or raised in its complaint. 
Further, in U.S.--Lead-Bismuth, the panel concluded it had the authority to compel 
submission of parties' business confidential data from the Department of Commerce.  
 Although the DSU grants panels broad authority to seek information, it is silent on 
what to do if a party fails to provide the panel with the information specifically requested.  
It was suggested in Canada--Aircraft that, in the situation where a party fails to comply 
with a panel's request for information, the panel should draw adverse inferences with 
regard to the missing information.  In an effort to determine whether Canada was 
engaging in export subsidies, the panel requested that Canada submit information on 





information and Brazil pushed the panel to adopt 'adverse inferences' where Canada had 
expressly refused to provide information specifically requested by the panel.  The panel 
refused to draw specific adverse inferences on the basis that Brazil had not made out a 
prima facie case that Canada had granted subsidies in the form of loan guarantees. The 
panel stated, however, that in "certain circumstances we consider that a panel may be 
required to make inferences on the basis of relevant facts when direct evidence is not 
available. This is especially true when direct evidence is not available because it is 
withheld by a party with sole possession of that evidence."476 
 Brazil appealed the panel's refusal to draw adverse inferences to the Appellate Body. 
The Appellate Body declined to reverse the panel's decision, reasoning the record was 
insufficient to conclude that the panel made an error in its application of law, or abused 
its discretionary authority.  The Appellate Body did make two findings with regard to the 
drawing of inferences. First, the Appellate Body rejected the panel's statement that a 
party must establish a prima facie case in order to request that a panel draw inferences. 
The Appellate Body maintained that the establishment of a prima facie case was an issue 
of the allocation of the burden of proof and the drawing of inferences is an inherent and 
unavoidable aspect of a panel's basic task of finding and addressing the facts making up a 
dispute.  Secondly, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel's statement that, under 
certain circumstances, the drawing of inferences was appropriate. It noted that the 
drawing of an adverse inference was not properly considered a punitive inference, but 
rather "merely an inference which in certain circumstances could be logically or 
reasonably derived by a panel from the facts before it."477 The Appellate Body concluded 
that the drawing of inferences was "an ordinary task" of the panels and in accordance 
with "general practice and usage of international tribunals."478  Finally, the Appellate 
Body warned that parties' refusal to comply with panel and Appellate Body requests for 
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information had the "potential to undermine the functioning of the dispute settlement 
system" and instructed future panels to take "all steps open to them to induce the parties 
to the dispute to comply with their duty to provide information deemed necessary for 
dispute settlement."479 
E. Sanctions 
In WTO case law, after Canada--Aircraft, a panel's authority to seek information from 
Members and its responsibility to assess the matter before has been clearly articulated. 
Yet, in addition to drawing adverse inferences from a Member's refusal to provide 
requested information, there is no clear mechanism available to a panel to compel the 
production of specifically requested evidence.  Interestingly, for some Members, the issue 
of refusal to provide specifically requested information may be linked to the legal 
authority to release certain confidential information to the WTO, even if done so in 
confidence, rather than acting in bad faith.  
 The ICSID rules do not expressly authorize sanctions or methods to specifically 
compel the production of evidence.  Under the rules, however, the tribunal has the power 
to determine that, as to a certain portion of the proceeding, one of the parties should bear 
the related arbitration expenses.480  As Schreuer observes, the imposition of a 
disproportionate share of costs could be "a sanction against what [the tribunal] saw as 
dilatory or otherwise improper conduct."481  There is significant ICSID case law on this 
type of sanction used by the Tribunal to compel a party to produce specified information 
or to behave in a specific way.  A brief review of this case is helpful.   
 
In the ICSID case American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc (Complainant) v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Respondent)482, as an example, respondent Zaire did 
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not have representation at the merits hearing nor did it take advantage of the Tribunal's 
offer to attend a supplemental hearing.483  The supplemental hearing was conditioned 
upon Zaire's payment, up-front, of the fees and expenses of the arbitrators and the 
administrative fees related to the hearing.484  The requirement of upfront payment by 
Zaire could be seen as a type of sanction to compel Zaire’s participation.  Regardless of 
this, in the end the final award in favour of the claimant in American Manufacturing 
simply ordered the parties to share equally in all of the arbitration fees and expenses, so 
in effect Zaire was not ever actually "sanctioned" for its non-appearance or its lack of 
participation.485  
 
In the Metalclad Corporation (Claimant) v. United Mexican States 
(Respondent)486 case, a motion for sanctions was filed.487  In this case, claimant 
Metalclad (a Delaware corporation) moved for sanctions against respondent Mexico due 
to its "untimely" filing of a counter-memorial and failure to submit translations by the 
due date.488  Metalclad sought to have the counter-memorial and the documents struck 
from the record.489  The motion prompted a flurry of written submissions and within a 
month, the tribunal ended the side-issue by denying the motion on the grounds that the 
result sought would have been "excessive under the circumstances," and upon a finding 
that Metalclad was unable to establish any direct harm due to the delay.490  In Metalclad, 
the claimant prevailed but was still required to bear its own costs of arbitration. 
 
In the Benvenuti & Bonfant (Claimant) v. People’s Republic of Congo 
(Respondent), the Tribunal explained that with respect to sanctions in a case of an abuse 
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of rights, ICSID tribunals can award costs against parties as a sanction against what they 
see as dilatory or otherwise improper conduct in the proceeding.491  Further, in the 
Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (Claimant) v. Republic of Liberia 
(LETCO)(Respondent), the Government did not appear nor present any case.  
Additionally, the Government instituted proceedings in its own courts in respect of the 
same dispute.  In the LETCO case, the Tribunal found that the procedural misconduct of 
nonappearance combined with instituting additional parallel proceedings sufficient to 
substantiate the finding of misconduct of the degree necessary to justify the allocation of 
all costs on the Republic of Liberia.492          
 
In the 2009 case, Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A.(Claimant) v. Republic of 
Turkey (Respondent), the Claimant initiated the arbitration on 28 September 2006 and the 
Request for Arbitration was registered by the Secretary-General of ICSID on 16 
November 2006.  On 11 May 2007, the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted and the first 
session to address procedural matters was held on 23 August 2007.493  During this 
session, the Arbitral Tribunal decided on fees, records of the hearings, means of 
communication, decisions of the Tribunal, procedural language, place of arbitration, and 
written and oral procedures.  Additionally, the Tribunal established the procedural 
timetable for the parties to follow in submitting their written submissions as follows: 
(a) Claimant’s Memorial on or before 1 March 2008; 
(b) Respondent’s Counter-Memorial on or before 8 September 2008; 
(c) Claimant’s Reply on or before 19 December 2008; 
(d) Respondent’s Rejoinder on or before 17 April 2009;  
(e) Hearing in September 2009.494    
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On 18 December 2007, the Respondent filed the first request for the production 
of documents and on 30 December 2007 the Claimant replied to the request of the 
Respondent, opposing them in their entirety and sought the first extension of time to file 
its Memorial.  On 25 January 2008, the Tribunal issued its first Procedural Order No. 1, 
whereby, among other things, with respect to the Respondent’s first request for 
production, it decided: 
With respect to the request for the production of documents, the Respondent is at liberty 
to renew the request with greater precision at a later stage if judged necessary and the 
Claimant will be given the opportunity to respond to any such request.495 
 
Following the Tribunal’s Procedural Order No. 1, the Claimant and Respondent 
engaged in a series of procedural requests, renewed requests for document production 
and requests for extensions of time, among others, and the Tribunal issued an additional 
eleven procedural orders, and in Procedural Order No. 12 requested the Claimant to file a 
detailed identification of specific classes of documents that were requested by the 
respondent on 6 July 2009.  The Claimant did not file any submission and the proceeding 
was declared closed on 1 September 2009.496  For this case, over three years were 
devoted to this arbitration and the Claimant never submitted the documents requested by 
the Respondent and the case was finally closed without a proper adjudication of the 
claims because the Claimant refused to participate in the process.     
 
The Tribunal in Cementownia found that the Claimant’s conduct in bringing the 
claim “failed to meet the requisite standard of good faith conduct . . . [and] the claim 
[was] manifestly ill-founded.”497  The Tribunal continued to find that the “misconduct of 
an arbitration proceeding leads generally to the allocation of all costs on the party in bad 
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faith.”498  The Tribunal explained that as the activities of the Claimant lead to “an 
accumulation of liabilities – abuse of process and procedural misconduct – there is good 
cause for the Arbitral Tribunal to go beyond the general sanction and to declare that the 
Claimant has brought a fraudulent claim against the Republic of Turkey.”499  Any details 
with respect to monetary fines or the amount of the Respondent’s arbitration expenses the 
claimant was expected to pay were not addressed by the Tribunal however.   
F. Formalized Discovery 
While WTO, ICSID and UNCITRAL have different approaches to submission of 
evidence and in the case of ICSID and UNCITRAL, much is left to the discretion of the 
trier of fact and agreements between the parties, in order to ensure the proper protection 
of due process and that parties have a sufficient understanding of their rights, the 
formalization of a discovery-type process that can be applied to international dispute 
settlement may be helpful along with options for the decision-maker to compel the 
production of evidence that are stronger than simply making adverse inferences as in the 
WTO and UNICTRAL systems or adjusting the apportionment of costs as is the standard 
in the ICSID system.    
Discovery is generally understood as meaning the disclosure by a party of facts, 
titles, documents, or other things which are in his exclusive knowledge or possession, and 
which are necessary to the party seeking the discovery or to be brought in another court, 
or as evidence of his rights or title in such proceeding.500  Although discovery is 
traditionally considered a common law feature, there is no uniformity as to how it is 
conducted between common law countries. Continental lawyers are accustomed to a 
different kind of discovery, or rather disclosure: lawyers for each side voluntarily 
produce all relevant documents to support their claim or defense, and the judge (or an 
arbitrator) may question witnesses, appoint experts, and, in a number of countries, also 
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order a party to produce relevant information.501  In the United States, three essential 
features are (a) counsel's cross-examination of witnesses; (b) discovery of the parties' 
documents; and (c) the use of parties, or their representatives, as witnesses.  Historically, 
international arbitration has been based on the European civil law system, which does not 
include cross-examination, document discovery and witness testimony from a party or its 
representative, resulting in a more passive and voluntary method of information 
exchange.502   
G. Oral procedures 
1. ICSID and oral procedures  
Oral procedure is addressed in ICSID Rule 32 and explains that it shall consist of the 
hearings by the Tribunal.  The parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, and witnesses 
and experts are specifically allowed to attend.  Further, unless there is an explicit 
objection by either party, the Tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary-General, may 
allow other persons to attend or observe all or part of the hearings.  In such cases, the 
Tribunal is responsible for developing additional procedures that are necessary for the 
proper protection of proprietary or privileged information and to make appropriate 
logistical arrangements.503  This requirement is in line with article 48(5) of the ICSID 
Convention, which prohibits the publishing of an award “without the consent of the 
parties.”504 
 
Traditionally, hearings associated with the ICSID arbitration process have been 
held behind closed doors and only the parties were allowed to attend.  Opening the oral 
hearings to others than the parties is particularly useful in that they would provide the 
public with greater transparency and a better understanding of ICSID’s investor-state 
arbitration process.  To accomplish this goal, in 2006 ICSID made revisions to rule 32 to 
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expressly bestow upon the tribunal the discretion to permit persons besides the parties, 
their agents, etc., to attend the hearings or even open them to the public.505  It is important 
to note the language of Rule 32 does not specifically define which additional other 
persons may be allowed to attend the oral hearings nor does it address whether this 
includes the public or members of the media.  Presumably these issues are left up the 
individual Tribunal itself to interpret as it deems appropriate. 
 
Further note should be taken of the fact that the opening of a hearing to the public 
is the sole decision of the tribunal unless there is a clear objection of the parties.  Specific 
consent of the parties to the arbitration is not necessary, provided the tribunal considers 
the views of the parties and consults with the Secretariat.506  Under the original version of 
Rule 32, the tribunal had the discretion to allow other persons to attend the hearings only 
with the specific consent of the parties. 
 
During the oral hearings, the members of the Tribunal are entitled to put 
questions to the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates507.  Moreover, the Tribunal is 
allowed to ask for any additional clarifications as necessary.  Witnesses and experts are 
allowed to be examined before the Tribunal during the oral hearings by the parties 
themselves under the control of the Tribunal President.508  Questions may also be put to 
witnesses and experts by any member of the Tribunal. 
 
In addition to the above procedures relating to the oral hearings, under Rule 36, 
Witness and Experts: Special Rules, the Tribunal has the explicit power to admit 
evidence provided by a witness or expert in a written deposition; and, with the consent of 
both parties, arrange for the examination of a witness or expert in an alternative manor 
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than before the Tribunal itself.509  The Tribunal shall define the subject of the 
examination, the time limit, the procedure to be followed and other particulars and the 
parties may participate in the examination.510   
 
While the parties are allowed to participate during the examination of witnesses 
and experts, note should be taken of the fact that the ICSID Arbitration rules do not 
explicitly address whether a party has the right to cross-examine the witness or expert of 
another party.  Rule 36(b) gives parties the right to participate in the examination of 
witnesses and experts which has been authorized to commence outside the presence of 
the Tribunal; however whether participation of the parties allows the right to cross-
examine is not clear.  Further, during hearings which take place in the presence of the 
Tribunal, Rule 35(1) indicates that witnesses and experts can be examined by both the 
parties and the Tribunal; however in the text of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, it is not 
clear whether adverse parties are clearly entitled to cross-examine witnesses and experts 
of another party.   
 
As explained above, ICSID proceedings are divided into a written and then oral 
phase.  During the written phase, witness statements are submitted along with other 
documents and pleadings.  Statements are prepared entirely by the party, and its legal 
representation, furnishing the testimony.  Prior to the oral phase, although not explicitly 
included in the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the Tribunal traditionally calls upon the parties 
to indicate which witnesses of the other side they wish to cross-examine. 
This approach has several shortcomings.  First, statements are carefully prepared 
with the assistance of counsel, leaving the opponent without a genuine sense of whether 
the substance of a witness' testimony requires cross-examination, let alone consideration 
of other indications of credibility that would come from a deposition of some other pre-
 






hearing encounter.511  Time constraints during the oral hearing, each side is typically 
allotted the same amount of time, make it impossible for parties to call all witnesses and 
they are left to select only those key participants on the basis of an inauthentic sense of 
their knowledge of the facts. 
An additional serious problem is that of the non-attending witness, and what to 
do with the testimony submitted in the written witness statement.  In principle, the 
Tribunal should disregard such witness' statement, and proceed on the basis as if it did 
not exist.  However, this approach is not uniformly followed and the ICSID Tribunal 
reserves the discretion to accept the written evidence, notwithstanding the witness' refusal 
or inability to appear for examination or cross-examination.  There are no firm and 
binding principles guiding a Tribunal in these circumstances,512 and one side may well 
face the prospect of having to challenge evidence without ever having had the 
opportunity for any form of confrontation.  Again, as with document production, the root 
of the problem rests in the absence of a genuine subpoena power at the disposal of the 
ICSID arbitration tribunal. 
With no prior ability to depose or otherwise acquire information from opposing-
side witnesses, ICSID disputants effectively face them cold at the oral hearing.  While 
witness statements are supposed to be complete and contain all information to be relied 
on by the presenting side, in practice they rarely do.  Witnesses are invariably granted the 
opportunity to include in their statements additional evidence that the other side might be 
hearing for the first time. 
ICSID claims often present radically opposing versions of fact, including on 
sensitive and material matters that tribunals must eventually issue a ruling on. However, 
ICSID arbitration tribunals tend to shy away from making clear findings against a 
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witness' credibility even where the circumstances clearly indicate the necessity for such.  
This hesitance regularly results in a muddling of the key factual elements of a claim.  
During ICSID oral hearings, witnesses are left free to amble from the truth as 
ramifications from perjury under the ICSID rules are weak or nonexistent.  Witnesses are 
sworn in although not to a judicial or quasi-judicial officer, but before the proceeding 
generally and upon their honour and conscience to tell the truth.513   
2. UNCITRAL and oral procedures  
Oral hearings are not automatic under the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: 
however, Article 28(2) requires the Tribunal to hold a hearing for witness testimony or 
oral argument if either party so requests.  In the absence of such a request, the Tribunal 
has the discretion to determine whether it would like to hold oral hearings based on its 
own initiative.  In making the decision whether or not to initiate oral hearings, the 
Tribunal will tend to base the decision on factors which may include the fact that it is 
usually quicker and easier to clarify points at issue pursuant to a direct confrontation of 
arguments rather than on the basis of correspondence balanced with the fact that travel 
and other costs of holding hearings are expensive, and that the need of finding acceptable 
dates for the hearings might delay the proceedings.  Alternatively, in the absence of a 
request by the parties for oral hearings, the Tribunal may proceed on the basis of 
documents and other materials as the Tribunal deems necessary.514    
 
In the event that there are oral hearings and oral examinations of witnesses, 
Article 28 requires the Tribunal to give the parties adequate advance notice, and if 
witnesses are to be heard, at least fifteen days before the hearing each party is required to 
communicate to the Tribunal and to the other party the names and addresses of the 
witnesses intended to be presented.  Further, each party is required to communicate the 
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subject and issues the witness statements will relate to and the language in which the 
witness will present.515   
 
Article 28 allows the Tribunal to determine the manner in which witnesses will 
be examined.  A common practice in international arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
Rules is for a witness' direct testimony to be presented in the form of a written witness 
statement with reply and rebuttal evidence reserved for the oral hearings.  At the hearing, 
the witness is required to reaffirm their previous written statements and direct 
examination is limited to testimony rebutting the written witness evidence of the 
opposing party, followed by cross-examination, redirect and questions from members of 
the Tribunal. 
 
With respect to the duration of hearings, under the UNCITRAL Rules the length 
of a hearing primarily depends on the complexity of the issues to be argued and the 
amount of witness evidence to be presented.  The length also depends on the procedural 
style used in the arbitration.  Some practitioners prefer to have written evidence and 
written arguments presented before the hearings, which thus can focus on the issues that 
have not been sufficiently clarified.  This method is not compulsory however.   
 
Regarding confidentiality of hearings, UNCITRAL Articles 28(3) and 34(5) 
provide only that hearings be held in camera and that the award be made public only once 
the parties’ have provided consent.  In practice, these provisions essentially require only 
that certain portions of the proceedings remain private, typically those related to trade 
secrets and sensitive business information, without imposing a more general duty of 
confidentiality.  In certain cases, however, it could be useful to open hearings to the 
public as in arbitrations where the state is a party to the dispute.  Open hearings would 
provide the public with greater transparency of arbitrations under the UNCITRAL 
Rules.516   
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Accordingly, the Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Report proposed that 
article 28(3) be clarified to give the tribunal the express power, after consulting the 
disputing parties, to allow third parties to attend hearings and to issue directions for the 
protection of business or confidential information as necessary.   
 
In UNCITRAL case number 659 – Germany: Oberlandesgericht Naumburg, was 
a situation where the successful party attempted to have the arbitration award enforced in 
German national court.  In an effort to block the enforcement of the award, the 
respondent claimed that his rights during the arbitration were violated  because despite 
the fact that the respondent requested oral hearings, the single arbitrator informed both 
parties that he would decide the case on the basis of documents only without holding oral 
hearings of any kind.517  In national court proceedings initiative by the claimant in order 
to have the arbitral award declared enforceable, the respondent raised the defense of 
procedural irregularities, referring on the grounds of UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law 
Article 36 (1)(a)(iv) and alleging that the refusal of the arbitral tribunal to hold an oral 
hearing violated his due process, in particular his right to be heard.  From a procedural 
aspect, the German national court found that the respondent was precluded from relying 
on this procedural irregularity as he did not object immediately when the arbitrator 
announced his intention not to hold oral hearings.518 
 
 On this issue, the German national court continued and held that refusal of an 
oral hearing by the single arbitrator did not constitute a violation of the party’s right to be 
heard.  The court continued to explain that the principle of oral hearings in the context of 
an international arbitration is not the same as that of oral hearings in national courts.  
With respect to international arbitrations, the court clarified that the right of parties to be 
heard is respected if the parties have at least the possibility to file a written statement of 
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defense and that the particular manner in which the right if defense is exercised, either in 
written or oral form, cannot be unilaterally decided by a party.519     
 
3. WTO and oral procedures  
Within the WTO system, after the first written submissions are exchanged 
between the parties, there is a first oral hearing or substantive meeting with the parties.   
During the oral hearing, following oral statements from all parties, the parties respond to 
questions from the panel in order to clarify the legal and factual issues of concern.  The 
time allocated to the oral hearings is limited and after the hearings conclude, the panel 
begins internal deliberations, reviews the matter, and makes an objective assessment of 
the relevant factual questions and legal issues. 
 
 Initially, the panel asks the party which has brought the complaint to present its 
case.  Subsequently, and still at the same meeting, the party against which the complaint 
has been brought is then asked to present their point of view.  Further, all third parties 
involved are also invited to present their views.  Formal oral rebuttals to the initial 
position statements are made at the second oral hearing or substantive meeting of the 
panel.  The party complained against has the right to take the floor first to be followed by 
the complaining party.  The parties are required to submit before the second substantive 
meeting formal written rebuttals.  The panel may at any time put questions to the parties 
and ask them for explanations either during the oral hearings or separately in writing.  
 
Traditionally, the parties at the first hearing do little more than restate their first 
written submissions. Little if any further elaboration is expected in oral exchanges or in 
questioning by the panel or by each other. The low expectations for the first hearing tend 
to become self-fulfilling; both parties and panellists tend to limit their preparations to an 
introductory level. The low level of accomplishment at the first hearing reduces the 
effectiveness of the second hearing a month or so later. Cases tend to develop in ragged 
fashion, governed by whatever the parties submit and when they submit it. 
 





The lower level of expectation throughout the oral proceeding tends to reduce the 
value of questioning by the panel. The panel does have the possibility of questioning the 
parties on factual and legal issues, but representatives of the parties are often not prepared 
to answer without further instruction. Oral questioning tends to be limited to less complex 
subjects, with limitations on the extent of follow-up questions. For these reasons, and also 
because of a desire to make a better record, primary reliance tends to be placed on written 
questions, and written questions, of course, are easier to avoid unless they are written 
with great care. 
The somewhat passive and slow-moving process of WTO disputes settlement is 
attributable in part by the way that power is structured in the model panel that the WTO 
inherited from GATT. The traditional view of GATT panels centered on the idea that the 
panel was a body created by the parties to help them resolve a legal dispute. In the 
beginning, panels were created by agreement of the parties. Panel members were selected 
by agreement of the parties. Panels were assisted by GATT Secretariat officials, and the 
Secretariat always presented itself as a servant of the governments rather than an 
independent body. Even though the new WTO procedure makes the panel process 
compulsory, panellists are still approved by the parties, Secretariat officials are still 
servants of the governments, and the governments still have the traditional expectation of 
party control. 
With this perception of the roles and relationships in a panel proceeding, it is 
difficult for panellists or Secretariat officials to force a higher standard of practice on the 
parties. The Secretariat legal staff is perhaps best qualified to initiate a more rigorous 
standard of practice, having the greatest experience in how panels operate and what they 
need to accomplish. Yet the Secretariat is not only the servant of governments, but it is 
also the servant of the panel, and as such finds it rather difficult to persuade the panel to 
do things that may lead to conflict with the parties. The panel members themselves are 
still only occasional, ad hoc participants, invited to participate with the consent of the 
parties. Thus they usually find it more comfortable to follow whatever guidance they are 
given by the parties. As a consequence, panel members nor Secretariat advisors exert 






The subject of opening WTO oral hearings to the public has been one of 
emotional discussion over the past few years.  Significantly more case law presenting the 
analysis that led to allowing public access to hearings exists in the WTO system than 
does in either the UNCITRAL or ICSID systems.  A brief review of this jurisprudence is 
useful because the fundamental reasoning behind opening WTO hearings to the public is 
also applicable to the UNCITRAL and ICSID.  Additionally, the role of the Appellate 
Body in interpreting the legal text of the WTO DSU to enable it to open Appellate Body 
hearings to the public is particularly interesting here because it highlights the value an 
appellate mechanism brings to the overall legitimacy and functioning of a particular 
dispute settlement system.   
 
More than simply acting as a court of second review, the WTO Appellate Body 
regularly interprets and re-interprets the language of the WTO DSU and enables WTO 
dispute settlement to adjust to the ever changing needs of its Members.  This ability, 
unique to the WTO, is essential to ensure continued relevance and effectiveness of the 
system over time.  In considering the UNCITRAL and the ISCID, perhaps the inherent 
flexibility of their systems and the significant delegation to tribunal discretion addresses 
this need and only with time will it become clear which approach is more effective.    
   
While in WTO dispute settlement only WTO Members are directly subject to the 
mandatory adjudication, no matter how small this community may be, it is essential for 
Members to have confidence in the WTO which is fostered by allowing WTO Members 
who have seldom or so far never used the WTO dispute settlement system to have the 
opportunity to follow dispute settlement hearings directly.  The fact that dispute 
settlement hearings at the WTO have traditionally taken place behind closed doors has 





and doubts about the unbiased and fair manner in which panels and the Appellate Body 
conduct trade disputes.520   
 
Historically, public access to hearings is a fundamental feature of legitimate 
judicial systems dating back to the French Revolution which introduced public scrutiny 
as a means to eliminate arbitrary trial outcomes.  Further, public scrutiny brings many 
benefits to a judicial process, among them including the ability to prevent or reveal 
abuses including corruption and incompetence.  Additionally, public scrutiny strengthens 
trust and confidence in fair justice and thereby the judiciary's legitimacy though the 
public which is required to accept its decisions.  
 
In 2005, the EC, the United States and Canada were the first WTO Members to 
jointly request that a panel open its hearings to the public.  In response to this request, on 
1 August 2005, the first panels in the parallel disputes US - Continued Suspension of 
Obligations (Hormones)  and Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations (Hormones) 
decided that the public was allowed to observe the hearings along with the parties. 
 
Article 12.1 of the DSU refers to a non-compulsory standard working procedure 
which panels can modify after consulting the parties and obtaining their consent.  The 
panels further determined, and the parties agreed, that Article 14.1 of the DSU does not 
prohibit open hearings by stipulating that panel “deliberations” must be conducted 
confidentially.  The panel then interpreted “deliberations” to refer only to the panel's 
internal work in deciding on the issues of the case, including the internal process of 
decision formulation.  The panel therefore determined that Article 14.2 was not 
applicable to the formal panel proceedings with the parties and that the hearings could 
then be opened to viewing by the public.521 Despite the resistance of many third parties, 
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the panel agreed to the request and in doing so ended the consistent practice of over sixty 
years of GATT/WTO dispute settlement proceedings behind closed doors. 522   
 
During the first open panel hearings, the public and other WTO Members were, 
for the first time, able to directly witness the hearings with the exception of the third 
party session, through a closed-circuit broadcast of picture and sound to a separate room 
at or near the WTO in Geneva.  This method was chosen for reasons of room capacity as 
well as to minimize any risks of interference by the public to the proceedings. 523  
Additionally, it was important to the panel to retain the ability to interrupt the broadcast 
at any time should it become necessary.  At the beginning of the first hearing, slightly 
over 200 persons were present. 524   The attendance later dropped to around 60, among 
which were many delegates from WTO Members.   
 
With respect to concerns about open panel hearings, there was no discernible 
effect on the conduct of the hearings, in particular no “trial by media”, no security or 
other incident, no additional pressure on the panelists or the parties, and particularly no 
effect on the serenity and professionalism with which the litigators argued their case 
before the panel. 525   Moreover, following the proceedings it was determined that the 
passive public observation did not change the intergovernmental nature of the WTO or 
the government-to-government nature of dispute settlement, as was previously 
anticipated.526    
 
The next series of cases before the panel with substantial media interest were the 
EC and US Large Civil Aircraft cases; however, due to the considerable amounts of 
commercially sensitive business information associated with the cases, they did not lend 
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themselves to public access.  Nevertheless, the EC and the US sought the maximum level 
of transparency that was practically possible, that being videotaping the non-confidential 
portions of the hearings and then showing the tape a few days later which allowed for the 
possible editing if necessary.  More commonly, other cases before the panel have 
operated with the closed-circuit real-time broadcast to a separate room at the WTO; 
however, twice already the public has been allowed to sit in the gallery in the room of the 
panel hearing.   
 
To date, the regular attendance at recent panel hearings has substantially 
decreased from the first open panel meeting in 2005. This decrease is to be expected 
given the rather specialized and technical subject matter of many WTO disputes.  The 
low level of actual attendance tends to be expected in domestic lawsuits and in no way 
detracts from the importance of open access, the purpose of which is to give those 
interested the opportunity to observe a hearing within existing capacity constraints. 527   
 
When the US/Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations (Hormones) case 
reached the Appellate Body in late May 2008, the EC, the US, and Canada decided to 
continue pushing for increased transparency through open Appellate Body hearings.528  
The successful experience with many recent open panel hearings was a good basis from 
which to start; however, the WTO law with respect to hearings of the Appellate Body is 
substantially different from that governing panel proceedings.   
 
The moment the Appellate Body first opened its hearings to the public in July 
2008, the parties to nine subsequent panel procedures agreed on the opening of their 
respective hearings. 529  The first public WTO appellate proceeding took place by using 
simultaneous a closed-circuit broadcast system to a separate room at the WTO.  The 
Appellate Body allowed third parties to choose whether to make their interventions 
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publicly or confidentially and most made their choice in accordance with their previously 
expressed positions at the panel level, however only Brazil and India actually made non-
public interventions during the hearing.   
 
With respect to public Appellate Body hearings, it is important to note that a 
substantial majority of WTO Members have never seen or participated in an Appellate 
Body session.  As of the beginning of 2008, only 66 WTO Members had participated 
directly or indirectly as third parties in an appellate review.530  Although the US/Canada - 
Continued Suspension of Obligations (Hormones) case was the first opportunity for many 
WTO Members, academics, WTO Secretariat officials and others to see the Appellate 
Body in action, the late notice and short registration deadline, combined with the then 
intensive Doha negotiations resulted in a rather small turnout.      
 
Issues related to the legal justification for public Appellate Body hearings 
surround Article 17.10 of the DSU.  It stipulates that "the proceedings of the Appellate 
Body shall be confidential," and therefore many Members believed that it would not be 
possible for the Appellate Body to open their hearings to the public.531  To further 
complicate matters, the Appellate Body in Canada - Aircraft had already, although 
superficially, interpreted the term "proceedings" in Article 17.10 to include the oral 
hearing. 532  That interpretation, however, was differentiable because it addressed a 
request for additional procedures for the protection of business confidential information.  
Further, to the Appellate Body, the concept that it lacked the ability to do something that 
was possible for panels made no sense from a policy perspective; however, it also could 
not withstand the more detailed legal enquiry into the text, context, object and purpose, as 
well as the negotiating history of Article 17.10.  It was necessary for the Appellate Body 
to strike a balance.   
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The specific Appellate Body enquiry took place at the beginning of the two 
merged appeals in US/Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations (Hormones).  It 
lasted more than a month and involved in total of nearly 120 pages of primarily legal 
submissions by the parties and third parties.533  Additionally, a special (closed) oral 
hearing took place before the Appellate Body announced its decision on this issue.   
 
In a succinct procedural ruling of 10 July 2008, the Appellate Body decided that 
the DSU permitted open Appellate Body hearings.  In doing so, the Appellate Body set 
aside the vigorous opposition by Brazil, China, India, and Mexico.  To achieve this end, 
the Appellate Body provided a rather flexible interpretation to the confidentiality 
requirement of Article 17.10 of the DSU, by rejecting that this requirement entails the 
same in all relations, is absolute and incapable of adaptation. 534 Based on a contextual 
reading of Article 17.10, the Appellate Body agreed with the EC, United States, and 
Canada in their interpretation that parties are free to forego confidentiality for themselves 
and their statements during Appellate Body hearings.  The Appellate Body also relied 
heavily on other indications demonstrating that complete hearing confidentiality is not 
possible due to the fact that Appellate Body reports are always published as are notices of 
appeals and other appeals, as well as letters to the Dispute Settlement Body in all cases 
where the appeal lasts longer than sixty days.535   
 
In determining that Appellate Body hearings should be open to the public and 
given that the standing Appellate Body is a more judicially legitimate institution than the 
ad hoc composed panels, it would have been unusual had the Appellate Body been barred 
from doing what panels had already been doing for three years.  It is important to recall 
that rulings of the Appellate Body obtain a higher level of authority than do those of a 
panel.  Additionally, Appellate Body rulings are directly relevant for the entire 
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Membership of the WTO.  The decision of the Appellate Body to hold open hearings 
consolidated the panel practice, which it indirectly confirmed and made unnecessary to 
appeal.   
H. Procedural flexibility and precedent 
In principle, a court cites precedent when an issue has been previously brought to the 
court and a ruling already exists on the exact issue.  In practice, if a judge agrees with the 
interpretation of the law in a previous case, the judge should simply state the present case 
is controlled by the prior precedent and reaffirm.536 
Given that WTO is backed by strong centralizing institutions537, WTO case law 
firmly establishes a system of precedence and procedure, ICSID and UNCTRAL systems 
do not take this clearly defined approach.  It is important to recall that the ICISD and 
UNCITRAL are voluntary dispute mechanisms and both parties must freely consent to 
submit their cases to this method of dispute settlement.  The WTO, in contract, is a 
mandatory dispute settlement mechanism and the consent to subject oneself to the WTO 
system is automatic when a country becomes a Member of the WTO.  The fact that WTO 
dispute settlement is not voluntary enables the imposition of stricter procedural standards 
and the existence of binding precedence.   
Often it is the flexibility of the procedural conduct of international dispute 
settlement proceedings, in the case particularly the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems, that 
is the main factor that leads parties to agree to submit their disputes to these mechanisms.  
In general, parties find particularly attractive the fact that ICSID and UNCITRAL 
mechanisms use fair neutral procedures which are flexible, efficient and capable of being 
tailored to the specific needs of their individual disputes.   
In the ICSID and UNCTIRAL systems, the development of procedures for a 
particular case through discussions between the parties and the tribunal members may 
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include establishing an expedited "fast-track" arbitral procedure used only for the instant 
case, or emphasizing particular types of evidence (e.g., technical, site inspection), or 
employing innovative evidence-taking procedures (e.g., witness-conferencing, meetings 
of experts).538 Alternatively, it may involve using relatively conventional litigation 
procedures, much like those in some national courts, to hear the parties' submissions and 
evidence. In all cases, however, the parties' autonomy and the tribunal's discretion are 
intended to be used to adopt procedures designed to permit the most efficient, reliable, 
and sensible presentation of the parties' evidence and arguments in a particular case.  To 
achieve this, many of the procedural protections that are designed for national litigation 
involving individual litigants are removed and instead efficient procedures that are 
streamlined are adopted with the view to attaining practicable results.539 This is well 
described in the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceeding and ICSID takes a 
similar position: 
This [procedural flexibility] is useful in that it enables the arbitral tribunal to take 
decisions on the organization of proceedings that take into account the 
circumstances of the case, the expectations of the parties and of the members of 
the arbitral tribunal, and the need for a just and cost-efficient resolution of the 
dispute.540 
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It is this procedural flexibility in the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems – the 
ability to specifically tailor the procedural mechanisms to the unique eccentricities of a 
particular case that undercuts strong adherence to precedence.  The more specifically 
tailored the procedures become to a specific case, the more easily differentiable that 
particular case becomes to a spectrum of future cases.   
In ICSID and UNCITRAL dispute settlement, unlike in the WTO system, given 
that there is no clear mandate for the consideration of precedent in the respective rules, 
decision-makers often find themselves isolated and forced to forge their own path free 
from the safety of precedent to ground their decisions.  While procedural flexibility is not 
inherently negative and should not be eliminated entirely from the UNCITRAL and 
ICISD systems, procedural flexibility should not be ad hoc or unbridled.  It is the 
uncertainty that comes from ad hoc and unbridled procedural flexibility that directly 
contributes to the potential for violations of due process, specifically the due process 
requirement to ensure that parties have adequate opportunity to be heard and present their 
case.  If procedures are flexible, how then does the decision-maker ensure that those 
creative and flexible procedures adequately ensure that the party has the opportunity to be 
heard and present their case?  Considerations surrounding the potential 
institutionalization of a balanced or limited adherence to precedent as related to the 
UNCITRAL and ICSID systems would automatically provide guidance to future decision 
makers on how to appropriately manage procedural flexibility and in a way that protects 
due process rather than endangers it.  While the WTO level of adherence to precedent 
may not be ideal or even possible for the UNCITRAL and ICSID systems, clarification in 
the form of a recommendation to UNCITRAL and ICISD decision-makers that precedent 
should be considered and even referenced when developing flexible procedures would be 
helpful.   
I. Rules on admissibility, sufficiency of evidence and the burden of proof 
The ICSID rules lack detailed evidentiary standards and leave much to the individual 
tribunal to interpret on a case by case basis.  Under rule 34(1) of the ICSID Arbitration 





of its probative value."  The effect of this lax rule combined with the lack of any other 
complementary jurisprudence or doctrine, is that neither party has any real sense in 
advance of how the tribunal will assess the weight of any particular kind of evidence.  In 
particular during the oral hearing portion of the dispute settlement process, this concept is 
being tested because the current trend is for many witnesses to appear at the oral hearing 
and although not explicitly called for in the ICSID Arbitration Rules, cross-examinations 
are becoming more detailed and intrusive.   
 Admissibility in its traditional context is a non-issue in ICSID dispute settlement 
because everything is admissible.  Although not explicitly included in the ICSID Rules, 
arbitration tribunals do tend to follow the basic principle that it is for the party that asserts 
the fact to prove it.  However what will be required for a particular fact to be proven is 
left to the individual ICSID arbitration tribunal to determine and apply.     
 
At the conclusion of the ICSID dispute settlement process, the Tribunal may, 
before the award has been issued, reopen the proceeding on the ground that new evidence 
is forthcoming "of such a nature as to constitute a decisive factor, or that there is a vital 
need for clarification on certain specific points."541 However, further details clarifying 
how the Tribunal should justify such actions are left to the discretion of the particular 
Tribunal.  
 
In the 2006 ICSID case, F-W Oil Interests, Inc. (Claimant) v. The Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago (Respondent), in the procedural portion of the final award the 
Tribunal explained that an oral hearing was conducted for ten days and during the hearing 
the parties were represented by counsel who made presentations of their respective cases 
to the Tribunal and also examined witnesses from their side and put questions to 
witnesses from the opposing side.542  Further, fifteen witnesses were presented by both 
Claimant and Respondent during the oral hearings and although no explicit notation is 
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included by the Tribunal, presumably each witness was examined by both sides and even 
by the Tribunal.543   
Despite challenges, the parties and the ICSID tribunals have not routinely 
resorted to basic US-type evidentiary principles and practices; however, ICSID case law 
tends to lack detailed insight into what happens during the oral hearings and how the 
tribunal bases its decisions. Therefore, it is difficult to address whether evidentiary 
objections and tribunal rulings on the objections are routine in ICSID hearings.  The tenor 
of published decisions suggests they are not.  Nevertheless, Tribunals are addressing 
issues related to absent witnesses and credibility of witness statements.  They are also 
applying relevancy standards to the issue of documents a party should produce and 
methods to compel production including the threat of drawing adverse inferences. 
In at least one ICSID case, the tribunal actually excluded evidence that arguably 
could have been relevant.  This decision deviates from the traditional practice in 
arbitration of admitting the evidence and then addressing any objectionable aspects to the 
evidence in terms of its weight.  In the Robert Azinian and others (Complainant) v. 
United Mexican States (Respondent)544 case, the Claimant submitted witness statements.  
The Respondent then contacted the Claimant-designated, non-party witnesses to 
interview them.  The Claimant claimed that the witness contact violated ICSID AFR 
article 43, which authorizes the parties to arrange for a witness examination outside the 
Tribunal's presence.545  In the Azinian award the Tribunal refused to restrict a party from 
interviewing the witnesses, subject to certain conditions, but it held that "[s]tatements 
made by a witness during any such interview shall not be received into evidence" and the 
"only testimony to be given probative value is that contained in the signed written 
statements or given orally in the presence" of the Tribunal.546  
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The Azinian ruling, however, should be contrasted with the ruling in the Tradex 
Hellas S.A. (Complainant) v. Republic of Albania (Respondent)547 case, in which the 
Claimant vaguely alleged that the Respondent had interfered with Claimant's designated 
witnesses.  The tribunal refused to hold the evidence inadmissible, and instead stated that 
it "shall take into account the objections raised by the Parties insofar as the Tribunal 
considers that the evidence objected to its relevant for the award on the merits."548  
Application of evidentiary principles in a US fashion appears to occur but it is 
not common in ICSID arbitrations.  The current system gives substantial authority to the 
tribunal on evidentiary matters and requires little justification from the tribunal as to why 
it decided to proceed the way it did.  This approach reduces the need for the tribunal to 
make difficult evidentiary decisions.   
While this flexible approach to admissibility of evidence poses uncertainty to the 
parities, it enhances the likelihood that the tribunal can hear all aspects of the case.  Since 
the tribunal is the decision-maker in all respects, including as to evidentiary matters, the 
harm in having all of the evidence presented is not as great as if a jury were deciding the 
case.  While in the US system full discovery minimizes surprise, in arbitrations surprise is 
more common.   
J. UNCITRAL burden of proof 
The traditional notion of the burden of proof is addressed in 2010 UNCITRAL Article 
27(1) which expressly provides that "each party shall have the burden of providing the 
facts relied on to support his claim or defense."  Further, Article 27(4) clarifies that the 
arbitral tribunal shall have the power to “determine the admissibility, relevance, 
materiality and the weight of the evidence offered.”   
 
There are several problems with these rules in that they fail to state and define 
the burden of proof or the standards of proof to be applied and offer no guidance on how 
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the tribunal should determine admissibility and weight of the evidence offered.  
Generally, everything is left to the discretion of the tribunal which leads to the non-
transparent application of burden shifting and the actual decision making process of the 
tribunal itself.     
K. WTO burden of proof549 
The determination of the appropriate burden of proof and the standard of review specify 
the rules under which a decision-maker proceeds in the face of uncertainty.    Standards 
of review and the question of applying the proper such standard come into play under the 
WTO in two ways. Firstly, they arise at the panel level, specifically when a panel is 
required to review a domestic administrative determination and decide if such a domestic 
ruling is in compliance with WTO rules and obligations.    Put differently, the question 
addresses "the degree to which, in a GATT (and now WTO) dispute settlement 
procedure, an international body should 'second guess' a decision of a national 
government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with 
an international rule"   
 
The second context in which standard of review arises in WTO dispute 
settlement is when the Appellate Body reviews decisions of a panel. In this situation, the 
issue becomes how much deference, if any, should the Appellate Body give to panel 
findings and interpretations of law, as opposed to facts.    Standards of review and the 
determination of which standard of review to apply to a certain case are substantially 
different from the application of and determination of burdens of proof and standards of 
proof, further explained below.   
 
Throughout WTO jurisprudence issues related to the burden of proof and the 
approach of WTO dispute settlement with respect to the burden of proof have been 
significantly addressed.  Interestingly, despite the substantial volume of case law on this 
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subject confusion remains.  Given that the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems do not 
address the burden of proof in detail and leave great flexibility and discretion to the 
individual tribunals, a review and consideration of the WTO approach provides useful 
incite to inherent complexities in this area.  Importantly, as the burden of proof analysis is 
central to any dispute settlement process, a thorough understanding of a particular dispute 
settlement system’s approach to the burden of proof is essential to ensuring that a party 
has been given the adequate opportunity to be heard and properly present their case.   
 
The burden of proof in dispute settlement has been referred to as “the law’s 
response to ignorance”550   It “compensates for the many uncertainties of litigation, 
allowing the judicial system to reach determinate outcomes in the absence of relevant 
information”551   In international law the generally-accepted rules relating to the burden 
of proof are relatively straightforward.  Simply stated, “[e]ach party . . . has to prove its 
claims and contentions.”552   It is here that the UNCITRAL and ICSID dispute settlement 
systems stop and leave the rest of the analysis to the individual tribunal.  In contrast, 
however, the WTO dispute settlement system continues significantly further.   
 
The main source of confusion relating to the burden of proof lies in the 
terminology used to express these rules as well as in the distinction between burden of 
proof and the presentation and evaluation of evidence.553   Additionally, differences in the 
way the burden of proof and the prima facie standard are defined in both common law 
and civil law jurisdictions can further contribute to this confusion.  
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In the WTO context, issues related to the burden of proof were less significant 
during the application of the original GATT dispute settlement system. This is most 
likely because disputing parties often presented panels with already agreed-upon facts.554   
Under the old GATT, the burden of proof was actually considered "more of an 
intellectual concept than a practical one" because panels directly questioned both parties, 
giving neither the benefit of the doubt.555   The evolution of the burden of proof in the 
GATT relates substantially to "nullification and impairment". Originally, under GATT 
Article XXIII, a breach of obligation alone was not enough to bring an action.556   Proof 
of "nullification or impairment" was required of the complaining party which was 
described as the "negotiation oriented approach"557   Gradually, GATT panels eliminated 
this confusing approach and held that any violation of GATT would be considered 
"prima facie nullification or impairment"558 
  
As explained by Appellate Body member, David Unterhalter, the burden of proof 
in WTO dispute settlement "answers two questions that are central to most forms of 
adversarial litigation that rests upon the proof of facts. First, which party must satisfy the 
decision-maker on a particular issue once all the evidence has been adduced? Second, 
what standard of proof must be met to satisfy the decision-maker on that issue"559   The 
WTO DSU incorporated at least two rules relevant to the burden of proof from the old 
GATT system.  First, the complaining party is required to prove all violations alleged by 
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it. Second, a respondent who invokes general exceptions under GATT Article XX is 
obliged to prove that the necessary requirements for the exceptions are satisfied.560  
 
In the WTO panel process, the question of who bears the burden of proof is quite 
essential because, unlike during the time of the GATT, the disputing parties to a WTO 
case often contest numerous facts and evidence in the panel proceedings.561   The 
allocation of the burden of proof has a substantial impact on the substantive rights and 
obligations of the parties and may directly determine the outcome of the case. 
 
The determination of the correct burden of proof can be closely linked to the 
concept of presumption. Presumptions, in basic pretext, require or at times allow the trier 
of fact upon the proof of X to proceed on the basis that Y is true.562   Where the 
presumption is irrefutable, then Y follows as a rule of law and will not be undermined by 
the presentation of additional evidence. Alternatively, where the presumption is refutable, 
then the truth of Y remains open to further determination on the basis that there is 
additional evidence to eventually disprove Y.563 
 
Presumptions may directly affect the burden of proof in that a presumption, by 
creating a commitment to proceed in a particular fashion, may determine which party is 
burdened with the obligation to present proof for a particular issue.564   Just as a 
presumption favours one party to the dispute and shifts the burden of proof, the 
successful refutation of that presumption by an opposing party may be sufficient to 
persuade the trier of fact that what has been initially presumed is not the case.565   There 
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is a shift in the burden of proof, but only in the sense that the opposing party is now at 
risk and should it fail to produce sufficient evidence, it will lose the case.     
 
As explained above, ICSID and UNCITRAL tribunals have the authority to 
decide for themselves which evidence is admissible and what standards to apply while 
assessing the probative value of each item of material evidence submitted.566   Moreover, 
they make the determination as to which party shall bear the burden of proof.567   The 
concept of burden of proof in international procedure has been regarded as: “the 
obligation of each of the parties to a dispute before an international tribunal to prove its 
claims to the satisfaction of, and in accordance with, the rules acceptable to the 
tribunal”568   This perception of burden of proof relates to the burden of persuasion in 
common law jurisdictions and civil law's singular notion of burden of proof.   
 
Although limited guidance is provided in the respective rules, in execution ICSID 
and UNCITRAL tribunals will require parties, regardless of which side they represent, to 
prove against an agreed standard of proof each claim or fact they submit to the tribunal 
for consideration.  In essence then, the burden of proof does not shift. Additionally, the 
scope of burden of proof is generally limited only to issues of triable fact. There is no 
obligation on the parties to prove to the tribunal matters of law. The arbitrators are 
presumed to already have sufficient knowledge relating to issues of law in a way that is 
similar to national courts in both common law and civil law jurisdictions.  
 
For the purpose of deciding whether a particular claim is well founded in law, the 
principle jura novit curia signifies that the court is not solely dependent on the arguments 
of the parties before it with respect to the applicable law, but should make its own 
determinations and interpretations.569   The ability of ICSID and UNCITRAL tribunals to 
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effectively conduct an independent analysis of the applicable law is unfortunately 
undermined by the inherent flexibility of their systems in that the more a particular case 
is specifically tailored to the needs of the parties, the less that case contributes to 
precedent as it becomes more differentiable from other situations.  Significant pressure is 
then placed upon the individual members of the tribunal as they are required to conduct 
an independent analysis of applicable law with little to rely upon to support their decision 
making process.  Further, as ICSID and UNCTRAL tribunals have great latitude in 
determining which standard of proof to apply to a particular case with little guidance, the 
burden placed upon the members of a tribunal is therefore heightened.    
L. Standards of Proof 
Despite the limited guidance in the rules, before an ICSID or UNCITRAL tribunal can be 
prepared to determine whether the burden of proof has been discharged, it is necessary 
for that tribunal to first make a determination relating to the applicable standard of proof. 
The standard of proof is a subjective measure under the discretion of the tribunal that is 
subject to human judgment.570   Prima facie evidence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
and preponderance of the evidence are all types of standards used to measure the 
sufficiency of proof presented for the purposes of determining whether the ultimate 
burden of persuasion has been met.  The US Supreme Court held in 1991 that "because 
the preponderance-of-evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of 
error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions 
between private litigants unless 'particularly important individual interests or rights are at 
stake'"571    
 
Kazazi explains that, “[d]ischarging the burden of evidence does not necessarily 
imply that the burden of proof has been discharged as well. Satisfying the first will allow 
the hearing to continue. . . that does not mean that the trier of fact may at the end of the 
hearing find that the proponent has provided sufficient evidence to discharge the overall 
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burden of proof resting on the proponent”572   Following this reasoning, the judgment will 
not automatically be given in favour of the party which has been successful in merely 
establishing a prima facie case, but instead will go to the party which satisfies the 
ultimate burden of persuasion.  
 
Traditionally, the primary purpose of prima facie evidence is to reduce the 
burden of production and the burden of evidence. Wherever provided, prima facie 
evidence shifts the burden of evidence from the proponent of the burden of proof to the 
other party. Before this stage, the opposing party is not bound to respond to the case, 
mere silence may indeed be sufficient.  However, in the WTO system, after one party has 
provided prima facie evidence, it will be deemed to have discharged its burden of 
production and will no longer be required to carry the burden of proof until the other 
party rebuts the prima facie evidence established by the proponent. Both the ICSID and 
the UNCITRAL do not go into this level of detail in their respective rules or 
jurisprudence.  In some municipal jurisdictions, prima facie evidence is accepted as the 
required standard for satisfying the burden of proof. International tribunals have often 
accepted claims on the basis of prima facie evidence in instances where it remains 
unrebutted; however, the most common standard of proof applied in international 
tribunals is the preponderance of the evidence standard.573  
M. WTO prima facie standard 
Prima facie is a standard of proof without a finite definition; however, it has been defined 
in general by international tribunals as evidence "which, unexplained or uncontradicted is 
sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed"574   The Latin term prima facie, or "at 
first appearance," means "the evidence sufficient to render reasonable conclusion in 
favour of the allegation he asserts" 575 This definition, nevertheless, only emphasises the 
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importance of the subjective element inherent in issues relating to the standard of proof 
and begs the question: what is the evidence which, unexplained or uncontradicted, is 
sufficient to maintain a claim?576    
 
Historically, use of a prima facie standard was utilised by GATT panels in the 
context of deciding whether a certain act or measure by a GATT contracting party 
constituted nullification or impairment in the sense of GATT Article XXIII.577   As 
GATT jurisprudence evolved, a finding by a panel of a GATT violation constituted prima 
facie nullification or impairment of GATT concessions.  Such a finding was rebuttable by 
the responding party.  If not successfully rebutted however, the initial prima facie finding 
of nullification and impairment became final along with all the legal consequences that 
followed under GATT Article XXIII.578    
 
The WTO introduced a more structured and formal system for resolving disputes 
than that of the GATT. The WTO system arose out of dissatisfaction with aspects of the 
GATT procedures although it is important to note that dispute settlement under the WTO 
system has not divorced itself from the former rules in the GATT Agreement.  GATT 
Articles XXII and XXIII remain central to dispute settlement under the WTO today.579    
 
WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body frequently cite the decisions of other 
international tribunals in order to bolster support for their own decisions.  In US – 
Gasoline, the WTO Appellate Body identified decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and others, as authorities for its 
determination that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties had 
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attained the status of a rule of customary international law.580   This practice has 
continued for the most part without interruption.581  While at times the ICISD and 
UNCITRAL tribunals do cite decisions of other international dispute settlement 
mechanisms, this practice is not consistent nor thoroughly documented.      
 
The typical standard of proof applied by WTO panels has been presented in 
Indonesia – Autos namely that it is for the complainant to establish a prima facie case of 
inconsistency with the provision before the burden of showing consistency with that 
provision is shifted to the defendant. The Appellate Body in EC – Hormones states with 
respect to the meaning of a prima facie case “that it is well to remember that a prima 
facie case is one which in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party 
requires the panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party”582 
However, the question remains: in order to discharge the burden of proof, what degree of 
evidence is required? 
  
In response to this concept McGovern explains that “[g]iven that panels have a 
margin of discretion in the assessment of fact, it might be better to speak of a case that 
entitles (rather than requires) the panel to reach a conclusion”583   In his evaluation of the 
prima facie standard as presented by the Appellate Body in EC - Hormones with respect 
to the burden of proof, McGovern queries whether it is still meaningful to even speak of a 
prima facie case, while observing that in deciding whether such a case has been 
established, not only is the evidence of the party who is charged to present a prima facie 
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case taken under consideration prima facie, but also the evidence presented by 
independent experts along with “at least some responses from the other party”584    
  
Traditionally, establishing a prima facie case serves the purpose of demonstrating 
that a case exists and allowing the case to move forward from the initial phase where the 
claimant is required to present to the adjudicator evidence supporting the claim, to the 
point where the responding party is required to rebut the evidence presented by the 
claimant.  Throughout WTO jurisprudence, the Appellate Body attempts to shift the 
burden of evidence to the responding party only once the complainant has established a 
prima facie case. However, confusion related to when the Appellate Body determines that 
it is actually appropriate to shift the burden is apparent upon a review of the relevant case 
law.       
 
WTO panels are not confined to the factual record as presented by parties. 
Lawyers with a background in common law find this troubling because, contrary to what 
takes place in most common law proceedings, Article 13 of the DSU authorises a panel to 
seek information “from any individual or body which it deems appropriate”585   This 
information may then be used to supplement that provided by the parties.  In this respect, 
WTO panels follow the practice of courts in civil law systems, as do the ICSID and 
UNCITRAL systems.586  
 
It is possible to trace some of the confusion related to the application of the 
prima facie standard to differences between the common law and civil law systems. This 
is because each system has an innately different approach to the application of burden of 
proof.  Moreover, when taking part in any international dispute settlement mechanism, 
participants bring with them preconceived ideas from their own domestic system relating 
to the application of burden of proof. This further contributes to the confusion of burden 
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of proof generally and its application within the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
specifically.  
N. Interaction between parties and decision-makers 
In the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems, the rules allow for the parties to spend significant 
time before the trier of fact to address and discuss how the tribunal will manage the 
adjudication of their dispute.  This high degree of interaction between the tribunal and the 
parties is largely due to the fact that there is significant flexibility in the rules of both the 
ICSID and UNCITRAL systems and much is left to the discretion of either the parties or 
the tribunal.  For this reason, much discussion must take place between the decision-
makers and the parties in order to establish the methodology of how the tribunal will 
handle the case before the merits of the case can be considered.  This interaction, though 
not always formalized, could be compared to the pre-hearing or pre-trial conferences in 
the US court system.   
In contrast to the ICISD and UNCITRAL systems, the WTO system is highly 
structured and leaves little time or opportunity for a dialogue type of interaction between 
the parties to a dispute and the panel or appellate body.  While oral hearings are clearly 
included in WTO dispute settlement, they come at a point in the process where the case 
has already been developed, after evidence has been prepared and written submissions 
have been exchanged and considered.  Given the way the WTO system approaches the 
burden of proof and the prima facie standard in the shifting of the burden of proof, this 
limited interaction between the parties and the panel or appellate body causes problems 
for the parties in that they have limited information upon which to base their case 
management decisions.  Further, parties to WTO dispute settlement have little 
opportunity to adjust their argumentation or their strategy once the dispute settlement 
process has begun.  Consideration of proposed adjustments to WTO dispute settlement 
procedures to enable increased dialogue between parties and panels throughout the 





O. Issuance and publication of the award or opinion  
ICSID Arbitration Rule 46 indicates that the award, including any individual or 
dissenting opinion, shall be drafted and signed within 120 days after closure of the 
proceedings.  Should the Tribunal deem it necessary, it has the option to extend this 
period by a further 60 days.  The award is required to be in writing and to include the 
following: 
 (a) a precise designation of each party; 
(b) a statement that the Tribunal was established under the Convention, and a 
description of the method of its constitution; 
(c) the name of each member of the Tribunal, and an identification of the 
appointing authority of each; 
(d) the names of the agents, counsel and advocates of the parties; 
(e) dates and place of the sittings of the Tribunal; 
(f) a summary of the proceedings; 
(g) a statement of the facts s found by the Tribunal; 
(h) the submissions of the parties; 
(i) the decision of the Tribunal on every question submitted to it, together with 
the reasons upon which the decision is based; and 
(j) any decision of the Tribunal regarding the cost of the proceeding.587 
The rapid publication of awards issued by ICSID tribunals has become 
particularly important in light of the increasing number of cases and the fact that it is not 
uncommon for several cases addressing similar issues are pending at the same time.588  In 
order to facilitate the timely publication of awards, ICSID Rule 48 makes their early 
publication mandatory.  Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention and the first sentence of 
Rule 48(4) provide that ICSID shall not publish an award without party consent.  If 
ICSID does not obtain the mandatory consent of both parties for publication of the full 
text of the award, and the award is not published by another source, ICSID must 
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promptly publish excerpts of the legal conclusions of the tribunal.589  The ICSID website 
publishes many ICSID awards and other submissions in ICSID arbitrations.590  Many 
ICSID awards appear in ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, International 
Legal Materials, or ICSID Reports.  Additionally, the US Department of State maintains 
transcripts of some ICSID hearings on its website as well as some party submissions.591   
Previously, a former version of ICSID Rule 48 authorized, but did not make 
mandatory, the publication by ICSID of excerpts from the awards.  Further, there was no 
provision addressing the timeliness of publication of excerpts of the main holdings while 
ICSID waited to receive the consent of both parties for the publication of an award.592  
Obtaining such approval occasionally took several months.593 
 Article 33 and 34 address the award under the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.   Article 33(1) requires that a majority of the arbitrators in a Tribunal make any 
award.  The primary drawback of the majority rule is that it may result in deadlock if no 
majority is available or, alternatively, may pressure one of the arbitrators to compromise 
their position and judgment in an effort to obtain a majority.   
 
Article 34(2) requires that the award “shall be final and binding on the parties” 
and that “the parties undertake to carry out the award without delay.”  Those provisions 
are designed to enhance the enforceability of the award by confirming the finality of the 
award and emphasizing the parties’ contractual commitment to comply with the award.  
Additionally, the arbitral tribunal is required under Article 34(3), when drafting the 
award, to state the reasons upon which the award is based, unless the parties have 
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specifically agreed that no reasons are to be given.  Article 34(4) requires the award to 
contain “the place where the award was made.”    
 
Article 34 (5) addresses publication of the award and explains that an award 
“may be made public only with the consent of both parties.”  Additionally, if the 
arbitration law of the country where the award is made requires that the award be filed or 
registered by the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal shall comply with the requirement within 
the period of time required by the relevant law.  Further, Article 34(5) allows for the 
publication of an award to protect or pursue a legal right or in relation to legal 
proceedings before a court or other competent authority.   Details regarding the method 
of publication, length of time before publication, translation, etc. are not addressed by the 
2010 UNCITRAL Rules.  
 
With respect to the publication of adopted panel reports, the WTO has a 
substantial history of promoting openness in relation to such documents and information; 
however, timeframes and practicality of access have only substantially improved in 
recent years with the advancement of the WTO website.  Additionally, the time necessary 
for translation into the three WTO official languages may directly contribute to delays in 
publication of documents, including adopted panel reports. In general, panel reports are 
directly published after their adoption through the Dispute Settlement Body.  For adopted 
Appellate Body reports, the WTO includes all adopted Appellate Body reports on the 
WTO website; however, timeframes and practicality of access have only substantially 
improved in recent years. As with panel reports, the time necessary for translation into 
the three WTO official languages directly contributes to delays in the publication of 







ICSID proceedings are usually conducted in secret, with no easy public access available 
to the pleadings, let alone the oral hearings.594  Practically, unless the tribunal and the 
disputing parties are in agreement, the hearings, pleadings, and the very existence of the 
case may very likely not be available to the public. 
Articles 28 and 34(5) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules address 
confidentiality of hearings and awards respectively, however there are no rules 
addressing the confidentiality of the proceedings as such or of the materials (including 
pleadings) before the tribunal.595  Therefore, the Paulsson & Petrochilos UNICTRAL 
Report proposed an explicit provision on confidentiality which clarifies that any materials 
used in the arbitration are confidential, with an exception for the submission of amicus 
briefs, in order to conform to revised article 15(5).596   
While an explicit rule on confidentiality might prove beneficial in commercial 
disputes between private parties, the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) 
and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) argue the 
inappropriateness of such a rule in investor-state arbitrations since it prevents a 
government from making its own submissions available to the public, which is contrary 
to the principles of good governance.597  Moreover, access to documents produced in 
arbitration proceedings are necessary to effectively apply provisions regarding amicus 
submissions.  As an example, a non-disputing party requesting leave to submit an amicus 
brief to a tribunal would not be able to justify why its perspective, knowledge or insight 
is different from that of the disputing parties or useful to the tribunal if the record is kept 
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confidential.598  Further, it would not be possible for a non-disputing party to prepare a 
specifically tailored submission when access to the pleadings is denied.599   
With respect to public access to WTO DSU documents, the WTO has made great 
strides in de-restricting documents and making information available online on its ever 
expanding website, in particular on the so-called Dispute Settlement Gateway.  There is 
now so much information available on the WTO website that it has become difficult to 
find specific pertinent information, much less keep up to date with the most recent 
developments. The most distinctive features of the WTO website are full text search of 
derestricted WTO documents, including panel and Appellate Body reports, the texts of 
the WTO Agreements, and schedules of WTO meeting as well as announcements of 
public panel and Appellate Body hearings. The availability of these dispute settlement 
documents has to be seen in the context of the de-restriction policy of WTO documents 
adopted by the General Council.600 
In spite of the general trend towards publication of WTO documents, full 
pleadings of parties or communications by third parties in Appellate Body and panel 
proceedings both during the dispute settlement process and after the issuance of the 
opinion are not independently published by the WTO Secretariat.  According to Article 
18.2 of the DSU a party’s submissions are confidential except if a party decides to make 
its submissions available to the public on its own. The United States (US), Canada, and 
the European Communities (EC), for instance, publish their submissions on a regular 
basis and at an early stage of the dispute. They are therefore also in favour of increased 
transparency through public submissions in the DSU review. The current practice of the 
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WTO Secretariat, however, is for panels and the Appellate Body to include summaries, or 
at times even full text versions, of party submissions and questions as annexes to the final 
panel report which is made public directly after adoption, delays depending sometimes on 
translation issues.601    
Q. Speed and costs of dispute settlement 
If one of the parties to ICSID arbitration is intent on dragging its feet, there will be ample 
opportunity for doing so.  It may take months before the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal is settled, and even afterwards there may be resignations and the necessity to 
reconstitute.  One has even heard of resignations on a prearranged basis if one of the 
parties has deliberately appointed an arbitrator who is not independent.602 
Investment claims are notoriously long and expensive.  While each party is 
required to pay its own legal fees and disbursements under any judicial regime, under 
ICSID arbitration they are also required to pay for the hourly services of the decision-
makers.  There is also travel and lodging expenses associated with bringing together a 
panel from all over the world to attend hearings and deliberations in some of the world's 
most expensive cities (in the case of ICSID based arbitration, usually Washington DC or 
Paris).  Further these cases can involve thousands of pages of documents, at least two 
rounds of complete legal pleadings, with usually several others if there are judicial 
challenges or requests for interim measures.  Further there is at least one complete oral 
hearing.  The arbitrator fees and expenses are now typically amounting to about US$ 1 
million per case, which is shared by each side and paid up-front as the case proceeds.  
The slow pace at which the proceedings progress and decisions are drafted can be equally 
frustrating for all sides.  Matters of logistics, the lack of strict time rules for the bringing 
of claims to hearing and issuing awards, and any number of intangible factors make the 
average resolution time form the date the claims are initially registered to the date of 
dispatch of the final award almost over two years, and regularly beyond that.   
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As private lawyers and law professors, investor-state arbitrators are paid by the 
hour at rates commensurate with their reputations and experience, and to some extent, 
with what they bill out other client matters.  Fees range from a low-level of $2400 per 
day per arbitrator as set by the ICSID in its most recent Schedule of Fees,603 up to, $800 
per hour in cases where the parties agree to top-off the ICSID rates.  Arbitrators' 
allegiances are to their own firms.  Their billing requirements make it impossible for 
them to approach a case in the same way a judge or other decision-makers do when they 
have no financial stake either in the existence of the claim itself, or in its prolonged 
duration. 
In itself, the generous remuneration of the arbitrators is not automatically a 
problem because significant expertise is needed.  Nevertheless, it can be argued that the 
ICSID arbitration system, in paying its adjudicators by the hour and without overall time 
limits, financially rewards the continuation and prolonging of proceedings.  
Pursuant to ICSID’s financial and administrative regulation 14, the Secretary-
General sets standard daily fees for members of conciliation commissions, arbitration 
tribunals, and annulment committees.604  However, in accordance with article 60(2) of the 
Convention, parties and the commission, tribunal or committee may agree on a different 
rate of remuneration than the stated fee.605  In an effort to provide further clarification, 
ICSID Rule 14 states that requests for increases in the applicable rate will only be made 
in exceptional circumstances and must be made through ICSID.  Rule 14 specifically 
responds to situations where tribunal members objected at the beginning of a proceeding 
to ICSID’s standard hourly rate of $350 and requested substantially more, sometimes on 
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the order of $500-$800 an hour.606  Rule 14 is intended to make it much more difficult for 
arbitrators to make such demands.607 
In the 2009 case EDF (Services) Limited (Claimant) v. Romania (Respondent), 
on 14 June, 2005, the ICSID received from the Claimant a request for arbitration 
proceedings and the request was registered on 29 July 2005 by the Secretary-General of 
ICSID and the Tribunal was constituted on 20 December 2005.608   In subsequent months, 
the parties engaged in a back and forth filing of requests for production of documents, 
squabbling over the scope of such requests, and the filing of submissions, observations, 
replies and rejoinders.  After several rescheduled attempts, the evidentiary hearing was 
held from 22 September 2008 to 26 September 2008 at the headquarters of the World 
Bank in Washington, D.C.  During the evidentiary hearing, sixteen witnesses and seven 
experts from both the Claimant and Respondent were examined.609 On 8 June 2009, the 
Tribunal declared the proceeding closed, but it was reopened on 27 July 2009, to allow 
both parties to update their respective statements on costs to take account for further 
submissions after the closing of the proceeding, and the dispatch of the award occurred 
on 8 October 2009.610 Over four years were devoted to this dispute. 
With respect to costs in the EDF (Services) Limited case, the claimant incurred 
costs of US$ 2,761,308 and the Respondent US$ 18,574,624.611  The Tribunal took note 
of the material disproportion between the Claimant’s and Respondent’s arbitration costs; 
however, the Tribunal noted that the traditional position in investment arbitration, in 
contrast to commercial arbitration, has been to “follow the public international rule which 
does not apply the principle that the loser pays the costs of the arbitration and the costs of 
the prevailing party . . . rather, the practice has been to split the costs evenly, whether the 
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claimant or the respondent prevails.”612  The Tribunal cited the Metalclad v. Mexico case 
where the claimant (investor) prevailed but was still required to pay its own costs.613  
Further, the Tribunal explained that this same approach of splitting all costs evenly has 
been adopted in cases in which the State was the winning party.614 
In allocating costs, the Tribunal determined that the dispute was fairly brought by 
the Claimant and in good faith was evidenced by each side.  The Tribunal explained that 
the disputing parties presented their cases well in both the written submissions and the 
oral presentations at the hearings.  The Tribunal held that, “given the material 
disproportion between the parties’ respective costs, the Tribunal holds that Claimant and 
Respondent should share equally the costs of the arbitration, and . . . that Claimant should 
pay all of its own costs and contribute to Respondent’s costs . . . for the amount of US$ 
6,000,000.615  
In its decision the Tribunal in EDF (Services) Limited explained that the 
investment arbitration tradition of dividing the costs evenly may be changing.  The 
Tribunal cited the 2005 NAFTA case of Methanex Corp. v. The United States where all 
of Methanex’s claims were dismissed and Methanex was ordered to pay the costs of the 
arbitration as well as the US’s reasonable legal costs.616  The Tribunal further explained 
that in the 2006 case of Thunderbird v. Mexico, the Tribunal’s majority said that the same 
approach as to costs should apply to international investment arbitrations as to 
international commercial arbitration and therefore allocated the costs on a 75:25 basis 
against the losing party.617    
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In WTO dispute settlement, with respect to the costs associated with dispute 
settlement, the DSU clarifies that all panelists' expenses, including travel and subsistence 
allowance, shall be met from the WTO budget in accordance with criteria to be adopted 
by the General Council.  Further, if necessary, the WTO Secretariat will make available a 
qualified legal expert from the WTO technical cooperation services to any developing 
country Member which so requests. This WTO expert will assist the developing country 
Member throughout the dispute settlement process but will ensure the continued 
impartiality of the WTO Secretariat.  The WTO Secretariat will also conduct special 
training courses for interested Members concerning the dispute settlement procedures and 
practices to facilitate Members' experts to be better informed and able to navigate the 
WTO system.  Regarding additional expenses associated with WTO dispute settlement, 
the DSU is silent, creating the presumption that each disputing Member is responsible for 
its own expenses.     
 
Article 40 through 42 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules addresses the 
costs associated with an UNCITRAL arbitration and require that the tribunal fix the costs 
of the arbitration in its award and clarifies that the term costs includes only: 
1) The fees of the arbitrational tribunal to be stated separately as to each 
arbitrator and to be fixed by the tribunal itself; 
2) The travel and other expenses incurred by the arbitrators; 
3) The costs of expert advice and of other assistance required by the arbitral 
tribunal; 
4) The travel and other expenses of witnesses to the extent such expenses are 
approved by the arbitral tribunal; 
5) The costs for legal representation and assistance of the successful party if 
such costs were claimed during the arbitral proceedings, and only to the 






6) Any fees and expenses of the appointing authority as well as the expenses of 
the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.618    
 
Article 41 clarifies that all fees and expenses associated with the UNICTRAL 
arbitration process must be reasonable and take into account the amount in dispute, the 
complexity of the subject matter, the time spent by the arbitrators and any other relevant 
circumstances of the case.  As quickly as possible after establishment, the  arbitral 
tribunal is required to inform the parties as to how it proposes to determine its fees and 
expenses, including any rates it intends to apply.  Within 15 days of receiving that 
proposal, any party may refer the proposal to the appointing authority for review.  If, 
within 45 days of receipt of such a referral, the appointing authority finds that the 
proposal of the arbitral tribunal is unreasonable or inconsistent with the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, it shall make any necessary adjustments which will be binding upon 
the arbitral tribunal. 
 
With respect to arbitrator compensation, Article 41 of the 2010 UNCITRAL 
Rules recognizes the need for flexibility, given the variety of factors that may affect what 
amounts to fair remuneration, by stipulating a test of reasonableness.619  The UNCITRAL 
rules attempt to balance this flexibility by providing a list of factors to be taken into 
account in deciding the question of reasonableness which include namely: the amount in 
dispute, the complexity of the subject-matter, the time spent by the arbitrators and any 
other relevant circumstances of the case.  Also to be taken into account in certain 
circumstances are analogous schedules of fees, if available.620  UNCITRAL Article 41(4) 
also provides for consultation with an appointing institution before the fixing of fees 
under appropriate circumstances. 
 
 
618 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 38. 
619 The drafters of 2010 UNCITRAL Article 41 considered and rejected a fixed schedule of fees 
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Article 42 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules presents the tradition that generally 
“costs of the arbitration shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party.”621  
However, the arbitral tribunal has the power to apportion each of such costs between the 
parties if it determines that apportionment is the most reasonable option and in taking into 
account the circumstances of the particular case.  Additionally, the arbitral tribunal does 
not have the ability to charge additional fees for interpretation, correction or completion 
of its award.  The arbitral tribunal shall in the final award or, if it deems appropriate, in 
any other award, determine any amount that a party may have to pay to another party as a 
result of the decision on the allocation of costs.  Further, the arbitral tribunal, on its 
establishment, may request the parties to deposit an equal amount as an advance to cover 
costs associated with the dispute settlement process and during the course of the arbitral 
proceedings the arbitral tribunal may request supplementary deposits from the parties.   If 
the required deposits are not paid in full within 30 days after the receipt of the request, 
the arbitral tribunal will inform the parties in order that one or more of them may make 
the required payment and if such payment is not made, the arbitral tribunal has the 
authority to order the suspension or termination of the arbitral proceedings.  After a 
termination order or final award has been made, the arbitral tribunal shall render an 
accounting to the parties of the deposits received and return any unexpended balance to 
the parties. 
R. Brief summary 
In the above comparative analysis of the WTO, ICSID and UNCITRAL international 
dispute settlement mechanisms, we have seen that while procedural flexibility is 
important and much discretion is left to the decision-makers in one form or another, the 
protection of due process is essential to insure the legitimacy of the respective system and 
that discretion is not abused.  We have seen that while defining specifics surrounding the 
concept of due process is rather complex, fundamental requirements for the protection of 
due process can be identified.  However, in the international context what is required to 
rise to a level that effectively meets the fundamental requirements of due process remains 
 





largely unknown and with surprisingly little guidance.  In the complex world of 
international dispute settlement, a world outside the dominating force of domestic law or 
the reach of proscribing legislators, competing interests create an environment ripe for 
the abuse of due process and while the fundamental requirements for the protection of 
due process provide some assistance, it is not enough. 
Procedure and due process requirements in international arbitration differ 
significantly from procedure and due process requirements in national court litigation.  
While a party's right to present his case may be more circumscribed in international 
arbitration than in domestic litigation, US courts for example, have tended to uphold 
arbitral awards subject to attack on due process grounds without insisting that all the 
requirements of due process under US law be met, so long as a party opposing 
confirmation has received a fair hearing. There is arguably a greater emphasis in 
international dispute settlement than in domestic litigation on the equal treatment of the 
parties during the proceedings owing to the consensual nature of arbitral jurisdiction.   
 
 Of the tribunals considered, a broad spectrum of degree of delegation of authority 
to the decision-maker or parties themselves emerged.  The UNCITRAL dispute 
settlement process is the most flexible, leaving significant discretion to the parties 
themselves to specifically tailor the procedures of the adjudication of their case to their 
specific needs and the arbitral tribunal is basically free to conduct the arbitration in any 
manner it considers appropriate and specific procedures tend to very greatly from case to 
case.  At the other end of the spectrum is the WTO dispute settlement process with 
clearly defined procedure from the WTO DSU.  In WTO dispute settlement, when 
compared to the UNCITRAL system, there is actually little procedural flexibility and all 
evidence in the case is submitted and evaluated before any findings of fact, applicable 
law or WTO violations are made by the panel.   
 While there are similarities and differences between each of the three 
mechanisms considered, a single system with the perfect approach to all issues has not 





for improvement have been identified and although different, each system can use the 




POLICY GUIDANCE FOR PROTECTING DUE PROCESS  
 
While fundamental requirements of due process protection must be respected in any form 
of dispute settlement, be it international or domestic, with respect to international dispute 
settlement there is no single generally accepted international treaty containing detailed 
procedural rules and guidance on how those fundamental requirements of due process 
protection should be implemented.  While there is a substantial body of international law 
and customary international law to refer to and international dispute settlement 
mechanisms could also refer to their past decisions as a form of precedent or guidance for 
future decisions, there is no clear solution and in practice interpretation of due process 
protection in the international context becomes largely ad hoc.  To this end, the 
development of policy options for the protection of due process in the international 
context which highlight simple methods to ensure the fundamental requirements of due 
process are effectively protected would be a welcome addition to the body of 
international law.   
Factors favoring the development of policy guidance for the protection of due 
process include the lack of a common procedural background shared by international 
dispute settlement participants, as well as the absence at the international level of the 





and social influences of national public policy.622  Further, policy guidance for the 
protection of due process will seek to provide support for the avoidance of an 
international dispute settlement tribunals’ adoption of the lowest common denominator of 
a procedural rule, that being the selection of the procedural rule that is simplest to 
implement, a potential result of unguided procedural flexibility.623 
Based upon the analysis of how the three above considered dispute settlement 
mechanisms address the protection of due process, the development of common rules 
relating to discovery in an effort to ensure that all evidence is made available to the 
decision maker is identified as the primary existing gap with the greatest impact potential. 
Additional policy guidance developed highlights the benefits of a clearly defined 
substantive appeals mechanism and also the practice of looking to past precedent in order 
to ground future decisions.  
 
The below sections provide a more detailed analysis of each of the proposed 
policy options for the protection of due process and considers their application to the 
three international dispute mechanisms analyzed above.  As a starting point for the 
development of due process protecting policy options, the comparative analysis of the 
procedural jurisprudence of the three international dispute settlement mechanisms 
considered above provides an effective source of reference.  Reference to the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and Model Law, the ICSID system and the World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding, for example, have served as remarkably 
solid foundations for both the statutes of the many other standing tribunals, as well as for 
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the procedural law of other dispute settlement bodies.624  This broad collection of 
jurisprudence has been described as "the most important means for the determination of 
the rules and principals of international law."625  These sources have resulted in a notable 
degree of "homogeneity" in actual practice - especially in the absence of a fully 
developed doctrine of international procedural law for the implementation of the 
protection of due process.626  
 
Chapter 7      Development of common rules related to discovery 
 The WTO, ICSID and UNCITRAL dispute settlement mechanisms commonly involve a 
struggle to develop the necessary information and legal understanding necessary to 
properly decide the case before them.  This can be attributed to the fact that while a party 
tends to be very happy to present all the information favorable to its side, this collegial 
attitude changes when it comes to voluntarily presenting any information that can be 
useful to the opposing party.  To address this issue, policies around the development of 
common rules or practices related to discovery in international dispute settlement would 
significantly contribute to ensuring that all evidence, whether favorable to a party’s 
position or not, is presented to and considered by the decision-maker, therefore 
safeguarding the decision-maker’s ability to make an informed decision.  Further, 
discovery practices would bolster due process protections as it would provide assurances 
that parties in actuality have an adequate opportunity to be heard and present their case.    
 
With respect to general procedure, while both the UNCITRAL and the ICSID are 
procedurally flexible, all three mechanisms do require the parties to submit filings 
presenting their respective positions, making their arguments and providing evidence 
upon which they plan to rely for the adjudication of their case.  Of importance is the fact 
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that in all three dispute settlement mechanisms the tribunal is significantly reliant upon 
the parties to voluntarily submit all the evidence upon which the decision-maker will 
ultimately base their decisions.  There is no clear mandate insofar as to the rights of the 
decision-maker to ensure that documents that may be unfavorable to a party’s position 
are presented for balanced consideration.  Matters of production are left entirely to the 
discretion of the tribunal but the tribunal has no clear power of document compulsion.     
 
A. What is discovery? 
Discovery is a legal mechanism designed for gathering information about either party to a 
case.  During the discovery phase of dispute settlement, there are five common practices 
used to obtain information from the parties before progressing to the substantive analysis 
of the case.  If used properly, parties can use the discovery phase to determine what 
arguments the other party intends to make and upon which evidence it will rely on to 
justify their position.  The five basic discovery methods are as follows: 
1.  Disclosure – both parties request certain items from the other party.  The list 
of items is sent to the other side and they typically have up to 30 days to respond.  
2.  Interrogatories –This is a list of questions sent for written completion from 
one party to the opposing party. 
3.  Admissions of fact – This written list of facts is sent from one party to the 
opposing party.  The party receiving the list of facts is asked either to admit or 
deny each fact. 
4.  Requests for production – Used to obtain documents and other materials from 
the opposing party. 
5.  Depositions – sworn testimony taken from a witness by a party and anything 





With respect to discovery practices, many American lawyers find it difficult to 
imagine filing a lawsuit only to be later informed that there will be no pre-trial discovery.  
Nevertheless, such is often the case in international dispute settlement as discovery is not 
contemplated in the rules and it may come as a rather rude surprise to US practitioners to 
find that their expectations for document discovery may not be realized.   
 For most of Europe, which bases its legal systems on civil law tradition, 
discovery as Americans understand it is considered intrusive, unnecessary and unfair.  In 
international dispute settlement, which borrows aspects of its procedure from both civil 
law and common law traditions, discovery is not allowed on a level comparable to what 
is standard within the American legal practice, if allowed at all.  To a very limited degree, 
international dispute settlement tribunals order the production of documents, but 
depositions, even of party witnesses, are almost never allowed.    
B. Common law and civil law approach to discovery 
The United States is a common law country and US rules on discovery are aimed at 
accomplishing the goals of preserving relevant information, ascertaining and isolating 
issues, and finding out what evidence is out there to assist in the adjudication of the 
case.627  To achieve the goal of maximizing the attainment of relevant information to aid 
in the legal process, the scope of the discovery rules is extremely broad.628  In a US civil 
case, a party is entitled to broad discovery of any information sought if it appears 
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”629  Therefore 
parties may engage in a virtual fishing expedition of documents in order to find the 
evidence they need to prove their claims.  In the United States there is no requirement 
that parties specifically identify the documents, individuals, or information they are 
seeking.   
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It is important to pause a moment to understand how broad the American concept 
of discovery actually is and how foreign this concept is to current practice in the WTO, 
ICISD and the UNCITRAL systems, where evidence production is limited in most cases 
to voluntary production.  In Article 43, the TRIPS Agreement considers the production of 
evidence and clarifies that judicial authorities have the power to order production of 
specified evidence but little guidance is provided as to what level of specificity is 
required and what options are available to compel a party to produce evidence.630  In any 
event, while the TRIPS Agreement does consider the production of evidence it does not 
provide guidance similar to the concept of discovery procedures that are found in the 
American judicial system.   
Under the American concept of discovery, the fact that a party does not have the 
obligation to specifically identify documents, individuals or information which they are 
seeking to compel is a very powerful concept.  When approached aggressively, virtually 
any information is within the realm of request.  This is further highlighted when the 
language “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” is 
considered which creates a very low bar to the justification of relevance.  Here the 
important concept to note is the fact that the information requested does not have to be 
admissible itself; however it must only be reasonably linked to the expectation that if that 
information is produced it will lead to the discovery of some other information, unknown 
at the time of request, that will be material and admissible.  Following this line of 
reasoning, virtually anything can and often is requested.  Within the United States legal 
system and true to its adversarial nature, parties often use discovery as a weapon, or at 
least for intimidation purposes.  Before a party brings a case to court they must be 
prepared in advance to open their private secrets up to public record and scrutiny.  The 
concept that a party to a case before the WTO, ICSID or UNCITRAL dispute settlement 
mechanisms could simply request information that could be reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of some other evidence that is admissible, and the party requested to 
produce would actually be compelled to produce, has not been contemplated.   
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 The US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a wide range of pre-trial 
discovery mechanisms, including oral depositions, written depositions, written 
interrogatories, written requests for admissions, and physical and mental exams.631 In 
general, in the US system, the discovery process is time consuming and the majority of 
discovery takes place at the beginning of the adjudication process to bring forth all 
evidence possible before the merits of the case are actually considered.  Initial discovery 
requests are served in the form of interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents and things.632  Next, plaintiffs may serve subsequent sets of requests, as many 
as they wish, as they become aware of more specific evidence they wish to obtain.633 
Finally, depositions under Rule 30 may be conducted on a person, whether a party to the 
litigation or not.634  Within the United States, subpoenas under Rule 45, compel or force 
individuals to testify before the court as well as to bring any relevant documents in their 
possession determined to be relevant.635    
Germany is an example of a civil law country.636  Unlike countries with a 
common law tradition, German courts have no authority to adopt general rules on civil 
procedure. On constitutional grounds this task is reserved for the legislature.  The 
German law of civil procedure has a variety of statutory sources, its main source being 
the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung or ZPO). Since its enactment in 1877, 
the Civil Procedure Code has been amended several times, but its basic structure and 
characteristic features have endured. 
 
631 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5). 
632 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, 34. 
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A number of guiding principles inform civil trials in Germany, some of which are 
firmly rooted in the German constitution.637  According to the principle of party control 
(Dispositionsmaxime), all relevant aspects of the proceedings are determined by the 
parties.638 The principle of party control of facts and the means of proof 
(Verhandlungsgrundsatz or Beibringungsgrundsatz) means that parties are responsible 
for presenting the facts and relevant evidence to the court. In consequence of the 
Verhandlungsgrundsatz, the German civil trial is adversarial and not inquisitorial, as has 
been alleged by some commentators.  Nonetheless, in comparison with the common law, 
judges play a more active role. The constitutional right to be heard (Recht auf rechtliches 
Gehor) is considered to be the most important principle of German law of civil 
procedure, guaranteed not only by the German constitution but also by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Article 6 [1]).639  It guarantees a litigant, as well as every 
other person directly affected by the result of a law suit, "an opportunity to address the 
court in support of its own claims and proof and in opposition to the assertions and proof 
of the opponent"640.  Conversely, the judge is under an obligation to take into account the 
allegations and arguments presented by the parties.641 
German procedure protects the litigants from surprise by requiring each party to 
identify the evidence upon which it relies, including the witnesses and what they are 
expected to say, in advance of any evidentiary hearing.  The scope of witness 
interrogation in Germany is much more limited than in common law countries, such as 
the United States.642  The taking of evidence in German trials is governed by a strict 
standard of relevancy.  This standard includes a requirement of "substantiation," pursuant 
to which the court may "order testimony only where a party can generally describe the 
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facts that the evidence is intended to prove."643  The "substantiation" requirement is 
intended to prevent a party from using the courts to "probe" or "fish" for evidence of 
which the party has no concrete knowledge.  This is very much in contrast to the 
approach taken in the United States as discussed above.  The traditional principle in 
German courts is that "no party is required to provide, for his opponent's victory in court, 
material which the opponent did not already have at his disposal."644  While there is 
considerable debate today in Germany concerning how concrete a party's suspicions have 
to be to justify taking a witness's testimony, and while some situations give rise to a duty 
to disclose certain information, the "substantiation" requirement demonstrates a rather 
restrictive attitude toward discovery in civil law jurisdictions.645 
In looking at common law and civil law practices together, the general concern 
for properly balancing and controlling the scope of discovery has two aspects.  Firstly, 
there is a concern that discovery conducted only by a magistrate or judge may not be as 
thorough as discovery conducted by the parties' lawyers.  The concern stems from the 
fact that judges and magistrates are subject to institutional pressures to limit long 
discovery in an attempt to more rapidly clear their dockets and address more cases.  The 
US system of discovery conducted by attorneys working on an hourly or contingency fee 
basis "aligns responsibility with incentive."646   
Discovery by a judicial officer may result in what could be considered an 
unhealthy state intrusion into the private arena. With respect to the US system, it is 
important to note that while discovery is mandated by the court, it is actually led and 
conducted by the individual parties and their representatives.  Authors on both sides of 
the Atlantic have suggested that with respect to the German system, the reluctance to 
develop vigorous tools for forcing parties and witnesses to divulge information and 










intrusions into areas of personal privacy.647  It seems undeniable that putting strong 
discovery tools in the hands of the judiciary would pose more of a danger of unwarranted 
state intrusion into personal privacy than does the US present system of party-driven and 
attorney-led discovery.648 
In the German system it is the judge or magistrate that actually executes 
depositions.  This is in contrast to the US system where the party attorneys execute 
depositions according to a strict protocol.  Having a judge or parajudge participate in 
every discovery deposition -- and not just participate, but in fact take the lead in the 
questioning -- means adding another person who has to prepare for each witness 
interview.  It means adding another person who has the right  to prolong the process of 
questioning each witness.  It means adding another person whose conflicting obligations 
have to be taken into account in scheduling each new witness interview.  Adding a judge 
or parajudge to the process of actual witness examination and record building in the 
discovery phase thus seems to add a substantial additional delay factor.  On balance, 
however, there is the potential for it to expedite the conduct of individual depositions by 
eliminating many of the games attorneys play during discovery depositions.   
Even without the US expansive rules of discovery, the German system at times 
has difficulty in controlling delay in a system of judge-centered fact production.649  The 
German system tends to proceed in a series of hearings until the judge or judges are 
satisfied that the crucial factual questions have been explored as fully as possible.  This 
system is subject to delay because a party could always argue for one more hearing to 
examine a new witness or a new issue, and judges tend to find it difficult to resist the 
pressure to stretch out the proceedings.  The response has been to require that evidentiary 
proceedings be concentrated as much as possible into one principal hearing but in 
practice this is not easy to achieve. 
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C. Discovery through examination of witnesses 
Discovery can be a very useful procedural device, especially in cases in which one of the 
parties does not have access to the necessary evidence for reasons beyond its reasonable 
control.650  Recognizing its usefulness, many civil lawyers and arbitrators now accept this 
procedure as long as it does not allow “fishing expeditions.”651  In practice, a type of 
blended discovery is becoming common – a situation that is acceptable to both common 
law and civil law attorneys.  
Traditionally, due to the presence of the jury, oral presentation of evidence and 
examination and cross-examination of witnesses by the parties’ counsel constitute a 
major part of a common law trial.  However, in a Continental hearing, oral presentation 
of evidence, including witness examination, is less important as greater weight is usually 
awarded to document evidence than witness statements as the majority of evidence is 
already in the file.652  Most civil lawyers are not skilled in the art of cross-examination 
and view it “with abhorrence.”653  The civil-law trial concentrates on legal argument and 
is controlled by the judge or an arbitrator. 
The WTO, UNCITRAL and ICSID follow the Continental model in conducting 
the hearing.  The arbitral tribunal exercises “complete control” over the process,654 and in 
effect reduces the role of counsel.  Use of comprehensive written submissions in 
international arbitration is also commonplace.655  Rather than a “short and plain statement 
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of the claim”656 typical for Anglo-American litigation, international arbitration typically 
begins with a detailed claim supported by all (or most) of the documents on which the 
claimant intends to rely.657  The parties also provide detailed witness statements658 and 
expert reports.659  Therefore, international arbitral proceedings tend to be more document-
oriented, similar to the civil law tradition, than Anglo-American civil procedure.660  The 
WTO, ICSID and UNCITRAL follow this pattern. 
Whether clearly defined or not in the rules of procedure for a particular dispute 
mechanism, both arbitrators and counsel are entitled to ask questions, and the order of 
questioning is either established in advance by the parties, often in the course of a pre-
hearing conference, or determined by the arbitral tribunal.  A certain degree of blending 
of practices between common law and civil law approaches is starting to take place.  
Many lawyers with a civil law background now recognize that oral witness examination 
of some type can be very useful, and lawyers and arbitrators from common law countries 
are also softening their approach to oral examination.661  This blended approach to 
questioning involves counsel conducting examination, and cross-examination, of 
witnesses before the tribunal starts asking their own questions.  Thus, examination-in-
chief and cross-examination are not separated into two phases as in the common law 
tradition.662 In WTO, ICSID and UNCITRAL settings, both common law and civil law 
parties tend to feel satisfied that their procedural traditions have been followed in the 
arbitral proceedings and formalization of practice might not be too difficult.663  These 
harmonized practices that have begun to emerge may indicate that the time is ripe to 
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formalize discovery practices in WTO, UNCITRAL and ICSID dispute settlement, 
something that this work advocates for.     
 The scope of cross-examination as employed in international arbitration differs 
from that typically seen in the United States, where cross-examination is limited to the 
scope of direct examination.664  In ICSID and UNCITRAL, although there is no clear 
guidance on how cross-examination should be conducted – if at all, common practice has 
yielded a method where cross-examination covers all of the issues the witness covers in 
his written statement.665  Moreover, cross-examination tends not to be as hostile as in the 
US courts, which makes its use in international arbitration less objectionable to 
Continental lawyers.666  In the WTO system, cross-examination is not relevant because 
WTO dispute settlement does not use party witness oral statements. 
 In the US system, a party conducts a direct examination of the witness.  
Immediately thereafter, the other party cross-examines the witness.  Cross-examination 
assumes the witness is present at an oral hearing, which itself is significant because it is 
not clearly required in ICSID or UNCITRAL for the witness to be present at the hearing.  
However today, evidence and argument in international dispute settlement are 
increasingly presented at oral hearings.  Further, cross-examination is important in that it 
produces facts not disclosed in direct examination, which presumably the questioning 
attorney did not elicit because they are harmful.667  Cross examination also allows the 
development of facts that could challenge the witness's credibility.668   
The International Bar Association (IBA) Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Arbitration provide for an innovative technique related to witness 
questioning in arbitration: “confrontation testimony” (also called “witness 
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conferencing”).669  In confrontation testimony, witnesses testify on the same issue 
together, not one after another.  If the witnesses contradict each other, they can be 
examined regarding their controversies on the spot.670  Confrontation testimony is neither 
American nor Continental and seems to fit international arbitration quite well to further 
extend the number of procedural options acceptable to parties and counsel from different 
legal traditions.  Formalizing the IBA Rules of Evidence related to confrontation 
testimony could be a good option for WTO, UNCITRAL and ICSID dispute settlement.  
 The IBA Rules of Evidence further allow the party himself, or the party’s officer, 
to be heard as a witness.671  In the case of international arbitration, the justification for 
this would center around the concept that the source of information does not matter.  
Arbitrators are the judges of the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of 
evidence.672   
  When following the American litigation style of procedure, it is typical for the 
parties to present their own experts as witnesses.  In the Continental legal system, experts 
are usually neutral and appointed by the court or the arbitrational tribunal itself.673  
However, in international arbitration, both party-appointed and tribunal-appointed experts 
are now common, and their reports are provided in writing and may be heard during the 
hearing.674  Further, both parties and the tribunal have the right to question the experts at 
the hearing which proves to be a blend of common and civil law practices.675 
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Parties in civil disputes in US courts can take a pre-trial deposition through oral 
examination of any person, including non-parties.676  The deposition procedure is subject 
to several rules, including the requirement that proper notice of the deposition be given to 
all parties.677  Restrictions are placed on the person before whom the deposition can be 
taken,678 the number of depositions a party can take679 and the length of any single 
deposition.680  As all aspects of US discovery, depositions must address relevant matters 
as set forth under Rule 26 (b)(1) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   
A pre-trial deposition serves multiple purposes.  It allows a party to learn about 
the witness's account of the events.  A deposition prevents surprise at trial and gives the 
parties a sense of the case for purposes of settlement evaluation.  A party can also pin 
down the witness so that if the witness's trial testimony differs from the deposition 
testimony, the witness can be impeached.  Further, a deposition preserves evidence.  If 
the witness is not available for trial, e.g., the witness is incapacitated or not within the 
court's subpoena power, the deposition could be used at trial.  Depositions remain 
uncommon in international dispute settlement,681 and not addressed in WTO, 
UNCITRAL or ICSID dispute settlement but could be a useful tool in gathering evidence.   
In Germany, judicial control over all witness examination, coupled with the rules 
requiring substantiation and identification, puts the burden on the party seeking 
disclosure.  As a result, Germany does not know the wholesale exchange of documents 
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nor the extensive grilling of large numbers of potential witnesses that characterize 
discovery in the United States.  The German system recognizes the importance of truth 
for the fact-finding process and the importance of protecting areas of personal or business 
privacy from unreasonable invasion, but the Germans' system of specific disclosure 
duties and expansive privileges demonstrates a preference for protecting privacy interests 
over the concern for finding the truth.  The German model is similar to current practice in 
WTO, UNCITRAL and ICSID dispute settlement; however, the formalization of 
discovery through clearly defining procedural aspects related to witness testimony, 
deposition and cross-examination would contribute to the ability of a party to present 
their case and ensure that the trier of fact is fully informed to decide the case.   
D. Discovery through document production 
In the US adversarial system, parties are given access to each other's non-privileged 
documents that are relevant to a claim or defence in the case.  Discovery, including 
relatively liberal document access, allows the parties "to narrow and clarify the basic 
issues" in dispute and permits the unravelling of facts related to the issues.682   
 The US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) authorize the discovery 
of another party's documents.683  The threshold for discovery, including the production of 
documents, is whether the requested matter, not privileged, "is relevant to the claim or 
defence of any party."684  The relevant information need not be admissible at trial so long 
as the "discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence."685   
 In a lawsuit's early stages, each party must make an initial disclosure, which 
requires the production of "a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all 
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documents" that the disclosing party may use to support a claim or defence.686  The initial 
disclosure must also reveal documents relevant to any damages calculation and any 
insurance agreement that would cover the judgment.687  Up to this point there are 
similarities to the WTO, UNCITRAL and ICSID dispute settlement systems where 
parties are also required to produce or reference the documents upon which they intend to 
rely; however, the United States system continues a substantial step further by allowing 
parties to request for the production of documents from another party without the 
requirement to define those documents with specificity.  In effect, in the US system, 
parties can ask for documents that they do not know with certainty to actually exist.    
 Under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules, a party can submit a request for production 
of documents to the opposing party.688  A general or broadly worded request is not 
acceptable but the request must identify, "with reasonable particularity," the requested 
document or category of documents.689 A party can then cause the issuance of a subpoena 
duces tecum requesting that a non-party produce documents under Rule 34.690   
 Under the Federal Rules, a party or person from whom discovery is sought can 
resist abusive discovery.  A person can move for a protective order to prevent or limit 
discovery that is an "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense."691  A party can object to a Rule 34 request if the requested documents are not 
discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1).692  Moreover, a court has the power to limit discovery 
that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source 
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that is more convenient" or for other reasons.693  The US system encourages the parties to 
cooperate in discovery but as discussed above, when determining whether to uphold 
requests for the production of documents US courts tend to place more prominence on 
full disclosure than they do on privacy and parties are expected to attempt to confer in 
good faith to resolve discovery disputes before bringing them to the court.694   
 In the German system, a party has only limited rights to seek specifically 
identifiable documents in the possession of the other party or nonparties, relating to 
specific legal, generally contractual, relationships.695 Outside of these limited rights, a 
party cannot force the opposing party or any nonparty to provide documents, which might 
support its case or cast doubt on its opponent's case.  There has been some discussion in 
Germany over whether the courts have fashioned a duty to cooperate, at least for parties, 
by shifting the burden of proof or drawing unfavorable inferences against parties who fail 
to come forward with certain types of evidence and this limited duty remains highly 
controversial.696  Expansive testimonial privileges complement these limits against the 
general discovery of evidence in the German system.  These privileges protect 
confidential relationships and private spheres of interest, most notably business secrets, to 
a much greater extent than in the United States. 
E. Compelling the production of evidence 
A significant issue arises when a party refuses to submit evidence and the tribunal does 
not have the power to compel a party to produce evidence within its exclusive control.  
This situation is particularly relevant when one party is significantly less advantaged than 
another, developing countries for example, which already face an uphill battle to produce 
their own evidence. If a wealthier counterparty can further manipulate the disparity in 
resources by "failing" to provide evidence, it further heightens disparities.  
 
693 F. R. C. P. 26(b)(2). 
694 F. R. C. P. 37(a)(2)(A). 
695 Sturner, U.S. “amerikanisched und europaisches Verfahrensverstandnis” in Festechrift for 






The US Federal Rules of Evidence apply to civil proceedings in US courts.697  
While the rules are to be "construed to secure fairness" so that "the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined,"698 they nevertheless establish specific 
guidelines as to what can and cannot be admitted in a civil proceeding.  The Federal 
Rules of Evidence also impose obligations on parties to object or move to strike evidence 
that is inadmissible and to obtain a ruling on the objection or motion.699  The rules are 
critical to the US adversarial process because they determine the facts that will be 
presented to the trier-of-fact (in many cases a jury).  As a result, lawyers appearing in US 
courts spend considerable energy and time determining the evidence needed to prove a 
claim or defence and assuring its admission before the court.  Likewise, through 
objections, they seek to prevent the opposing side's use of inadmissible evidence.  The 
court, in turn, makes frequent rulings on admissibly based on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  
  
 WTO, UNCITRAL and ICSID dispute settlement, however, are not governed by 
"hard and fast rules" concerning "the character and weight of evidence."700  Instead, 
without strict guidance from arbitration rules, this dispute settlement tends to be flexible 
and "admit virtually any evidence."   The evidence's "relevance, credibility, and weight" 
is then considered in their deliberations.701  This is inherently not a bad situation; 
however, common rules related to discovery would need to ensure that all evidence is 
properly brought before the decision maker, not just that is favourable to each party.  
F. ICSID, UNCITRAL and WTO compelling production 
In sum, in ICSID arbitration any discovery of evidence beyond voluntary disclosure is 
firmly in the control of the tribunal.  Parties to ICSID proceedings cannot expect 
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extensive, US-style document discovery and depositions are not heard of.  If a party fails 
to cooperate in the evidentiary process, ICISD tribunals can only take formal note of such 
failure and any reasons given by the party.  The ISCID provides in Arbitration Rule 
34(2)(a) that "[t]he Tribunal may, if it deems it necessary at any stage of the proceeding: 
call upon the parties to produce documents, witnesses and experts." Unlike WTO panels, 
which cannot compel parties to act but only "seek information" under DSU Article 13.1, 
ICSID arbiters can order a party to produce evidence; however, there is no guidance on 
how ICSID arbiters should go about this process or what should happen if the requested 
party refuses.  A party’s uncooperative conduct may lead the tribunal to draw adverse 
inferences from that lack of participation and may affect the assessment of damages and 
allocation of costs.  In ICSID case AGIP v. Congo, the government of Congo’s failure to 
comply with the provisional measure ordering it to produce documentation was reflected 
in the tribunal’s assessment of damages; however, there was no indication that the party’s 
refusal to provide the requested documentation had any more substantial effect on the 
outcome of the case.702 
The UNCITRAL Tribunal’s discovery of actual adverse evidence to a party’s 
position is authorized only under 2010 UNCITRAL Rules Article 27(3) which empowers 
the tribunal, at any time during the arbitral proceedings, to “require the parties to produce 
documents, exhibits or other evidence,” in addition to that presented in support of their 
claims, within such a period of time as determined reasonable by the tribunal.703  Further, 
Article 27(4) clarifies that the arbitral tribunal shall have the power to “determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and the weight of the evidence offered.”  In theory, 
Article 27(3) should provide the UNCITRAL Tribunal with the power to compel parties 
to produce evidence in their possession, including that which is adverse to their position; 
however, there is no clarification as to what the repercussions would be if a party refuses 
to produce such evidence or to even admit that such evidence exists.  Further, there are no 
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guidelines directing the level of particularity in the Tribunal’s request for additional 
information.   
Can international dispute mechanisms make use of national courts to assist them 
in compelling the production of discoverable evidence?  Because they draw their 
adjudicative powers from a contract, UNCITRAL and ICSID arbitrators can only issue 
orders directed at parties to the arbitration and such orders, unlike orders made by 
national courts, are not self-enforcing.  Consequently, the powers enjoyed by arbitral 
tribunals in relation to the determination of the facts of a case are limited in two ways: 
first, they are powerless to order non-parties to provide evidence; second, the parties to 
the arbitral proceedings cannot be compelled by arbitral tribunals to comply with 
evidentiary orders made against them.704  In order to ensure that these limitations on 
arbitral tribunals’ powers will not prevent them from considering evidence relevant to the 
issues in dispute, UNCITRAL article 27 allows courts to provide assistance in relation to 
evidentiary matters.  Such assistance may be requested either by the arbitral tribunal 
itself, or by a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal.  It is important here to recall 
that as the ICSID is removed from national court systems, assistance from national courts 
in the gathering of evidence is not considered in the ICSID system.     
 UNCITRAL Article 27 states “[t]he arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval 
for the arbitral tribunal may request from a competent court of this State assistance in 
taking evidence.  The court may execute the request within its competence and according 
to its rules on taking evidence.”  Article 27 may be relied upon to seek the national 
court’s assistance to compel a person to produce evidence at the arbitral proceedings, 
during which the merits of the case are to be considered by the tribunal.  Regarding 
discovery practices, where local rules of procedure applicable in the context of judicial 
proceedings allow the parties to seek the court’s assistance to compel a party to provide 
documents, testimony, or other information that the parties may subsequently choose to 
produce as evidence at the trial, can such processes be linked to evidence taking within 
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the scope of Article 27?  Phrased another way, can Article 27 be relied upon in the 
context of pre-trial discovery or disclosure?  Over the past few years there have been 
several cases on this point not all reaching consensus. 
 The question arose in an English case decided in 2003: PNB Paribas and others 
v. Deloitte and Touche LLP.705  While England is not considered as a UNCITRAL Model 
Law jurisdiction, its law on arbitration was to a significant extent inspired by the Model 
Law.  For that reason, the party seeking the court’s assistance in that case argues that the 
relevant English provisions ought to be interpreted in light of article 27, which was said 
to be broad enough to allow courts to intervene in the context of pre-trial discovery or 
disclosure.  However, the court found the argument’s premise to be flawed on the basis 
that article 27 is limited and “is dealing with the taking of evidence and not with the 
disclosure process” and that “there is nothing in the Model Law which suggests that the 
Court should assist with the process of disclosure.”706   
 In another case, a Canadian appellate court explicitly disagreed with that English 
decision and concluded in Jardine Lloyd Thompson Canada Inc v. SJO Catlin that article 
27 was broad enough to contemplate judicial assistance sought in the context of pre-trial 
discovery or disclosure.  Relying on domestic precedents tending to show that the 
concept of evidence includes both evidence produced at trial and evidence obtained 
through pre-trial discovery, the court pointed out that article 27 “speaks of assistance in 
taking evidence,” that it would be inappropriate “to add, by implication or otherwise, the 
words at the hearing,” and that “if drafters of Article 27 had intended that assistance 
would only be given for taking evidence at the hearing, they could have expressly said 
so.”707   
 
705 Rules of Commercial Court, England, 28 November 2003, [2003] EWHC 2874 (Comm). 
706 Ibid. 
707 Jardine Lloyd Thompson Canada Inc v. SJO Catlin, Alberta Court of Appeal, Canada, 18 





 Finally, a Hong Kong decision dating from 1994, Vibriflotation A.G v. Express 
Builders Co. Ltd.708, may also be interpreted as implicitly standing for the proposition 
that article 27 can be relied upon in the context of pre-trial discovery or disclosure.  The 
applicant, while pursuing discovery in relation to the arbitration, sought the court’s 
assistance under article 27 to obtain potentially-relevant documents from a person who 
was not a party to the arbitration.  While the application was ultimately dismissed, the 
court did it not because it considered that article 27 did not allow it to intervene in the 
context of pre-trial discovery or disclosure, but rather because the local rules of civil 
procedure invoked by the applicant were held not to allow discovery to be obtained 
against non-parties.709     
As WTO, ICSID and UNCITRAL proceedings usually involve a struggle to 
develop the necessary information and legal understanding to decide the case properly 
and although the tribunals have broad authority to seek information, there is real silence 
an no meaningful guidance on what to do if a party fails to provide information 
specifically requested.  In general, the tribunal should draw adverse inferences; however, 
there is little to no guidance on how this is to be accomplished.  Irrespective of the fact 
that the WTO Appellate Body's clarification in the case Canada - Aircraft, that  parties to 
a dispute are required to respond fully to a panel’s request for information, from time to 
time, parties continue to ignore this request.  While a WTO panel is authorized draw 
adverse inferences from such a failure to produce evidence, they have shown a reluctance 
to do so.  
For the purposes of the UNICTRAL system, it would seem that parties and the 
tribunal have the option to rely on domestic courts to enforce requests for discovery and 
disclosure; however this is not codified anywhere.  In any event, the relevant case law 
addressing the value of pre-trial discovery and disclosure does provide a basis upon 
 







which to rely for the formalization of  a type of blended discovery system within the 
UNCITRAL system at least.  
G. Disclosure and equal treatment of parties 
With respect to the disclosure component of discovery, the interpretation of UNCITRAL 
article 18, equal treatment of parties, provides an interesting perspective in that full 
disclosure to all parties to a case is fundamental to ensure that parties are treated equally.  
While this is also the case in WTO and ICSID dispute settlement,  the below UNCITRAL 
cases demonstrate the importance of the obligation of disclosure, on the part of the parties 
and also the arbitral tribunal and the formalization of disclosure in the discovery process 
would only serve to facilitate the effective exchange of information to avoid potential 
surprises at the time of the consideration of the merits of the case.   
The purpose of UNCITRAL article 18, as interpreted in the Re Corporacion 
Transnacional de Inversiones, SA de CV et al. v. STET International, S.p.A. et al case,710 
is to protect a party from egregious and injudicious conduct by an arbitral tribunal but it 
is not intended to protect a party from its own failures or strategic choices.  Further, the 
principles of article 18 apply to all aspects of UNCITRAL arbitral proceedings, and 
breech of these principles may lead to the challenge of the award or application to set 
aside the award by an unsuccessful party.  In the Attorney-General v. Tozer (No. 3) case, 
the UNCITRAL arbitral award in issue was actually set aside in part because a document 
submitted by a party to the arbitral tribunal had been inadvertently omitted from the file 
given to the applicant.711  It was not clear whether this was as a result of a mistake on the 
part of the tribunal or a deliberate strategy of the opposing party.  Nonetheless, the award 
was set aside because the party in question was not fully informed of all the material 
evidence.  In the A’s Co. Ltd. v. Dagger case in New Zealand, an arbitrator who allowed 
a party to develop a different case to that anticipated and permitted evidence on issues 
that the other party did not expect to have addressed, was held to have failed to give the 
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other party an opportunity to effectively participate in the hearing.712  This particular case 
underlies the importance of discovery and the contribution formalizing discovery 
practices would make to the equal treatment of parties.  By formalizing discovery, parties 
would be more empowered to search out their own evidence from the other side and 
surprises at the time of trial would be more easily avoidable.   
The obligation to treat parties with equality requires the arbitral tribunal to apply 
similar standards to all parties and their representatives throughout the arbitral process.  
This principle extends to both evidence and submissions on the facts and on the law.  
According to the case Trustees of Rotoaira Forrest Trust v. Attorney-General, the 
principle is complied with where: each party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to fully 
state its case; each party is given an opportunity to understand, test and rebut its 
opponent’s case; if there are hearings, proper notice is given thereof, and the parties and 
their advisors have the opportunity to be present throughout the hearings; and each party 
is given reasonable opportunity to present evidence and argument and evidence in 
support of its own case.713  To succeed in an argument that a party has been deprived of 
the opportunity to present its case, it must be shown that: a) a reasonable litigant in the 
applicant’s position would not have foreseen a reasoning on the part of the arbitral 
tribunal of the type laid down in the award and b) with adequate notice, it might have 
been possible to convince the arbitral tribunal to reach a different result.  An English 
court in the OAO Northern Shipping Company v. Remolcadores de Martin SI case 
suggested that an arbitral tribunal has to give the parties an opportunity to present 
arguments on all of the “essential building blocks” of the tribunal’s conclusions and the 
award was set aside on such failure.714  The notion of being able to reasonably anticipate 
the arbitral tribunal’s findings is also reflected in the Swiss Federal Court where it 
annulled an award on the basis that the arbitral tribunal had based its decision on a 
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legislative provision which the court found was “manifestly non-applicable” to the 
circumstances of the arbitration and could not therefore have been anticipated by the 
parties, ruling that the arbitral tribunal in doing so had deprived the claimant of its right 
to be heard.715  
H. Risks associated with the development of common rules related to discovery 
Nothing is perfect and several potential drawbacks from developing common rules 
related to discovery in international dispute settlement can be identified which must be 
considered. Formalizing the discovery process would likely lead to delays in the overall 
dispute settlement process.  If arbitrators required a party to produce evidence, and 
sanctions were issued due to lack of compliance (this could take the form of financial 
fines), this would only increase the time required to settle the dispute.  In systems were 
rapid dispute settlement is highly prized, increasing the time required to settle disputes 
may not be looked upon as a positive change.  Formalizing the discovery process would 
also increase the costs of dispute settlement for all participants. If disputes take longer to 
resolve, this translates into more billable hours for the legal staff.    
Further, in the WTO context over-legalization of the WTO dispute settlement 
system may be a concern.  As the WTO remains a diplomatic forum, less restrictive 
procedural rules allow for flexibility in the context of political negotiations.  Although 
not as politically sensitive, the procedural flexibility inherent in the ICSID and 
UNCITRAL systems is also valued and may cut against the increased procedural 
requirements necessary to develop common rules related to discovery.  
The discovery of documents may be considered a critical element of fact-finding, 
truth seeking and decision making in many types of dispute settlement.  The advantages 
of discovery are said to include: 
Fairness to both sides, playing will at the cards face up on the table, clarifying the 
issues between the parties, reducing surprise at trial and encouraging settlement.  
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Any system of disclosure should have as a broad rationale the just and efficient 
disposal of litigation.  It is against this broad rational that any reforms to 
discovery systems should be considered.716 
However, parties to disputes in systems with strong discovery procedures may 
find that the benefits of discovery come at a comparatively high cost.  Yet, as discussed 
below, it is not just the amount of money spent on discovery that causes pause for 
reflection.  Rather, it is the low value for money that prompts criticism of the discovery 
process – in terms of the cost of discovery relative to the utility of discovered documents 
in the context of the dispute settlement or litigation. 
The high price of a discovery process was noted in the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission’s Civil Justice Review, which found that “the objectives of the discovery 
process are either not being achieved or can only be achieved at great cost.”717  There are 
concerns that the high costs of discovery are pricing litigants out of the court system.  
Australian Chief Justice James Spigelman of the New South Wales Supreme Court has 
noted that “when senior partners of a law firm tell me, as they have, that for any 
significant commercial dispute the estimate for discovery is often AUS$ 2 million, the 
position is not sustainable.”718  Moreover, the commercial realities of discovery at this 
order may represent a significant barrier to justice for many litigants.   
E-discovery costs can also include expensive computer software and hardware.  
Acting Justice Ronald Sackville of the New South Wales Supreme Court, formerly a 
judge of the Federal Court of Australia, remarked on the discovery process: 
It is here that extraordinary and disproportionate costs are frequently incurred by 
parties to litigation.  Far too often the search for the illusory smoking gun leads to 
squadrons of solicitors, paralegals and clerks compiling vast libraries of 
materials, much of which is of no significance to the issues in the proceedings.  
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The problem has been compounded, not alleviated, by the exponential growth of 
electronic communications which can be tracked and often reconstructed after 
deletion.719  
The sheer volume of data that must be managed in modern trade and commerce can blow 
out the cost of searching through electronic material for the purposes of discovery, 
resulting in costs disproportionate to the value of the documents discovered – in terms of 
their use in litigation.  The increasing amount of information which contemporary 
litigants must deal with was recently highlighted in the Australian case Betfair v. Racing 
New South Wales.720 In this case, for example, one source of discoverable documents 
was an electronic data warehouse containing the electronic records of over 2.52 million 
customers and occupying some 21 terabytes of memory growing at 70 gigabytes per day.  
One terabyte is estimated to contain 500 million printed pages.721 
In the United States, the use of discovery has been criticized as favoring the 
wealthier side, in that it enables parties to drain each other’s financial resources in a war 
of attrition.  For example, one can make information requests, which are expensive and 
time-consuming for the other side to complete, produce hundreds of thousands of 
documents of questionable relevance to the case, file requests for protective orders to 
prevent the deposition of key witnesses, and so on and so on.  In a critique of the US 
legal profession, attorney and writer, Cameron Stracher described a variety of unpleasant 
tactics common in the United States, and concluded: 
With the noble sentiment of leveling the playing field so that no party has an 
undue information advantage, the writers of the discovery rules created a 
multilevel playing field where the information-rich can kick the information-poor 
in the head and escape unscathed.  Discovery is anything but … Hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to maintain the status quo, to preserve the information-rich 
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at the expense of the information-poor.  Thousands of lawyer hours to keep the 
discovery process as unrevealing as possible.  The best minds of a generation 
thinking of new ways to manipulate, distort and conceal.722  
I. Recommendations for Discovery policy in the context of ICSID, UNCITRAL 
and WTO dispute settlement mechanisms 
Notwithstanding the risks outlined above, the recommendation of this section is for the 
international community to consider developing policy on common rules related to 
discovery.  In the context of the analysis of the ICSID, UNCITRAL and WTO systems, 
such policy could see how to adopt an approach to document production more similar to 
that of the United States, rather than the German or civil law approach where the 
adjudicator alone decides which documents to request.  Giving parties the power to 
specifically request the production of documents would be a significant step towards 
ensuring that the trier of fact is fully informed before a decision is made.  An important 
limitation to this recommendation, however, would be to impose a degree of restraint on 
the scope of discovery in international dispute settlement which is more limited than that 
applied in the United States.    
 
There is push back in international dispute settlement mechanism case law 
against a US style of discovery.  In the ICSID case Railroad Development Cooperation v. 
Republic of Guatemala,723 when deciding on a request for provisional measures related to 
compelling the production of documents, the tribunal upheld the respondent’s claim that 
the request for production was a US-style pre-trial discovery fishing expedition which has 
no place in international arbitration.  The tribunal further agreed with the respondent’s 
claim that the request included “four broad categories of documents starting with the 
words all documents referring or relating to or all declarations which include sixteen 
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broad document sub-categories.”724  The tribunal agreed with the respondent that the 
expansive nature of the request was overbearing.  In this holding, the tribunal cited the 
ICSID case Biwater Gauf  v. United Republic of Tanzania,725 and agreed with the 
decision that overly broad and potentially burdensome document requests should be 
circumscribed to include only the obligation to produce clearly identified documents.  In 
looking at this analysis, it is clear that a one size approach to discovery will not be 
appropriate in international dispute settlement and some type of limited US-style 
discovery will be needed.   
 As discussed above, the United States system takes a very broad approach to the 
scope of discovery and what information is considered discoverable.  This extremely 
broad attitude is not necessarily desirable in an international context.  The fact that a 
party can request information through discovery that is not admissible in the particular 
case combined with the fact that the United States system allows for a party to request a 
broad spectrum of information, information that they are not required to describe with 
any degree of particularity, is too broad for an international dispute settlement setting, 
particularly for the WTO, UNCITRAL and ICSID systems considered here.  This 
unnecessarily broad scope to discovery would heighten the adversarial nature in a 
particular mechanism to a potentially undesirable level.  It is important to recall the 
motivations parties have for choosing a particular international dispute settlement 
mechanism and oftentimes the collaborative approach to dispute settlement is a factor.  It 
is important to note here that a degree of adversarialness between the parties is not bad, 
and can even be considered necessary, as it contributes to ensuring that the parties’ cases 
are argued thoroughly.  It is only in the event that the adversarial nature of the dispute 
threatens to eclipse a party’s motivation for submitting their claim to that dispute 
settlement mechanism in the first place that requires restraint.  
 Reasonably limiting the scope of what is discoverable in the international dispute 
settlement context would be feasible.  A useful example, and potential policy option, of a 
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limited or restrained discovery approach, and one that could prove useful in formalizing 
discovery in WTO, UNCITRAL and ICSID systems, is Article 3 of the Rules on the 
Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration adopted in 1999 by the 
International Bar Association.726  Although the word discovery is omitted from the IBA 
Rules of Evidence, Article 3 provides for submitting “all documents available to [the 
party] on which it relies,” to the other party and the tribunal.727  In addition, a party may 
submit to the arbitral tribunal a Request to Produce,728 which should contain: 
(a)(i) a description of a requested document sufficient to identify it, or (ii) a 
description in sufficient detail … of a narrow and specific requested category of 
documents that are reasonably believed to exist; 
(b) a description of how the documents requested are relevant and material to the 
outcome of the case; and 
(c) a statement that the documents requested are not in the possession, custody or 
control of the requesting Party, and of the reason why the Party assumes the 
documents requested to be in the possession, custody or control of the other 
Party.729 
This approach effectively limits the scope of information that is discoverable in that it 
requires that the party requesting the information to be presented be familiar enough with 
that information to describe it in detail.  This approach is significantly different from the 
one established under the United States’ Federal Rules of Civil Procedure described 
above because in the US system parties can request for and compel the production of 
evidence if they can broadly describe its category and type.  In effect, parties in the US 
system can request and force the production of materials that they don’t know to exist at 
the time of requesting it.  In the context of international dispute settlement, perhaps this 
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more limited approach to discovery is a reasonable middle ground for ensuring sufficient 
evidence is produced for effective resolution of the case and a good starting point in the 
development of common rules related to discovery.  
Another way to limit information that can be discovered is to consider the scope 
of information that a party may be justified in requesting to be produced by the opposing 
party.  As presented above, in a US system, a party is entitled to broad discovery of any 
information sought if it appears “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.”  While this statement might be too broad for the purposes of 
international dispute settlement systems, including the UNCITRAL, WTO and ICSID 
systems, perhaps the scope can be adjusted to satisfy both common law and civil law 
lawyers participating in the system.  The scope of discoverable information could be 
significantly limited, for example, by removing the latitude inherent when the scope is 
phrased to allow evidence to be discovered if it is reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of other evidence that would be admissible.  That is, perhaps the scope of 
discovery in international dispute settlement could be limited only to the “discovery of 
admissible evidence.”  This would significantly constrain the scope of discoverable 
evidence in that a party would only be able to request the production of evidence that 
would be admissible to the international dispute settlement mechanism and no longer 
have the wide flexibility to request for any information, admissible or not.  Further, this 
approach would significantly reduce the adversarial component common to the US 
approach to discovery in that parties would not be able to use the discovery mechanism 
as a weapon or to harass the opposing party.    
An additional option for limiting the application of the US discovery policy 
would be to employ components from the German approach, requiring effective 
substantiation of discovery requests.  This is based upon the concept that a party should 
not be forced to provide evidence to make the case of their opposing party.  In requiring 
substantiation, the requesting party would be faced with a burden to substantiate the 
reasons why they reasonably need the evidence.  Additionally, in effect the substantiation 
requirements forces a degree of specificity upon the requesting party because in order to 





specificity.  This substantiation requirement could be formulated into a necessity test and 
in a sense, the substantiation requirement or necessity test is already included in the IBA 
text above. 
Tensions can arise, however, when parties to a dispute come from separate legal 
traditions, such as when a common law party brings a case against a civil law party in an 
international dispute settlement setting.  The ensuing tension between either a common 
law or civil law approach can prove unsatisfactory to at least one party.  A common law 
attorney representing a party would most likely expect substantial pre-trial discovery.  In 
contrast, a civil law attorney would likely prefer, or at least be more at comfortable with, 
minimal or no discovery, such as a procedure disallowing depositions and permitting 
only a limited exchange of documents.   
It remains a challenge for the international dispute settlement community to 
develop a satisfactory solution to these opposing approaches.  Hopefully, as the 
international dispute settlement community continues to develop its best practices, such 
tensions between common law and civil law traditions will be eased and parties will 
implement discovery procedures that incorporate elements of both common and civil law 
as described above.  The time is ripe for this to happen.   
 
Chapter 8 Common Policy on the Value of a Substantive Appeals Process 
A. Appeal and review of decisions 
It has been widely assumed that parties submit to voluntary dispute settlement 
mechanisms to resolve their disputes at least in part because such awards offer an 
effective and early end to the dispute in a way that a court judgment does not.  However, 
a swift and final resolution is only an advantage if the dispute settlement mechanism 
makes no mistakes, or the stakes are small enough that mistakes are acceptable in the 
interest of continued relations between the parties.  In contrast to the WTO system, which 
does have a very well developed substantive appeals mechanism, the ICSID and 





on procedural defects, do not include a system that conducts a substantive review.  The 
development of common policy in the international community on the value of an 
appellate mechanism with the mandate to consider substantive issues, rather than those 
that are merely procedural – something similar to that of the mandate of the WTO 
Appellate Body, would significantly contribute to due process protections in international 
dispute settlement by creating a safety net for parties that find themselves the victim of 
substantive error.       
B. ICSID 
Under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, rules for recourse against arbitral awards are 
contained in Chapter VII of the Rules governing “Interpretation, Revision and Annulment 
of the Award.”730  Under these provisions the losing party may request that the Chairman 
of ICSID’s Administrative Council designate a three-member annulment committee to 
review an award.  While the scope of the review is significantly limited, the procedural 
rules used during annulment hearings are identical to those used during the main case, 
with no particular provision for expediting appeals.731  The ICSID Convention further 
provides for complete waiver of judicial recourse, providing in Article 53 that “the ICSID 
award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any 
other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.”732  As discussed below, this 
situation today is changing as evidenced by the EU-Canada Economic and Trade 
Agreement and the EU-Viet Nam free trade agreement where provisions were included 
replacing prevailing ad hoc arbitration systems. 
The ICSID Convention is removed entirely from any domestic legal system and 
it is therefore not possible for a party to resist recognition and enforcement of an ICSID 
Convention award in a national court.  It is important to note that this is not the case for 
awards rendered under the Rules of ICSID's Additional Facility.  Such awards, which 
now include the NAFTA Chapter 11 cases brought before the Centre, are subject to 
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enforcement under the provisions articulated in the New York Convention and the 
arbitration laws of the location of the actual arbitration proceeding.  Further, the only 
remedies available against an award rendered under the ICSID Convention are those 
contained in the Convention.733 
 
In the ICSID system, if a dispute arises between the parties as to the meaning or 
scope of an award, either party may request an interpretation of the award.734  In addition, 
the Convention further allows either party to request a revision of the award under Article 
51 on the grounds of discovery of some fact of such a nature as decisively to affect the 
award, provided that when the award was rendered that fact was unknown to the Tribunal 
and to the applicant and that the applicant's ignorance of that fact was reasonable. 
 
With respect to award enforcement, Article 53 of the ICSID Convention dictates 
that an ICSID award is “binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal.”  
Article 54(1) mandates that "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered 
pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by 
that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment in a court in that State."735  
In dictating this automatic link to domestic judgments rather than foreign, ICSID in effect 
eliminates all opportunity for review.  From this perspective, the enforcement mechanism 
of the ICSID appears to be much more efficient than the regime under the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,736 which 
provides both procedural and substantive exceptions to the recognition of an arbitral 
award.737  When a State does not comply with an award voluntarily, however, obtaining 
recognition by a national court of the award most likely will not be sufficient.  Parties 
may wish to resort to attachment of assets, but where State parties are involved, sovereign 
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U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.38 [hereinafter the New York Convention]. 





immunities become an issue.  The process of obtaining attachment of assets is referred to 
as execution of an award, and here is where the special protections of the ICSID 
Convention end.  Execution of an ICSID award is governed by the laws concerning the 
execution of judgments in the State in whose territory execution is sought and the laws of 
that State relating to immunities.738 
C. Annulment in ICSID 
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention creates the possibility for either party to seek 
annulment of the award on the basis of one or more specified grounds which include: (1) 
that the tribunal was not properly constituted; (2) that it manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(3) that one of its members was corrupt, (4) that there was a serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure; and (5) that the award failed to state the reasons on which 
it was based.739 The ICSID grounds for annulment are roughly equivalent to the narrow 
grounds for non-recognition provided in the New York Convention.  In fact, the ICSID 
grounds for annulment are narrower than those in the New York Convention as there is 
no provision for annulment based upon any violation of public policy   
 
Annulment is a limited remedy - it is not a remedy against an incorrect decision.  
An ICSID ad hoc annulment committee may not reverse findings of fact or law or 
conduct a substantive review of the case as it does not have the powers of a court of 
appeal in the traditional sense.740  Additionally, a new tribunal adjudicating the merits of 
a resubmitted case is not bound by the reasons given by the ad hoc annulment committee 
for annulling the original award.741      
 
The entire ICSID framework fails to consider the important necessity of intra-
body review in that there is no hierarchal relationship between the reviewing and first 
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instance decision-makers.  Annulment committee members, like the tribunal arbitrators 
whose work they are reviewing, are composed from essentially the same group of private 
lawyers and law professors, and are not required, nor even expected, to have any 
additional expertise in matters of international law or arbitration.742  Although annulment 
committee members are required to be listed on the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, in 
practice these listed individuals often sit also as the first instance tribunal members on 
other claims.743  The very same persons can sit or have sat simultaneously as arbitrators 
in regular ICSID proceedings and on the annulment committees.  Thus, it is virtually the 
same lawyers and professors reviewing each other's work, without even the patina that 
the appellate group has any greater claim to wisdom in decision-making, as implicitly is 
assumed in any adjudicative system that includes an internal appeal mechanism. 
  
In analysing the ICSID case law with respect to grounds for annulment, three 
cases are of particular importance which includes: Maritime International Nonineed 
Establishment (MINE) (Complainant) v. Republic of Guinea (Respondent)744, Wena 
Hotels Limited (Complainant) v. Arab republic of Egypt (Respondent)745, and Suez, 
Sociedad General de Agual de Barcelona S.A and Vivendi Universal S.A (Complainant) 
v. Argentine Republic (Respondent).746    
 
In principle ICSID arbitrators have the duty to explain the reasons on which their 
decisions are based in a clear and straightforward manner to enable the parties to 
understand them.  However, the interpretation in the ICISD case law with respect to what 
clearly explained reasoning and analysis conducted by the tribunal in practice requires is 
inconsistent and leads to confusion.  The requirement to present reasoning and analysis is 
clearly stated in the MINE case where the Decision notes that in the ICSID Convention, 
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annulment under Article 52 is limited, but also “the only remedy against unjust 
awards.”747  It adds that the minimum requirement just mentioned “is in particular not 
satisfied by either contradictory or frivolous reasons.” This last qualification seems to 
imply at least some examination of the degree of relevance or adequacy of the reasons 
mentioned in the award is necessary.  This is perhaps in contradiction to another 
statement in the same MINE decision, where the Ad hoc Annulment Committee stressed 
that “the adequacy of the reasoning is not an appropriate standard of review” because it 
would serve to draw the annulment committee into the domain of appeals.748 
 
With respect to annulment based on the claim that the tribunal made a serious 
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure (Article 52(1)(d)), the Wena case quotes 
the MINE case in stating that this ground for annulment would only be met if the 
violation caused the tribunal to reach a result substantially different from the one that 
would have otherwise prevailed.  The Tribunal in the Wena case explained: 
 
In order to be a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, the 
violation of such rule must have caused the Tribunal to reach a result 
substantially different from what it would have awarded had such rule been 
observed.  In the words of the ad hoc Committee’s Decision in the Matter of 
MINE, “the departure must be substantial and be such as to deprive a party of the 
benefit or protection which the rule was intended to provide.”749      
 
Regarding annulment based on the ground that the tribunal failed to state 
sufficient reasoning or analysis to support how they arrived at the final decision, which is 
included in Article 52(1)(e) and relates to Article 48(3), for the purposes of whether an 
annulment of the decision is appropriate it is irrelevant as to whether the reasons 
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presented by the initial tribunal are correct or convincing – all that is in question is 
whether reasons are present in the text of the decision; otherwise, the ad hoc committee 
determining whether annulment of the decision is appropriate would be drawn into a 
review of the merits of the case.  This test for grounds for annulment based on the 
presence of reasoning is automatically met as long as the reader is able to follow the 
analysis used by the tribunal to arrive at their decision, even if clear mistakes in fact or 
law are present in the text of that decision.  This approach is originally set out in the 
MINE case and further quoted in the Wena case.  Further these approach was presented in 
the Vivendi case most succinctly when the annulment committee stated: 
 
[...] the requirement that an award has to be motivated implies that it must enable 
the reader to follow the reasoning of the Tribunal on points of fact or law.  It 
implies that, and only that.  The adequacy of the reasoning is not an appropriate 
standard of review under paragraph 1(e), because it almost inevitably draws an 
ad hoc Committee into an examination of the substance of the tribunal’s decision, 
in disregard of the exclusion of the remedy of appeal by Article 53 of the 
Convention.750   
  
Although the Wena and Vivendi annulment committees concurred on the general 
approach for annulment of an ICSID award based on lack of tribunal reasoning as stated 
in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, they diverged on their implementation.  Under 
Vivendi, the Tribunal observed that reasons upon which the decision is based may be 
stated by the tribunal “succinctly or at length” and annulment should only occur in a clear 
case, that is, when the failure to state reasons leaves the “decision on a particular point 
essentially lacking any expressed rationale” and that point is “necessary to the tribunal’s 
decision.”751   
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The reasoning of the annulment committee in the Wena case is significantly less 
demanding on the initial tribunal.  The annulment committee in Wena explained that the 
reasoning and analysis of a tribunal may be implied or assumed to have taken place 
“provided the reasoning be reasonably inferred from the terms used in the decision.”  
Following this logic, a tribunal is then assumed to have used sufficient reasoning and 
logical analysis to support  the outcome of the case if the terms used in the text of the 
decision appear to have derived from logical reasoning or analysis; however, the detailed 
presentation of the reasoning and analysis used by the tribunal to arrive at the final 
decision need not be clearly articulated in the text of the final decision.  Further, 
according to the Wena annulment committee, if the award is lacking reasoning, the 
“remedy need not be the annulment of the award.”  The Wena annulment committee 
continued to explain that the missing reasoning to support the decision can be supplied by 
the annulment committee considering whether to annul the decision whenever the 
annulment committee is in a position to do so on the basis of its knowledge of the 
dispute.752  
  
It remains to be seen how future ad hoc annulment committees will deal with this 
difference.  As the Wena committee noted, the purpose of the duty to state reasons is that 
the parties are entitled to understand the tribunal’s line of thinking and why they are 
found to be right or wrong.753  The purpose is met if the committee supplies the reasons 
from the context of the award and the record.  Remanding the award back to the tribunal 
would only yield the same result at a higher cost and after a longer period of time. 
  
Partial annulment was granted in both the MINE and Vivendi cases.754  Vivendi 
specified that it was not open to the respondent to “counterclaim” for total annulment 
when the claimant had filed a request for partial annulment only, but that it was for the ad 
hoc annulment committee to determine the extent of the annulment.  The reason for the 
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committee’s power to decide the scope of the annulment is simply that certain grounds 
for annulment affect the award as a whole, while others affect only a part of it.755   
D. ICSID Annulment is not a sufficient appellate mechanism 
The ICSID annulment process falls significantly short of being a genuinely effective 
review process because annulment committees are blocked from conducting a review of 
the substantive issues of the case.  Further, annulment grounds under article 52 offer no 
remedy against tribunals who err, even patently, in their interpretation and application of 
the law, much less their conclusions regarding facts.  Besides the injustice inflicted on the 
disputing parties, facially erroneous investor-state awards bring disrepute to the system as 
a whole, and wreak havoc on future tribunals and litigants faced with bad law awards that 
invariably will be cited by future parties, and must then be either disingenuously 
distinguished, or deliberately disavowed.756  An ambitious and dramatic improvement to 
the current standard under the ICSID system would include the establishment of some 
form of appellate body to review the substantive components of decisions.  The creation 
of such a remedy would affectively amend existing BITs, and would require a new treaty 
and perhaps a protocol to the ICSID Convention.  While ambitious, it is certainly 
feasible, particularly given the successful example set by the WTO.      
 
The ICSID contracting states, particularly capital-exporting states and the 
investors represented by them, place a great deal of value on the high degree of finality to 
the current ICSID arbitration process and a formalized appellate process would serve, in 
their mind, to reduce this finality.  The finality to ICSID awards can be viewed as central 
to ICSID’s purpose of acting as a neutral venue providing an effective and rapid remedy 
for investors.  An appellate process could be viewed as an additional and somewhat 
unnecessary delay to a needed outcome. 
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In the absence of a clear mandate to establish an ICSID appellate process, 
ICSID’s existing annulment procedure will continue in providing limited grounds for the 
review of awards.  Further, the establishment of an ICSID appellate procedure would 
raise difficult policy and technical issues in that only some ICSID arbitrations would be 
subject to further review while others are not.            
E. UNCITRAL 
Under the UNCITRAL system, with respect to corrections to the award, within thirty 
days after the receipt of the award, either party, with notice to the other party, may 
request that the arbitral tribunal give an interpretation of the award and any award 
interpretation shall form part of the award.757  With respect to corrections to the award, 
within thirty days after the receipt of the award, either party, with notice to the other 
party, may request the arbitral tribunal to correct in the award any errors in computation, 
any clerical or typographical errors, or anything else similar in nature.758  Additionally, 
the arbitrational tribunal, within thirty days of the issuance of the award, may make such 
corrections on its own initiative.  This appears to be the only place the UNCITRAL Rules 
address changes to the award after issuance and further appears to be the full extent of 
possible review or appeal under the UNCITRAL Rules. 
  
Should either party request, within thirty days of the issuance of the initial award 
and upon notice to the other party, the tribunal has the power to issue an additional award 
under Article 39.  A party may request the arbitral tribunal to issue an additional award as 
to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings however omitted in the initial award.  The 
tribunal is not obliged automatically to produce an additional award and will only do so if 
it considers the request for an additional award to be justified and further considers that 
the omission can be rectified without any further hearings or evidence.759  There is no 
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guidance in the UNCITRAL Rules as to how the tribunal is required to proceed if there is 
a need for additional hearings or evidence. 
 
While the UNCITRAL Rules are rather limited with respect to a formalized 
appeal process that contemplates the review of the substantive merits of a particular case, 
both the Rules and the Model Law provide more detailed guidance on the ability of a 
party to contest the national enforcement of an award.  Significantly different from the 
ICSID or WTO systems, under UNCITRAL dispute settlement, enforcement of awards is 
often interpreted by or challenged in national court.   
 
The disparity found in national laws with respect to a party’s options or recourse 
against an arbitral award underlies a major obstacle in the harmonization of international 
arbitration legislation.  Considering the potential impact of setting aside an arbitral award, 
Article 33 represents one of the essential objectives of the UNCITRAL Model Law as 
compared to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.  First, the Model Law calls for the 
application for setting aside an award to be made within three months after the receipt of 
the final award.  This application is the only available means of recourse to challenge the 
award.  Article 33 explains that within thirty days of receipt of the award, unless another 
period has been agreed upon by the parties: 
 
(a) A party may request the arbitral tribunal to correct in the award any errors in 
computation, any clerical or typographical errors or other similar errors; 
(b) If so agreed by the parties, a party may request that the tribunal provide an 
interpretation of a specific point or part of the award.760 
 
Further, the arbitral tribunal is able to correct any errors based on its own initiative.  
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, a party may also request the tribunal to 
make an additional award as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted 
 





from the award.  If the arbitral tribunal considers the request to be justified, it shall make 
the additional award within sixty days.761       
 
 Article 34 of the Model Law addresses a party’s recourse to a court against an 
arbitral award which may be made within three months of the receipt of the award, 
through an application for setting aside the award, and in accordance with the following: 
 
(a) the party making the application for setting aside the award furnishes proof 
that: 
  (1) a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity;  
(2) the party making the application was not given proper notice or was 
otherwise not able to present his case; 
(3) the award addresses a dispute not contemplated within the terms of 
the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions beyond the scope of 
the submission to arbitration; 
(4) the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties. 
(b) the court finds that: 
(1) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration; 
  (2) the award is in conflict with the public policy of the State.762 
  
Of importance to note is that fact that a party is not precluded from appealing to 
an arbitral tribunal of second instance if the parties have agreed on such a possibility at 
the time of drafting the arbitration clause of their contract.  The list of grounds to vacate 
an award is substantially the same as those in Article V of the New York Convention and 
include: (1) lack of capacity of the parties to conclude the arbitration agreement; (2) lack 
of a valid arbitration agreement; (3) lack of notice of the appointment of arbitrators; (4) 
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inability of a party to present its case; (5) issuance of awards dealing with matters not 
covered by the submission to arbitration; (6) composition of an arbitral tribunal or 
conduct of arbitral proceedings contrary to an effective agreement of the parties, or 
failing agreement, to the Model Law; (7) non-arbitrability of the subject-matter of the 
dispute; and  (8) the violation of public policy.763  Further, the court when asked to set 
aside an award, may suspend the setting aside proceedings to give the arbitral tribunal an 
opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take on another action that will in the 
arbitral tribunal's opinion eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award.764   
 
Article 35 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law address the recognition and 
enforcement of awards under UNCITRAL arbitration.  An arbitral award, irrespective of 
the country where it is rendered, shall be recognized as binding and, upon application in 
writing to the competent court, shall be enforced.765  With respect to the refusal of a State 
to recognize an award, Article 36(1) explains that at an arbitral award may be refused 
only if: 
  
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party provides 
proof that: 
  (1) a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity; 
(2) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper 
notice and was unable to present his case; 
(3) the award addresses a dispute not contemplated by or not included 
within the scope of the submission to arbitration; 
(4) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was 
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties; 
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(5) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set 
aside or suspended by a competent court; 
(b) if the court finds that: 
(1) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of the State; 
(2) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
public policy.766 
 
In the UNCITRAL case number 391, Re Corporacion Transnacional de 
Inversiones v. STET International, the claimant challenged the enforcement of the 
UNCITRAL arbitral award before an Ontario court and sought to have the award set 
aside while the respondent requested its enforcement.  The claimant contended that the 
award should be set aside on the grounds that they had been denied equality of treatment 
and opportunity to present their case in direct contradiction to UNCITRAL Model 
Arbitration Law Article 18.  Further, the claimant stated that the award was in conflict to 
the public policy in Ontario.   
 
 The Ontario court held that under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the 
claimant had the onus of proving that the award should be set aside and that if the 
claimant fails to do so, then Articles 35 and 36 require the court to recognize and enforce 
the award automatically.  The court further noted that the grounds for proper refusal of 
enforcement of an arbitral award under the UNCITRAL Model Law are to be construed 
narrowly and that the public policy ground for resisting enforcement should apply only 
where enforcement would violate basic notions of morality and justice of which 
corruption, bribery or fraud are examples.767  The court further explained that the due 
process protection of Article 34(2) included both procedural and substantive fairness 
which may overlap with the public policy defense.768   
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 After reviewing the facts of the case, the Ontario court found that the claimant 
had failed to establish sufficient grounds to set aside the arbitral award.  With respect to 
equal treatment and opportunity for a party to present their case, the Ontario court 
explained that a party that refuses to participate in an arbitration is deemed to have 
forfeited the opportunity to be heard under the UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 25.  The 
court explained that the purpose of Model Law Article 18 is to protect a party from 
egregious and injudicious conduct by a tribunal.  The court explained that this article is 
not intended to protect a party from its own failures or strategic choices.  Further, the 
court explained that the fact that the award might be legally or factually wrong was not, 
in and of itself, sufficient grounds for setting it aside.  With respect to compelling a party 
to present testimony, the court explained that the arbitral tribunal had no power under 
Article 27 of the Model Arbitration Laws to compel such testimony and failure of the 
applicant to seek judicial assistance cannot be imputed to the tribunal.     
 
 In UNCITRAL Case Number: 868 – Germany: Bayerisches Oberstes 
Langesgericht, where the German National court was tasked with considering the 
grounds upon which an award from an arbitral tribunal conducted under the UNCITRAL 
rules could be set aside on the grounds of public policy.  The court held that an arbitral 
award could only be set aside for infringement of public policy, if the award was contrary 
to basic legal values.  The court clarified that the fact that the award in this situation 
possessed a degree of factual incorrectness was not sufficient to justify setting it aside 
based alone on a claim of the violation of public policy.  The court further explained that 
the procedures for setting aside the award of an arbitral tribunal were not meant to 
scrutinize the award’s content.769  
F. Appeal grounded on public policy 
In the UNCITRAL system a substantive appellate mechanism does not exist; however, a 
party can claim in national court for the award to be vacated on grounds similar to those 
 






for appeal in the ICSID system but public policy is also specifically a consideration 
which is highly problematic.  Public policy is an ever-changing concept and risks 
misapplication particularly when considered through narrow-minded cultural lenses.  
This becomes further apparent when a court in one cultural context attempts to consider 
what is appropriate public policy for nationals of other countries and cultural contexts.    
While public policy analysis is unavoidable when judges seize property, such a 
malleable notion may not be necessary or even appropriate in the international setting.  
For example, if German and Italian companies choose New York to arbitrate a dispute 
that has not effect in the United States, it might be best to leave European judges the task 
of deciding whether the award is compatible with whatever public policy might be 
relevant to their particular context.  In contrast, procedural defects such as excess of 
authority and denial of the right to be heard, being more universally understood, lend 
themselves less to disruptive application.770  
 There are some public policy violations that do justify judicial intervention.  As 
an example, a U.S. judge might decide to vacate an award allowing racial or religious 
discrimination even if allowed under relevant foreign law.  The issue here is not 
necessarily about the existence of public policy as grounds for appeal; but, it is the 
temptation to invoke this excuse in a what that is abusive.  Further the lack of guidance of 
judicial discretion in the development of what public policy is acceptable for application 
in situations beyond the comprehension of the current court’s jurisdiction is also 
worrying.  
 An interesting method in addressing this issue is to adopt explicitly the French 
distinction between public policy applicable to domestic and international cases.771  
While both international and domestic public policy are considered in French courts, the 
latter addresses policies relevant only in contexts that are within French borders.  The 
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former implicates cross-border rather than purely French interests.  The concept, referred 
to as international public policy, would be constituted not by any supra-national norms, 
but rather by the policy applied by national courts to cross-border transactions with no 
direct impact on the forum.   
G. Value of substantive appeal process 
The fact that both the ICISD and UNCITRAL systems to do not currently offer potential 
users a review mechanism that considers substantive issues has the potential to be 
troublesome.  It could create a disincentive for potential users to engage in ICSID or 
UNCITRAL dispute settlement out of concern for the absence of a mechanism to correct 
erroneous substantive errors.  There are many practitioners and clients that are under the 
impression that by choosing international dispute settlement as the exclusive mode for 
resolution, parties are largely forsaking the right to relief from even an egregious arbitral 
error.   
The first instance of appeal for a losing party to international dispute settlement 
tends to be the tribunal itself.  However, in systems other than the WTO which has a very 
developed appellate mechanism that considers substantive issues of law in the review 
process, a petition to alter or re-examine an award is highly unlikely to be successful as 
most international dispute settlement mechanisms strictly circumscribe arbitrators’ 
powers to change their final award after it is signed.772  The UNCITRAL and ICISD 
systems follow this practice of limited review as demonstrated above.  The ICISD and 
UNCITRAL rules establish a one-tier system, whereby awards are final, subject only to 
corrections of form or clerical error by the deciding tribunal.  These provisions tend to be 
narrowly construed by arbitrators, such that modification will generally be granted only 
where the tribunal would have included the modification in the original award had it been 
aware of the inaccuracy. 
 Furthermore, without the explicit provision in the parties’ agreement for 
continuing jurisdiction or formation of a new tribunal for appellate review, at least under 
 
772 ICC Rules of Arbitration (1998), Art 29(1); London Court of International Arbitration Rules 





US law, an arbitration tribunal becomes functus officio and without authority to act as 
soon as the final award is rendered in a particular case.773  Parties therefore have little 
basis upon which to argue that arbitrators have an implied or inherent power to revisit 
their own awards on substantive grounds, if the applicable arbitration rules and 
agreement are silent on the matter.     
H. A lack of a substantive appellate process does not bring finality 
In general, the absence of a substantive appeals process in international dispute 
settlement, not considering the WTO, in actuality does little to guarantee that an 
arbitrator’s award will mean the end of the dispute.   Because arbitral awards require the 
confirmation of a national court at the place of enforcement in order to attach assets in the 
face of resistance from the losing party, and international arbitration treaties provide 
legitimate bases upon which awards can be challenged, the rendering of an arbitral award 
may be only the first step in a chain of court litigation in a variety of different 
jurisdictions.  In fact, where the only form of recourse to international arbitral awards is 
in national courts, it is possible and even likely for the national court appeal process to 
include more than one phase of case presentation, as the losing party attempts to establish 
its claims to vacate the award and pursues its contentions up the scale of courts in the 
national judicial system.774  It does seem reasonable, however, that there is a portion of 
actions in national courts to set aside arbitration awards that would not be brought if there 
were a substantive form of appeal within the initial international dispute settlement 
mechanism.    
I. The WTO approach 
In the situation of the WTO, much legitimacy comes from the existence of the Appellate 
Body which forms a highly developed substantive review mechanism and is established 
in a way that is more similar to that outlined by the ICJ.  The WTO Appellate Body acts 
 
773 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States (London: Kluwer, 2010) 
546-577. 
774 William H. Knull, III and Noah D. Rubins, “Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is It 





as a type of safety net, providing a judicial body of second instance capable of addressing 
issues related to the independence or impartiality of the panel of first instance, among 
other issues.  In the WTO system, the Appellate Body is an essential component to ensure 
that due process protection with respect to ensuring the integrity of the decision maker is 
secure.  Further, although not usually a concern in WTO dispute settlement, should there 
be issues regarding the notice provided to the parties the Appellate Body has the 
competence to address such issues.   
The WTO system has a very advanced appellate process; either party can appeal 
the report of the Panel to the WTO Appellate Body.  Of important note is that appeals can 
only be based on the Panel's application of WTO law to the case in controversy, and not a 
re-evaluation of the facts of the case.775 The WTO Appellate Body consists of seven 
permanent members, appointed for four-year terms, which are renewable only once.776 
An Appellate Body member therefore may have a fixed appointment of up to 8 years, as 
opposed to Panel members, who are appointed ad hoc for each dispute. The Appellate 
Body members must be "individuals with recognized standing in the field of law and 
international trade, not affiliated with any government."777 Over the years Appellate Body 
members have come from a variety of backgrounds, and include retired government 
officials and judges, international law academics, international lawyers, international 
courts and tribunal judges, and others.778  
With respect to the composition of Appellate Body divisions, the DSU limits 
itself to the rule that appeals from panel cases are to be decided by only three members of 
the Appellate Body, that these three members are to be determined by a system of 
rotation and that "such a system of rotation shall be determined in the working 
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777 World Trade Organization, Information and Media Relations Division, Understanding the 
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procedures."779 One of the three members presides over each division by election.  While 
a division is responsible for hearing and deciding a specific appeal, the other four 
members are also consulted in a session of all seven members called an Exchange of 
Views, which normally lasts for two or three days.   
While explicitly addressing the problem of nationality of panellists with respect 
to WTO Members that are parties to the dispute,780 the DSU says nothing for the 
Appellate Body process. According to the Working Procedures, "the Members 
constituting a division shall be selected on the basis of rotation, while taking into account 
the principles of random selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all Members to 
serve regardless of their national origin."781  
 
A division must decide the appeal within ninety days from the filing of the 
appeal.  Of those ninety days, exchanges of written submissions by the parties and third-
party participants take thirty days or more.  As the translation of final draft of the opinion 
into the other two official WTO languages takes two weeks, fewer than forty-five days 
remain for a division to do its work. The work of a division includes preliminary 
deliberations, an oral hearing (normally lasting one or two days in which the division 
asks the parties questions requiring immediate answers), the Exchange of Views, and 
finally further deliberation and the drafting of a report for submission to the DSB. 
 
WTO appellate review is limited to legal points in a matter similar to the review 
of the highest national courts.  It does not extend to a review of fact-finding by the panel 
below unless an error of fact is so significant that it constitutes a legal error. The 
assembly of all Member States must adopt the Appellate Body's recommendation for the 
recommendation to become conclusive and binding.  
 
 
779 DSU art. 17.1. 
780 DSU art. 8.3. 
781 WTO Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/3, 





When a WTO Member State decides to initiate appellate proceedings, the 
respective notice will usually be published within three to four days on the Appellate 
Body homepage.  However, the content of the appeals notice is not always clearly 
formulated, neither for the public nor WTO Members.  In the Shrimp-Turtle case, for 
instance, India, Pakistan and Malaysia had previously complained that the United States’ 
notice of appeal had been too “vague and cursory”.782 Some developing countries 
therefore suggested the establishment of additional guidelines on the nature of the notice 
of appeal in order to make sure that such notices are sufficiently clear.783  Submissions of 
parties or third parties to a dispute before the Appellate Body are in the same way and for 
the same reasons confidential as submissions in panel proceedings.  Further, Art. 18.2 of 
the DSU equally applies to appellate proceedings. 
 
Although these concerns regarding sufficient clarity of the notice of appeal have 
also been addressed in the DSU negotiations, they have also been considered by the 
Appellate Body itself in the meantime. New Working Procedures for Appellate Review 
entered into force on 1 January 2005. The modified rules require, inter alia, more detail 
on the nature of the appeal. Appellants are requested to include a list of the legal 
provision(s) of the covered agreements that the panel is alleged to have erred in 
interpreting or applying, and to provide an indicative list of the paragraphs of the panel 
report containing the alleged errors.784  
 
With respect to enforcement, the WTO system often encounters difficulties in 
enforcing a ruling and grapples with what can be done if the parties are not willing to 
comply with a ruling rendered by the WTO. The major problem is that the WTO does not 
have a mechanism for enforcement.  The "legalization" of the dispute settlement process 
has not been paired with a stronger enforcement arm.  This creates a major impediment to 
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the WTO's enforcement of its rulings.  In response, the WTO does not seek to enforce 
directly compliance itself but employs softer methods such as monitoring and reporting 
on implementation and discussions in councils and ministerial meetings, to encourage 
Members to conform.   
J. What is finality in the context of dispute resolution? 
Historically, “finality,” meaning in practice the lack of appeal on the merits of the 
dispute, has tended to be counted among the advantages of private dispute resolution over 
national court litigation.  However there is no reason to assume that arbitrators are any 
less prone to mistakes than judges are.  Further, one commentator suggested that many 
potential parties avoid the UNCITRAL and ICSID mechanisms  “because they have no 
confidence that the arbitrators’ decision will be as objective, predictable and correct as 
one would expect if the decision were made by a highly respected judge sitting without a 
jury.”785  As international cases presented to international dispute settlement mechanisms 
are increasingly complex, both technically and financially, the likelihood of error is 
further increased.  To further complicate the job of international dispute settlement 
mechanisms, they often face the application of legal principles from multiple countries, 
and there is no guarantee the arbitrators will be sufficiently familiar with any of them.   
The establishment of a substantive appeals process in the ICSID and UNCITRAL 
systems will not be easy and the mere concept creates several complicated questions for 
consideration.  How wide should an international appeals mechanism range? Should it, 
for example, cover all maters in dispute in the original arbitration, including issues of 
fact? Or should it be confined to issues of law?  Should it be concerned only with 
reviewing the decisions of the original tribunal on the issues before it? To what extent 
should it allow new issues to be introduced at the appeal stage? 
A substantive appellate process that considered errors of fact would involve the 
investigation of the question whether the original tribunal had improperly attached weight 
to particular evidence or had indeed decided issues of fact without any evidence to 
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support its conclusions. This type of review raises serious concerns surrounding the 
concept of the autonomy of the original tribunal.   
With respect to appeals mechanism where the appellate process limits itself to 
consideration of errors of law that are significant, who is to determine whether the error 
of law is obvious or not obvious?  In a domestic regime the civil courts are there and 
available to determine whether this filter system should operate in favor of the appellant.  
However, where there is no substitute for a domestic court operating as a filtering agency, 
there are more difficult problems.  For example, is the filtering to be done by the very 
same body which sits for the purpose of determining a substantive appeal? 
The next question for consideration is whether the members of the appellate body 
should be a standing court or tribunal, having a published list of members or, whether the 
members of the appellate body should be appointed ad hoc by an administrative 
machinery such as the Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID.  This in turn 
raises the question as to how the appellate body should be composed by whoever is 
responsible for appointing it.   
The advantage of the establishment of a permanent appellate body with published 
names is that it can develop a coherent body of jurisprudence and can thereby gradually 
establish consistency of approach to the kind of issues likely to arise on appeal.  
However, it is important to note, as discussed above, that those with a Civil Law 
background will likely find the concept of anything approaching a doctrine of stare 
decisis difficult to accept.  This will be discussed further below.  
In relation to ICSID  and UNCITRAL dispute settlement systems the 
establishment of a permanent appellate body could be made to fit in with the existing 
procedural regime.  On one hand, under ICSID one has a system of ad  hoc annulment 
committees which may be called upon to deal with issues of fact arising before the 
original tribunal for the purpose, for example, of deciding whether the tribunal is properly 
constituted or has manifestly exceeded its powers or has departed from a fundamental 
rule of procedure.  On the other hand one would run perhaps an unacceptable risk of 





appellate  body considering whether the original tribunal had erred in relation to a 
question of law on an issue before it.  For that reason, there is perhaps much to be said for 
combining the functions of an appellate tribunal on the questions of law with the 
functions of the had hoc annulment committee into a single appellate body similar to that 
of the WTO system.   
K. The value of finality 
In general, with respect to appellate proceedings in the context of international dispute 
settlement, former general counsel Thomas Klitgaard remarked: 
Speed and finality are virtues, but only if you win.  They are not virtues if a 
fundamental mistake has been made.  The arbitral institutions dealing with … 
disputes should set up a mechanism for appeal.  It would be up to the parties to 
elect the mechanism in their agreement.  If they did not so elect, they would 
assume the risk of an unprincipled or fundamentally erroneous decision.  But at 
least the issue involving the possibility of review would be focused for the 
business persons on each side, who often become aware of the lack of an appeal 
only after the remedy of international arbitration is already selected.786     
 Expanding the possibilities for review and appeal in any dispute settlement 
system comes at a price through reduced flexibility and speed.  However, this exchange 
of finality and speed for accuracy might be one that parties to international dispute 
settlement feel is necessary if it is to be an acceptable alternative to domestic 
adjudication.  The benefits of arbitration in the international context can be significant; 
however, given the stakes oftentimes involved, either public or private, finality and speed 
may likely become secondary to neutrality, enforceability, consistency, predictability, 
technical expertise, and others.  In particular, talking a little more time to ensure accuracy 
and a just decision at the end is likely a far better investment than focusing only on speed 
which has a higher likelihood to result in an erroneous decision.  
 
786 Thomas J. Klitgaard, “The Transnational Arbitration of High-Tech Disputes,” presentation 
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 When the value of finality is considered in light of the high stakes and factual 
and legal complexity of many international disputes combined with increasingly complex 
technical evidence, it becomes more apparent that there is potentially a significant need 
for substantive appellate procedures in international dispute settlement mechanisms.  By 
establishing clause modules that will establish clearly-defined standards of review, 
deadlines, evidentiary procedure and limitations, and other procedural details, the parties’ 
negotiated compromise between finality and accuracy can be implemented faithfully, 
allowing both sides to calculate future risks and feel confident entrusting their 
international disputes to international dispute settlement mechanisms.   
L. Some judicial review is needed 
It can be argued that an optimal legal framework for international dispute settlement 
would limit national court scrutiny to narrow review standards, regardless of whatever 
judicially administered review measures might be considered appropriate for domestic 
cases.787  The best default rule for judicial review of international awards gives losers a 
right to challenge awards only for excess of authority and basic procedural unfairness, 
bias or denial of an opportunity to present one’s case, but not on the merits of the case.788 
In the eventuality that the substance of a dispute could regularly be second-
guessed by judges, international dispute settlement would merely become the precursor to 
national litigation.  It is important to note that limited review, however, does not mean no 
review at all.  Few commercial actors would be comfortable to buy into a system with no 
prospect for rectifying gross procedural unfairness.  In agreeing to arbitrate, business 
managers generally assume to risk that arbitrators may make mistakes on the substance of 
the dispute and these can and should be remedied by the system’s appellate mechanism 
but this is not always the case.   
However, such business managers are not likely willing to give up fundamental 
due process protections in submitting their case to international dispute settlement.  When 
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one side regrets its bargain to arbitrate only after the award is rendered, national courts 
should maintain a hands-off approach that balances the interests of winners and losers.789  
Normally, in the context of international dispute settlement, national judicial intervention 
should be justified only to promote the basic integrity of the process and the arbitrators’ 
respect for the contours of their mission.790  It must be remembered, however, that the 
text of the law must be read in the context of its application and even a statue that is 
written to allow challenge only for defects related to procedural regularity could be 
interpreted to allow justification for an overzealous judge to examine a dispute’s legal 
merits under the guise of correcting arbitrator excess of authority 
M. Basic components for a substantive appeal processes 
In constructing an efficient and equitable international dispute settlement substantive 
appeals option for the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems, three conflicting interests must 
be balanced.  First, the procedural aspects of any appellate process must contain 
sufficient detail to provide systematic predictability and to minimize potential collateral 
disputes over the interpretation or implementation of the system’s rules.  Secondly, the 
system must be sufficiently flexible to encompass the preferences of a wide variety of 
potential parties and have the ability to accommodate a range of different attitudes 
towards the value of efficiency and finality as compared accuracy and fairness.  There 
should be clearly defined rules for the appeals system but a degree of flexibility should 
still be present should the parties agree on some changes.  Thirdly, the analysis during the 
appellate process must reach a level that is more than cursory and consider issues that 
reach beyond those that are procedural to those that are substantive and address the merits 
of the actual case.  In doing this, the appellate process must not become too cumbersome 
so as to create unnecessary delay. 
 
789 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 386 (1911) (The most enlightened 
judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground for 
interference is very clear).  
790 Lord Alfred T. Denning, The Discipline of the Law (New York: Lexis Nexis, 1979) 74 
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 Expedited Procedure – The desirability of expediency and cost reduction in 
resolving any dispute suggests that the process should, where possible and consistent 
with its principle objectives, simplify and accelerate the appeals process.  While it should 
not be the default option, if the parties choose to restrict or exclude new evidence at the 
appeals stage, a significantly shortened time frame may be possible relative to the time 
needed if more evidence is to be permitted.  “Fast track” mechanisms could include time 
limits on initial submissions and subsequent briefs, accelerated tribunal formation or 
standing appeal panels, caps on the length of oral hearings, and short deadlines for the 
rendering of an award.  Guidance as to how the procedures can be accelerated without 
sacrificing substantive accuracy can be gleaned from those currently employed by the 
WTO appeals system. 
 Scope and Standard of Review – At the core of any new substantive appellate 
mechanism will be the scope of review.  By choosing the appropriate standard, parties 
would be able to select a narrower or broader scope in accordance with the needs of the 
particular issue at hand, balancing expediency against breadth or recourse.  It will be 
essential that whatever standard of review is selected, it be clearly defined from the 
beginning in order to avoid time-consuming disputes over appellate jurisdiction.  In 
addition, it should be clear that the appellate tribunal itself has the exclusive jurisdiction 
to determine whether the complaint submitted falls within parties’ agreement as to scope.  
Possible standards could fall anywhere in the range between the minimal review provided 
by the New York Convention and a complete de novo review.  Review could be limited 
to errors of law791 or provide for remedies were, as an example, an award was found not 
to be supported by any evidence, by substantial evidence or by a preponderance of the 
evidence or was against the great weight of the evidence.  As different standards provide 
different tradeoffs of speed and accuracy, and given the need for a degree of flexibility in 
ICSID and UNCITRAL settings, it may be most effective to allow the parties to choose 
among two or more alternatives to tailor the proceeding to their own needs. 
 
791 A report by a committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(UCCUSL) suggests that advantages of arbitration are less undermined by appeal concerning 






 Sanctions – In national courts, legal ethics rules and lawyer sanctions are used to 
increase the pain involved in bringing non-meritorious actions.  An arbitral appeals 
system could do the same by giving the appeals tribunal the discretion to assess penalties 
upon either the appealing party or his attorney where the request for review is found to 
have no legitimate basis.  A related device is the provision of post-award interest.  When 
any delay in the payment of an award caused by the losing party in opting for arbitral 
review is reflected in the final amount assessed, neither party is likely to employ delay 
tactics at the appeal level, and the frequency of appeals with a low probability of success 
will be further reduced. 
 Waiver of Judicial Remedies – one of the more controversial elements that might 
be incorporated into an international arbitral appeals system to minimize potential 
detrimental effects on speed and finality is a waiver of judicial remedies.  Such a rule 
would deprive the losing party of the opportunity to oppose enforcement of the award 
before judicial bodies anywhere in the world, whether prior to and instead of applying to 
the agreed-upon tribunal, or after that body decides the outcome of an appeal.792  Such a 
waiver is generally enforced under English law, and can likely be used to reasonably bar 
judicial recourse once a particular international dispute settlement mechanism has been 
initiated.793  If such a clause is effective in a wide range of jurisdictions around the world, 
the result could be a dramatic increase in the efficiency and finality over the standard 
situation where courts currently provide the exclusive forum for challenge.  A waiver of 
judicial recourse, however, is more likely to be effective at the location of the arbitral 
proceedings than at the place of enforcement due to the interest of states in safeguarding 
public policy when an award is closely connected to their territory or citizens.   
 Standing Body or Ad Hoc Tribunal – Given the concern for flexibility in 
international dispute settlement, it is not entirely clear that one or more standing appellate 
bodies (such as that used in the WTO dispute resolution facility) would be a more 
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effective solution than ad hoc panels formed from a list of qualified arbitrators 
established by relevant administering organizations.  Both options could provide the 
necessary expertise in appeals arbitrator candidates.  Standing ICSID or UNCITRAL 
appellate bodies could provide speedier resolution of challenges and more uniform 
interpretation and a greater degree of consistency with previous case law.  Alternatively, 
ad hoc tribunals would reduce additional administrative costs to international institutions 
and consequently to the parties, and may better respond to the technical details of a 
particular dispute by maintaining the flexibility to include technical experts in a particular 
subject matter as necessary.  A combination of the benefits of ad hoc and standing 
appellate panels could be achieved if international dispute settlement institutions 
maintained an extensive list of potential appellate members who could be called upon 
depending upon their particular technical expertise at short notice.   
 Appellate Remedies – The scope of remedies available to an arbitral appeals 
panel is as important an aspect of a review system as the review mechanism itself.  
Should a panel decide that an award is erroneous, there need to be a number of actions 
available to it to take, and the parties should agree at the outset which of these options 
will be available to the appellate panel, to avoid disputes over the appeal tribunal’s 
authority and to better reflect the parties’ preferences with regard to economy and 
accuracy.  If an award is flawed but not to the degree that it is fatal, an appeal tribunal 
could be empowered to amend the award, or to issue a new award replacing the flawed 
one.  Alternatively, the award could be reversed and remanded, either to the original 
panel or, in some rare circumstances where the original panel are not available or are 
found to be somewhat suspect or disqualified given the issues on appeal, a new panel 
could be formed with instructions on how errors should be corrected.   
 Cost Shifting – The proliferation of erroneous appeals can be significantly 
reduced by including at a contractual level the tools that courts use to reduce caseloads.  
The most fundamental tool for reducing non-meritorious appeals is cost shifting.  This 
would mean that should an appeals panel affirm the arbitration award, the party initiating 
the arbitral appeal would be responsible for paying his opponent’s reasonable legal costs 





more common in international commercial arbitration than in American litigation, if 
could be argued that cost shifting provisions will do little to alter incentive to bring 
arbitral appeal.  However, cost shifting is by no means a forgone conclusion in 
international arbitration.794  Explicit provisions for a “costs follow the event” rule at the 
appeals stage will therefore remove all discretion and uncertainty as to the distribution of 
legal costs, removing the power of losing parties to extort advantageous settlement from 
the victor by threatening appeal.795      
Security for Costs – If a losing party will already be drained of assets by the 
enforcement of the arbitral award against it, the prospect of paying both sides’ appeal 
costs will pose little deterrent threat.  Appeals panels could therefore be empowered to 
require a deposit of security to cover the costs incurred by the appellee during the 
procedure.  While a default rule should likely leave the question of security for costs to 
the appeals panel’s discretion in order to avoid shutting out parties with highly 
meritorious complaints, alternative language could provide for security of costs in all 
appeals, or in all cases where matters of fact or law are at issue, rather than appeals as to 
procedural defects.  
N. The case of  the WTO Appellate Body 
The WTO Appellate Body’s case law is highly authoritative and has made a significant 
contribution to the development of international trade law and in practice is today the 
only substantive appeals process for international dispute settlement.  This is changing as 
recently the European Union and Canada announced their agreement to rely on a new 
permanent investment court system under the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA),796 replacing the prevailing ad hoc arbitration system that was 
initially part of the deal.  The EU also included a similar provision in the text of the EU-
Viet Nam free trade agreement.  This change, however, only refers to investor-state 
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dispute settlement under Chapter Eight (investment)797 of the CETA.  Interestingly, rather 
than referring to the mechanism already established by the ICSID system, the parties 
have opted to develop their own mechanism which includes new substantive appeal 
procedures.  The final text of the CETA establishes a permanent Appellate Mechanism 
which is similar in concept to that of the WTO Appellate Body.  The inclusion of a 
substantive appeals mechanism is a huge departure from the traditional approach to 
investor-state dispute settlement because previously, as explained above with respect to 
the ICSID system, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to challenge an award on 
the basis of a legal or substantive error.  Under the new CETA approach, legal errors can 
now be challenged.   The fact that the new Appellate Mechanism is patterned after the 
WTO Appellate Body only highlights the value of the WTO appellate system and it can 
be reasonably expected that this new system will increase the consistency and 
predictability of the jurisprudence.   
 
 The WTO DSU, provided in Article 17, that “a standing Appellate 
Body shall be established . . .”  In line with this mandate, the DSB set up the Appellate 
Body through its decision of 10 February 1995 on the Establishment of the Appellate 
Body.798  During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the two main trading powers, the 
United States and the European Communities had both been exposed, in their views, to 
several panel reports which they felt contained serious legal errors799 and as a safety 
measure against such erroneous panel reports, the negotiators provided for an appellate 
review mechanism.  The European Communities proposed the creation of an appeals 
mechanism for parties who believed that panel decisions were “erroneous or 
incomplete.”800  The United States supported appellate review for “extraordinary cases 
where a panel report contains legal interpretations that are questioned formally by one of 
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the parties’.801  Canada viewed the appellate review mechanism as a way to correct errors 
of “fundamentally flawed decisions.”802  Bob Hudec described the WTO appellate review 
mechanism as a “safety valve” against “bad” panel decisions.803 
 
 Interestingly, the decision to establish a standing Appellate Body is held to be 
somewhat of an afterthought, rather than the product of a large design to create a strong 
international court system.804  This concept is supported by the fact that of the 27 articles 
of the DSU, only one article, Article 17, specifically addresses the Appellate Body and 
the WTO process for appellate review and only one of the four appendices of the DSU 
considers the Appellate Body or its work.  Compared with the significant amount of 
information on the panel process, the small amount of attention paid to appellate review 
demonstrates the limited importance given by the original WTO negotiators to any type 
of appellate review.   
 
 Article 17 of the DSU defines the work of the Appellate Body in very general 
terms to be the hearing of appeals from panel cases805, but then goes on to narrow the 
scope of appellate review and the overall mandate of the WTO Appellate Body.  Appeals 
are limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations the panel 
develops and generally findings of fact by the panel are not included in the scope of 
appellate review.806  The Appellate Body is mandated to address each of the legal points 
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raised during the appellate review process807 but it is limited only to upholding, 
modifying or reversing the panel’s legal findings and conclusions.  Access to appellate 
proceedings is limited only to parties to a dispute and third parties or other WTO 
Members do not have standing to appeal a panel report, even if they have clear interests 
at stake. 
 
 According to Article 17.6 of the DSU, the Appellate Body is to be composed of 
seven members and when compared with the ICJ, the ICC or the ITLOS, which are made 
up of 15, 18, and 21 judges respectively, the small size of the WTO Appellate Body is 
somewhat surprising.808  Further, Article 17.2 provides that appeals are never heard by all 
the members of the Appellate Body, but only by three of the seven persons serving on the 
Appellate Body on rotation.  Critics were concerned that this rotational system of 
decision making provided by the DSU negotiators would have resulted in the 
development of inconsistent WTO case law.809  However, the Appellate Body recognized 
and addressed this danger in the development of its Working Procedures.  Rule 4 of the 
Working Procedures, entitled “Collegiality,” requires the division responsible for 
deciding an appeal “to exchange views with the other Members [of the Appellate Body] 
before the division finalizes the appellate report.”810  This mechanism of “exchange of 
views” is quite unique in dispute settlement, be it national or international, and has been 
of “enormous benefit to the work of the Appellate Body.”811  While the responsibility for 
deciding the appeal remains with the division, the exchange of views actively involves 
the full Appellate Body in every appeal.  Interestingly, after retiring from the Appellate 
 
807Ibid. 
808Article 3 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36(1) of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, and Article 2(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea. 
809 R. Hudec, “The New WTO Dispute Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years” (1999) 
8 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 28. 
810 Rule 4.3 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. 
811 C.D. Ehlermann, Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO, 
Policy Paper RSC No 02/9, The Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European 





Body, several of its former Members publically made statements to the high degree of 
collegiality among the Members of the Appellate Body and the resulting positive effect 
on its case law.812    
 
 The working procedures of the Appellate Body have directly contributed to the 
prominence obtained by this appellate mechanism today.  The working procedures 
provide for judicial-type proceedings and a court-like appeals body.  The Appellate Body 
made it clear from the outset that it would have a “fairly high standard of practice,” as 
compared with the “more easy-going standard of practice common to party-controlled 
panel proceedings.”813  Part I of the Working Procedures sets out the duties and 
responsibilities of the Appellate Body Members and put much focus on their 
independence and impartiality, as well as on the avoidance of conflicts of interest.814  The 
Appellate Body adopted on a temporary basis the Rules of Conduct for the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes and 
attached these Rules in Annex II to the Working Procedures.  The Rules of Conduct, as 
they apply to Appellate Body Members and the Appellate Body Secretariat, are more 
elaborated than the rules of other international courts, such as the ICJ.815  Part I of the 
Working Procedures also set out the rules on the composition and operation of 
divisions.816       
 
 Part II of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review provides for specific 
rules on the commencement of an appeal, on the working schedule of an appeal, on the 
appellant’s and appellee’s submissions, on the rights of third parties, on the oral hearing, 
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on the filing and circulation of documents, on the prohibition of ex parte 
communications, on multiple appeals, on the transmittal of the record to the Appellate 
Body, on additional memoranda, on the consequences of failure to appear and on the 
withdrawal of an appeal.  Annex I of the Working Procedures contains a detailed time 
table for appeals.  With the maximum timeframe of 90 days mandated by Article 17.5 the 
working schedule is tight, with very short time periods in which the participants in the 
appeal must file their written submissions and in which the division of the Appellate 
Body hearing the appeal must conduct the oral hearing, deliberate, exchange views, 
deliberate again, draft, translate and finally circulate the report.  The Working Procedures 
for Appellate Review leave no doubt that the Appellate Body division hearing the appeal 
(and not the participants) is firmly in control of the appellate process, just as one would 
expect from a court as opposed to an arbitral body.   
 
 When in an appeal a procedural question arises that is not covered by the 
Working Procedure, the Appellate Body division hearing that appeal has the authority to 
adopt an additional procedural rule for the purposes of that appeal.  The Working 
Procedures give this authority to the division “in the interests of fairness and orderly 
procedure in the conduct of an appeal.”  For example, the Appellate Body division in EC-
Asbestos used this authority to adopt an Additional Procedure to address the many amicus 
curiae briefs submitted to the division in that appeal.817 
 
 The Working Procedure adopted in February 1996 have served the Appellate 
Body very well and have allowed it to conduct its work in a fair, efficient and genuinely 
judicial manner.  Throughout the years the Working Procedure has been amended several 
times to address specific deficiencies.  This was particularly the case with amendments 
effective as of 2002, which made it easier for third parties to participate in the oral 
hearing, and the amendments effective as of 2005, which elaborated on the content 
requirements for the notice of appeal, introduced the requirement of notice of other 
 





appeal to be filed by other appellants, and modified the time of the oral hearing.818  
These, along with other amendments, have further strengthened the court-like nature of 
the Appellate Body and the judicial-type nature of the WTO appellate review 
proceedings.   
  
 In the July 2015 case, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products819, the Appellate Body was faced with the issue as to whether new 
argumentation could be considered during an appeal or if such consideration was a 
violation of due process protections afforded to the parties. Defendant Guatemala 
objected that it was confronted for the first time on appeal with specific arguments and 
with extensive supporting materials and therefore requested the Appellate Body to 
exclude from the scope of the appeal the new arguments, which, according to Guatemala, 
would require the consideration of new facts and to address issues that are not issues of 
law covered in the Panel report or legal interpretations developed by the Panel.820  
 
 In previous jurisprudence, the Appellate Body has maintained the principle that 
new argumentation is not excluded from the scope of appellate review; however, its 
ability to consider new arguments is indeed circumscribed by Article 17.6 of the DSU.821 
In an effort to provide clarity, the Appellate Body found that it would be able to consider 
new arguments if: 1) they do not require it “to solicit, receive and review new facts”822; 2) 
they “involve either an ‘issue of law covered in the panel report’ or ‘legal interpretations 
developed by the panel’”.823 In any event, the Appellate Body has clarified that such 
consideration must not compromise a party’s due process rights to have a fair opportunity 
to defend itself adequately.824  
 
 
818 Working Procedures for Appellate Review. 
819 Appellate Body Report, Peru-Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS457/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2015, para 5.81.  
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821 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para. 211. 
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 In the current case, the Appellate Body reasoned that while Peru did not raise the 
specific argumentation during the initial panel process to which Guatemala objected, Peru 
did raise arguments concerning the interpretation of the same specific WTO covered 
agreements at issue.  According to the Appellate Body, Peru’s arguments, although new, 
were framed as concerning the interpretations of the same WTO provisions as at issue 
before the Panel and covered in the Panel report.  Therefore, Peru’s new arguments on 
appeal could be considered as relating to “issues of law covered in the panel report” or 
“legal interpretations developed by the panel” allowing their consideration by the 
Appellate Body without any prejudice to Guatemala’s due process rights. 825  With 
respect to the submission of new facts, the Appellate Body did clarify that in the event 
new argumentation on appeal requires the consideration of new facts, it would not be 
appropriate for the Appellate Body to address such arguments to that extent.  In the 
current situation, the submission of new facts was not an issue because the new 
argumentation put forward by Peru relied entirely on facts previously submitted and 
considered by the Panel and explained in the Panel report.826   
  
 As demonstrated above, a particularly valuable component of the WTO appellate 
review mechanism is its case law, and in particular the case law balancing free trade and 
other societal values and interests and case law ensuring the fairness and effectiveness of 
the WTO dispute settlement system.  In general, the case law of the Appellate Body 
carefully balances free trade with other societal values, such as public health, the 
environment, or consumer protection.  This balance is initially set out in the numerous 
provisions of the WTO agreements but the Appellate Body has clarified this delicate 
balance and applied it in specific cases.  In line with the common intentions of the WTO 
Members, the Appellate Body, when interpreting and applying provisions of covered 
agreements leaves Members significant discretion to implement measures for the 
protection and promotion of these societal values and interests. 
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 The Appellate Body has gained significant stature as a result of its case law 
ensuring the fairness and effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system.  The 
agreement on the rules and procedures of WTO dispute settlement reached by the 
Uruguay Round negotiators and reflected in the DSU was a significant achievement.  
However, at the time of operation it was clear that the WTO dispute settlement had 
important gaps in the rules and procedures.  The rulings of the Appellate Body on issues 
such as burden of proof, judicial economy, the use of experts, the submission and 
admission of evidence, standard of review, terms of reference, third party rights, good 
faith in dispute settlement proceedings, and representation by private council, have made 
an important contribution to the fair and effective functioning of the WTO dispute 
settlement system.  It is important to note that the WTO Appellate Body is not without its 
critics and proposals to further strengthen the system and some specific examples will be 
further considered below.          
O. Potential appellate mechanisms in the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems 
Policies around the establishment of a WTO-type appellate mechanism, perhaps similar 
to the new CETA Appellate Tribunal, in both the ICSID and UNCTIRAL systems which 
follows a similar ICJ-type of judicial appointment mechanism would be an elegant 
solution to addressing concerns surrounding the integrity of ad hoc tribunals and the fact 
that both the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems do not currently offer potential users a 
review mechanism that considers substantive and legal issues.  It must be noted that 
although the ICSID allows for annulment of an award based on a claim of decision-maker 
corruption or lack of proper notice, this is done on an ad hoc basis and does not rise to the 
level of the WTO Appellate Body mechanism.  In the ICISD the administration of the 
annulment procedure is conducted by the Administrative Council of ICSID which 
appoints an ad hoc committee to consider the very limited grounds for annulment under 
Art. 52(3).  As current ICSID annulment stands, the remarkable situation may arise where 
there is an original arbitration, then the proceedings before an ad hoc committee relating 
to annulment, then the annulment of part of the original award, the reference of the 
annulled part of the original award to a new ad hoc arbitral tribunal, followed by 





both to the surviving part of the original award and to issues before the new tribunal are 
not necessarily binding on the parties and can be re-opened.  This eventuality, stemming 
from the fact that all tribunals in the ICSID system are ad hoc with little coordination is 
worrisome and could be addressed by the establishment of a permanent substantive 
appeals mechanism.      
Interestingly, while the UNCITRAL Rules do provide clarification on the causes 
for a party to contest the enforcement of an award, tribunal corruption, impartiality or 
adequate notice are not included among them.  In general, the UNCITRAL and ICSID 
systems establish a one-tiered system where awards are automatically considered final, 
subject to very limited grounds to contest enforcement.   In contrast, proceedings in 
domestic courts for example are a matter of public record, the public can have access to 
the pleadings, judges are neutrally rostered and parties have the clear right to appeal.  
UNCITRAL and ICSID arbitrations lack such basic accountability mechanisms. In any 
legitimate process making decisions that weigh private against public interest, tribunals 
must be accountable for what they do and therefore the establishment of an appellate 
mechanism for the UNCITRAL and ICSID systems would be useful.  
With respect to UNCITRAL Article 34, Application for setting aside as exclusive 
recourse against arbitral award, the case Apa Insurance Co. Ltd v. Chrysanthus Barnabas 
Okemo827 and courts in numerous other jurisdictions have made clear that setting aside 
proceedings are not appeal proceedings in which evidence is re-evaluated and the 
correctness of the arbitral tribunal’s decision on the merits is examined.  The underlying 
rationale for that approach is that the arbitral tribunal decides in place of the State court 
and does not merely constitute a first instance.828  In describing the nature of setting aside 
proceedings, the Spanish court in Sofia v. Tintoreria Paris, held that the “applicable 
review in annulment proceedings is that of an external trial … in such a way that the 
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competent court examining the case solely decides on the formal guarantees of the 
proceedings and the arbitral award, but cannot review the merits of the matter.”829    
As the UNCITRAL system does not contemplate the review of an award its 
merits, parties are left to resort to domestic courts to address the national enforcement of 
UNCITRAL decisions, thereby instilling in them a type of supervisory jurisdiction.  
However, the disparity found in national laws with respect to a party’s options or 
recourse against an arbitral award underlies a major obstacle in the harmonization of 
international arbitration legislation.  With respect to domestic court’s review of 
international arbitration cases, there emerges a pattern to the readiness of domestic courts 
and other national supervisory bodies to interfere with awards on the grounds of error of 
fact or law or on the grounds of implementation of the initial arbitration agreement, 
including jurisdiction and procedural fairness.  In general most domestic courts treat any 
type of review of the merits of the case as off limits and are only willing to consider 
issues around basic procedure and case management.  This situation then leaves parties to 
the UNCITRAL system without any meaningful type of substantive review mechanism.   
In English Law the provisions of the 1996 Arbitration Act illustrates the tension 
between the review of issues of law and fact.  The 1996 Act makes no distinction relevant 
for present purposes between domestic arbitrations and international arbitrations subject 
to the New York Convention which have their seat in England.  The key provisions of the 
1996 Act which involve the review of the merits of a case are to be found in sections 69 
to 70 which provide as follows: 
69(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may 
(upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a 
question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings. 
An agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal’s award shall be 
considered an agreement to exclude the court’s jurisdiction under this section. 
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(2) An appeal shall not be brought under this section except –  
 (a) with the agreement of all the other parties to the proceedings, or 
 (b) with the leave of the court. 
The right to appeal is also subject to the restrictions in section 70(2) and (3). 
(3) Leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied –  
(a) that the determination of the question will substantially affect the 
rights of one or more of the parties; 
(b) that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine;  
(c) that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the award –  
(i) the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously 
wrong, or 
(ii) the question is one of general public importance and the 
decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt,  and 
(d) that, despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by 
arbitration, it is just an proper in all the circumstances for the court to 
determine the question. 
(4) An application for leave to appeal under this section shall identify the 
question of law to be determined and state the grounds on which it is alleged that 
leave to appeal should be granted. 
(5) The court shall determine an application for leave to appeal under this section 
without a hearing unless it appears to the court that a hearing is required. 
(6) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court 
under this section to grant or refuse leave to appeal.  
(7) On an appeal under this section the court may by order –  
  (a) confirm the award; 





(c) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for 
reconsideration in light of the court’s determination, or 
(d) set aside the award in whole or in part. 
The court shall not exercise its power to set aside an award, in whole or in part, 
unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters in question 
to the tribunal for reconsideration. 
70 (1) The following provisions apply to an application or appeal under section 
67, 68 or 69(2) An application or appeal may not be brought if the applicant or 
appellant has not first exhausted –  
 (a) any available arbitral process of appeal or review, and 
(b) any available recourse under section 57 (correction of award or 
additional award). 
(2) Any application or appeal must be brought within 28 days of the date of the 
award or, if there has been any arbitral process of appeal or review, of the date 
when the applicant or appellant was notified of the result of that process.  
While on the surface it may appear that the English court is moving dangerously 
into the realm of a review of the merits of a case; however, in actually this situation 
demonstrates a compromise in that it is an attempt to preserve some method of the courts 
deploying the consideration of arbitration awards to achieve the further development of 
English law while at the same time establishing a protective barrier for the autonomy and 
independence of the arbitral tribunal in the area of consideration of the merits of the case.  
Thus, under English law, the appeal must be on a question of law and not fact.  In the 
result, the only permissible reference materials end up being the award itself and it would 
not be possible for the purposes of the court’s decision whether to grant leave to appeal to 
investigate the underlying evidence of the manner in which the arbitration or the hearing 
were conducted.  Importantly, section 69(2) provides that there can only be an appeal if 
either all parties agree or the court gives leave and 69(3) imposes for requirements for the 
giving of leave.  The court, before granting leave to appeal is therefore required to 





whether it is obviously wrong as a matter of law or whether the criticism raises a question 
of general public importance and the decision is open to serious doubt.  Further under 
section 70, the appellant must first exhaust any available arbitral process of appeal and 
must apply to the court within 28 days of the date of the award.  Interestingly, the 
reference to an arbitral process of appeal assumes the existence of a two-tier arbitration 
structure that already has a review mechanism.  As discussed above the UNCITRAL and 
ICSID systems are lacking this type of appellate mechanism.        
Similar to English law, most jurisdictions do not permit an appeal from an 
arbitrator’s award on the merits of the case.  In Switzerland there is no appeal on the 
merits of the case and disagreement as to whether the sections of the opinion containing 
reasoning on the merits should even be considered or reviewed.  In Hong Kong the 
UNCITRAL Rules have been adopted almost without variation and consequently no 
appeals on the merits are allowed in international arbitrations, although in domestic 
arbitrations appeals on issues of law only are permitted.  In France, appeals on the merits 
are also not aloud and the grounds for annulment are clearly set out in NCPC.ART.1502 
including that there was no arbitration agreement or that the agreement was void or had 
expired or that the award was contrary to public policy.  In the United States there is no 
ground of appeal in the merits area; however, manifest disregard for the law can form the  
basis of an appeal.  This, however, appears to involve the deliberate refusal to apply 
established principles of law rather than a mere error in application of the law.   
With respect to the ISCID dispute settlement mechanism, it is important to recall 
that the procedural regime and arbitration awards emanating from it are insulated from 
the supervisory jurisdiction of domestic courts all together.  In fact, domestic courts are 
limited only to the automatic recognition of ICSID awards.  In Societe Benvenuti & 
Bonfait v. Gouvernment de la Republique du Congo,830 the lower court granted 
recognition of an ICSID award against the People’s Republic of Congo, but qualified its 
decision by requiring the award creditors first to seek the court’s authorization if they 
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wanted to enforce the award against Congolese assets.  On appeal, this qualification was 
removed.  The Cour d’appel held that, in regard to ICSID awards, the function of the 
recognizing court is strictly limited to ascertaining the authenticity of the award as 
certified by the Secretary-General of ICSID, to the exclusion of any consideration of 
sovereign immunity.831  In following this decision, as soon as an ICSID award is 
recognized in accordance with the simplified procedure set forth in the Convention, the 
award becomes valid title on which measures of execution can be taken.  ICSID awards 
must be recognized with speed and without judicial interference. 
Further, annulment under the ICSID is a limited remedy – it is not a remedy 
against an incorrect decision and an ICSID ad hoc annulment committee does not have 
the power to reverse findings of fact or law or to conduct a substantive review of the case 
and does not have the powers of a court of appeal in the traditional sense.  Further 
troubling is the fact that ICSID annulment committee members, like the tribunal 
arbitrators whose work they are reviewing, are composed from essentially the same group 
of private lawyers and legal professionals and has no hierarchy over the initial ICSID 
tribunal.        
Another issue stems from the consensual nature from which both UNCITRAL 
and ICSID jurisdictions derive their authority.  Currently, as the respective systems stand, 
once the tribunal issues an award their jurisdictional mandate ends.  There is no clear 
power for the tribunal to consider amendments to the award once that award has been 
issued.  This could explain why in the UNCTRIAL system rights of a party to contest the 
enforcement and recognition of an award in a domestic court system are the focus rather 
than a party’s recourse to the tribunal of first instance.  This concern could be addressed  
by developing a clearly defined substantive appellate mechanism in both the UNCITRAL 
and ICSID systems and clarifying that once a case is submitted to either system the 
jurisdiction extends automatically to the appellate mechanism.  Alternatively, a 
substantive appeals mechanism could be available to parties as a choice at the time of the 







arbitration; however, this is not as an effective of a solution  because oftentimes at the 
time of drafting an arbitration agreement the need for an appellate mechanism is not 
considered in detail. 
P. ICSID’s Proposed Appellate Mechanism 
In October 2004, ICSID’s Secretariat proposed an appellate mechanism.832  Justifications 
included efficiency and economy, as well as coherence and consistency in ICSID case 
law.  The Secretariat suggested that investor-state dispute settlement would be best 
served by ICSID offering a single appeal mechanism as opposed to multiple treaty-based 
mechanisms.833  The secretariat further explained that a formalized appeals facility would 
expand the scope of review of ICSID awards from any of the five grounds for annulment 
as set out in ICSID Convention Article 52, to also include review of the substantive 
correctness of an award from a broader perspective.834  This is a significant advancement 
for the ICSID and would have the potential to quickly address many of the concerns 
highlighted above. 
 
With respect to the design of the proposed ICSID Appeals Facility, the 
Secretariat recommended that the appeals panel be composed of 15 persons elected by 
the Administrative Council of ICSID on the nomination of the Secretary General of the 
Centre.  The terms of the panel members would be staggered, having eight of the first 15 
serve for three years, while all the others serve six-year terms.  With respect to the 
qualifications of the members of the Appeals Panel, the Secretariat recommended that 
they have “to be persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, 
international investment and investment treaties.”835  Interestingly, the footnote at this 
section of the Discussion Paper references the suggested requirements applicable to 
members of the WTO Appellate Body.  The Secretariat continues to recommend that 
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unless disputing parties agree otherwise, each case submitted to the appeals facility 
would be herd by three of the fifteen appellate panel members, another similarity to the 
WTO Appellate Body.  The Secretariat continues to propose that under the possible 
Appeals Facility Rules, the appeal tribunal might uphold, modify or reverse the award 
concerned.   
 
Irrespective of the fact that there was significant support to the concept of 
establishing an ICSID Appellate Facility, unfortunately on May 12, 2005, discussions 
related to the establishment of an appeals facility were indefinitely postponed for further 
study as it was decided that “it [would be] premature to attempt to establish such an 
ICSID mechanism” at this time.836  The issue of an ICSID Appellate Facility has not been 
revisited to date.   
 
Throughout the discussion paper the Secretariat did clarify that for a case to be 
considered by any ICSID Appeals Facility submission to the appellate process must be 
clearly articulated in the original agreement between the parties.  Further, the 
recommendations of the Secretariat on procedure in an appeals facility echoed the ICSID 
rules on the initial adjudication of the case, reserving much discretion to the individual 
parties to tailor procedures and details of the management of the case to the needs of the 
parties.  It is the contention of this paper that this is a risky mistake because any type of 
appellate facility should be designed to be significantly different from the court of first 
instance with significant independence for the purpose of catching and addressing the 
mistakes that get through the first round of consideration of the case.  Again, the WTO 
Appellate Body provides an effective example here in that it is much more court-like in 
comparison to the relatively free-flowing mechanism of consideration by at WTO panel.  
While it is more justifiable for the first review of a case to be more flexible, appellate 
facilities do not share the same luxury because they have a larger burden as the final 
safety net before enforcement of an award.  While it is true that the ICSID dispute 
settlement mechanism is based on the concept of retaining significant flexibility for the 
 





parties and tribunal to specifically tailor procedure to the needs of the case, this is not an 
appropriate model for an appellate facility, nor should an appellate facility be bound to 
the same constraints as an initial tribunal.        
Q. Appellate mechanism in ICSID and UNCITRAL 
Interestingly, and similar to the situation in the WTO, the establishment of an 
UNCITRAL or ICISD appellate  mechanism would also be a bit of an afterthought.  This 
is not problematic, however, because similar to the WTO, the UNCITRAL and ICSID 
could establish a WTO-type of appellate body, and then give it the mandate to develop its 
own working procedure based on the current needs which could also develop as 
necessary over time.  According to the WTO DSU, “working procedures shall be drawn 
up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-
General, and communicated to the Members for their information.”837  In the context of 
the WTO, the adoption of the working procedures is therefore a matter for the Appellate 
Body itself.  The only procedural prerequisite is the consultation of the Chairman of the 
DSB and the Director-General, but not their approval or the approval of the DSB.  A 
potential UNCITRAL or ICSID appellate mechanism can easily follow the lead of the 
WTO Appellate Body and the initial mandate establishing an UNCITRAL or ICSID 
appellate mechanism could provide for judicial-type proceedings and a court-like appeals 
body.  The appellate process could be mandated to have a high standard of practice, as 
compared with the more flexible standard of practice common to party-controlled 
tribunal  proceedings.  Further, and continuing with the WTO example, appeals could be 
limited to issues of law covered in the initial opinion and legal interpretations the initial 
tribunal develops.  Findings of fact by the initial tribunal could also be excluded from the 
scope of UNCITRAL or ICSID appellate review.   
R. Criticisms of the WTO Appellate System – nothing is perfect 
Textualism is the view that judges should settle disputes by looking at the original 
meaning of treaty provisions and textualists argue that the original meaning of treaty 
 





provisions must be determined by looking closely at the text.838  Textualists therefore 
focus the majority of their attention and analysis on questions of grammar, word 
placement, and dictionary definitions.  Textualism stands in sharp contrast to broader, 
more holistic approaches to interpretation such as structuralism and developmentalism, 
which take into account the underlying purpose that animates the document.839   
 
 With respect to the analysis of WTO jurisprudence, there is significant agreement 
that the Appellate Body takes a very textualist position in its reports, characterized by a 
focus on the words and structure of treaty provisions.  The full extent of the Appellate 
Body’s textualist approach is evident in the EC – Sardines case.840  This case involved a 
dispute between Peru and the European Communities (EC) over the labeling of sardines.  
A 1989 EC regulation provided that only fish of the species sardina pilchardus could be 
labeled and marked as “sardines.”  Peru exported other kinds of fish, and in particular 
sardinops sagax, which it desired to label as “sardines.”  Peru sued the EC in the WTO, 
claiming that the EC regulation violated the terms of the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement (TBT).  Peru pointed to a non-binding international standard, the Codex 
Alimentarius, which would allow sardinops sagax and other fish to be labeled as 
sardines.  The Appellate Body agreed with Peru, holding that the EC had violated the 
TBT by failing to use relevant international standards as a basis for its regulations.841 
 
 While the substance of the dispute was very technical, involving the proper 
designation of several genera of fish, the consequences of the decision were significant as 
this was the first time the Appellate Body had held that a technical regulation adopted by 
a member state was invalid because it was not in conformity with an explicitly non-
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binding international standard.  With this holding, the Appellate Body was in effect 
giving more weight to an international standard than that international standard itself 
claimed to possess.   
 
 Interestingly, the Appellate Body did not acknowledge the momentous nature of 
this decision, and rather its analysis focused on interpretations of treaty text and 
dictionary definitions.  One of the first questions posed by the Appellate Body was the 
proper definition of a technical regulation.  The text of the TBT stated that a technical 
regulation was a “[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics  or their related 
processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, 
with which compliance is mandatory.”  The Appellate Body interpreted this provision to 
mean that the document must (1) apply to an identifiable product, (2) lay down 
characteristics of the product and (3) make compliance with the product characteristics 
mandatory.842  Upon a review of the TBT agreement, one can see that the Appellate 
Body’s interpretation as not really an interpretation at all but merely a restatement of the 
text.  Further, this restatement does not offer further guidance to member states about the 
actual meaning of the text. 
 
 Another important section of the Appellate Body’s decision addressed whether 
the EC had used the Codex Alimentarius as a basis for its regulation.  The EC claimed 
that it had used the standard as a basis for its regulation, arguing that “as a basis” should 
be interpreted according to the basic structure of the text as a whole.843  The Appellate 
Body settled the matter by referring to the definition of “basis” in a variety of 
dictionaries.  First the Appellate Body pointed out that Webster’s Dictionary defines 
“basis” as “the principal constituent of anything, the fundamental principle of theory, as 
of a system of knowledge.”844  Second, the Appellate Body stated that the New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary provided further support by defining “basis” as “the main 
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constituent” and “[a] thing on which anything is constructed and by which its constitution 
or operation is determined.”845  Finally, the Appellate Body stated, “from these various 
definitions, we would highlight the similar terms ‘principal constituent,’ ‘fundamental 
principle,’ ‘main constituent,’ and ‘determining principle’ – all of which lend credence to 
the conclusion that there  must be a very strong and very close relationship between two 
things in order to be able to say that one is ‘the basis for the other.’”846  The Appellate 
Body concluded this discussion by holding that the EC had not used the Codex 
Alimentarius as a basis for its regulation.847   
 
 Based on these arguments the Appellate Body arrived at the decision that 
domestic technical regulations must be consistent with even non-binding international 
standards in order to satisfy the requirements of the WTO treaty.  This is a significant 
shift in the binding power of international law and was arrived at through a narrow 
textualist reasoning resting predominantly on definitions from dictionaries.  A few 
characteristics of the particular WTO version of textualism stand out in the EC- Sardines 
case.  The Appellate Body begins with a piece of the text, interprets it by restating the 
text, and then uses this interpretation to make a conclusion that was the very subject of 
the dispute.  Dictionary definitions of seemingly obvious terms are used to arrive at 
controversial holdings and the basic logic seems strained as the Appellate Body jumps 
from one self-evident statement to the next self-evident statement, arriving abruptly at a 
hugely consequential and controversial conclusion.  This propensity for seemingly 
arbitrary reasoning has the potential to be troubling. 
 
 Critics of the WTO case law have highlighted the failure of the Appellate Body 
to recognize the array of interests that are at issue and the potential consequences for the 
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system as a whole.848  They explain this shortcoming is based on the Appellate Body’s 
concern for its own legitimacy and its belief that close textual interpretation provides 
greater authority on Appellate Body opinions.849  Put another way, the Appellate Body is 
cautious about clearly explaining its real, closed door reasoning because it fears criticism 
that it is overstepping its limited mandate, that of resolving member state disputes.         
 
 Other common criticisms of the WTO Appellate Body include that there is no 
clear guidance on what standard of review the Appellate Body should apply when 
reviewing panel decisions, that the Appellate Body exceeds its mandate and acts too 
much like a tribunal of last instance or even a Constitutional Court and that the Appellate 
Body tends to lean towards judicial activism which puts the entire panel system at risk by 
undermining its decision authority and increasing incentives to appeal an unfavorable 
panel decision.  In practice, most all panel decisions are appealed which further 
undermines the authority of panels.  In some instances, the Appellate Body takes a 
custodianship approach toward panel decisions, at times implying ad hoc panels lack 
capacity to rule on their own.  One potential solution to strengthen the capacity of panels 
and the whole system in general would be the establishment of a permanent panel body 
instead of the current system where panelists are appointed ad hoc, discharging their tasks 
on a part-time basis and in addition to their ordinary duties.850  This model would 
arguably increase the capacity and quality of panel decisions but to date, no significant 
action has been taken in this regard.        
 
 The WTO Appellate Body certainly has a difficult task.  In comparison with the 
other existing appellate review systems in international law it is unique with regard to the 
regular use made of it and the sophistication of its case law.  The WTO Appellate Body is 
a standing judicial body that has an essential role in maintaining the credibility and 
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reliability of the WTO dispute settlement system, without which the WTO dispute 
settlement system might not have survived.  While it is clear that the WTO Appellate 
system is not without critics or faults, it does provide a practical example to the ICSID 
and UNCITRAL of a successfully negotiated international appellate mechanism upon 
which to potentially base their own appellate facilities.  Given that recent bilateral free 
trade agreements are resorting to developing their own substantive appellate mechanisms 
similar to that of the WTO Appellate Body, the time is ripe for international dispute 
settlement more broadly to adopt policies to include a substantive approach to appeals.     
Chapter 9     Policies to consider past precedent in making future decisions 
 
Precedent presents a particular challenge in the context of international law.  As a matter 
of doctrine, past judicial decisions are not automatically considered to be law; however, 
international precedent is commonly referred to.  From international investment to 
international criminal law, prior decisions are invoked, argued over and applied by 
practitioners and by tribunals all the time.  An initial example can be taken from the 
International Court of Justice which has consistently cited its own judgments and 
advisory opinions over the years.   
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ identifies “judicial decisions” together 
with “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” as 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”  According to Article 59 of the 
ICJ Statute, decisions are  binding only in the relation between the parties and only in the 
case in question.  This interpretation was followed by the court in the Barcelona Traction 
case, where the ICJ even refused to refer to invoked arbitral decisions, noting that they 
could not ‘give rise to generalization going beyond the special circumstances of each 
case.’851 The Court has since progressed, changed its approach and in 1953 it relied for 
the first time on the decisions from over a century earlier on the Alabama Claims case, 
which it credited with establishing the principle from which all tribunals have 
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‘competence-competence.’852 The Court again in 1982 referred to the decision rendered 
in 1977 on the delimitation of maritime boundaries between France and the United 
Kingdom in the Irish Sea, and partially employed the method followed by the arbitral 
tribunal.853 In the last several years, these references to past precedent have significantly 
increased, for example in the delimitation of borders in the Gulf of Fonseca,854 between 
Bahrain and Qatar,855 Malaysia and Indonesia,856 and Cameroon and Nigeria.857 
 With regard to reference to general international law in international arbitration, 
numerous statutes refer to it in one way or another and there is noted desire to apply this 
law broadly.858 A particular example can be found in the WTO Appellate Body’s first 
decision where it noted that the General Agreement ‘is not to be read in clinical isolation 
from public international law.’859 Similarly, the European Court of Justice reiterated that 
the ‘European Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers.’860 
The European Court of Human Rights also reiterated that in interpreting the European 
Convention on Human Rights ‘it must also take into account any relevant rules and 
principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties.’861  
In practice, common principles are referred to by both judges and arbitrators in numerous 
references to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and to 
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decisions of the International Court of Justice conferring a customary character to the 
disposition of these Articles.  There are also a large number of judgments and arbitration 
decisions that rely on precedent from the Permanent Court of International Justice or 
from the International Criminal Court concerning the responsibility of States.862  
Among the most common justifications for treating precedent as an important 
factor in future decision making is the argument on fairness, equity or basic justice and 
the concept of “treating like alike.”863 A failure to treat similar cases similarly is 
traditionally argued to be arbitrary and consequently unjust and unfair.  A legitimate legal 
system achieves fairness by decision making rules designed to achieve consistency across 
a range of decisions.   
 Predictability is another important reason to establish a system with strong 
adherence to precedent.  When a decision maker is tasked to decide a particular case in 
the same way as the last, parties will be better able to anticipate the future.864  The ability 
to reasonably predict what a decision maker will do helps potential parties to plan their 
strategy without significant fear of the unknown.  Predictability comes at a price 
however, and is only achieved through reducing the ability to adapt to the future.865  In 
the language of precedent, following a precedent at a particular time may produce a 
decision that is not optimal based on the facts of the particular case.   
 Efficiency is another argument in support of a system with strong precedent.  
Strong precedent allows less reconsideration of questions already considered than if there 
was not rule of precedent.  If the goal is to reduce the number of individual decisions 
adjudicators are required to take, the efficiency argument then goes a long way to support 
a system of precedent.   
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A. What is precedent? 
What does it mean for a past event to be precedent for a current decision? And how does 
something done today establish a precedent for the future? Can decisions really be 
controlled by the past but still be responsible to the future?  Interestingly, arguments 
based on precedent must first look backward and consider the past.  The traditional view 
of precedent, both within and outside of the law, tends to be focused on the use of 
precedent from yesterday to drive the decisions of today and tomorrow.  Importantly, an 
argument based on precedent must also look forward and take responsibility for the fact 
that decisions made today will set a precedent for individuals making decisions 
tomorrow.  This is a big responsibility, particularly in the international context which is 
free from the established cannons of interpretation similar to those found in national 
settings.  
At its heart, the term stare decisis can be defined in a simple way and means to 
stand by decided cases, to maintain former adjudication and to uphold precedents.  Stare 
decisis operates to promote system-wide stability and continuity by ensuring the 
establishment of norms and their survival.  Stare decisis reflects values that are 
fundamental to the legal process and the historical tension between change and stability 
within the common law.  In the context of the United States legal system, such norms are 
viewed as fundamental and include the freedom from racial discrimination by the 
government, the general reach of the commerce clause, and even the legality of paper 
money.866 
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English courts began to develop 
"a qualified obligation to abide by past decisions."867 At the beginning of the eighteenth 
century William Blackstone noted "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, 
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where the same points come again in litigation."868 Blackstone outlined many of the same 
policy concerns modern writers use to justify stare decisis.  He thought litigants would 
need to rely on precedent, having a system of precedent would increase the credibility of 
the court, and precedent  would increase stability because the law would not change too 
rapidly.869  
At the end of the eighteenth century, the English courts and commentators firmly 
established the doctrine of stare decisis.870  Courts would follow prior precedent when 
promulgated by a superior court, the House of Lords would follow its own prior 
decisions, and the Court of Appeals would usually follow the past decisions of both the 
specific court the case was in front of and other coordinate courts of the same level.871 
There were three limits on the doctrine: (1) the rule would not be followed if it were 
"plainly unreasonable" or (2) courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions, 
and (3) the binding force of the decision was the actual "principle or principles necessary 
for the decision," not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.872  The American 
Founders expressed similar attitudes towards stare decisis and were certain it was 
necessary but found difficulty in what it entailed and when it was appropriate for it to be 
abandoned.873   
In national legal systems, precedent constitutes a point to start for judges to 
develop their reasoning.  Commonly, judges hold close to precedent to ensure legal 
certainty and in concern for the fact that their decisions might be challenged before 
higher level courts.  It is this conservative practice and approach that leads into the stare 
decisis rule concept in common law jurisdictions.  In international jurisdictions, the stare 
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decisis rule has been excluded; however, tribunals have commonly referenced their 
previous decisions.   
Any system of law requires a minimum of certainty, and any dispute settlement 
system must have some minimum degree of foreseeability.874  Further, these systems 
assume that persons in comparable situations are treated as comparable – again the equity 
components play a large role here.  Precedent plays an essential role for this and from the 
perspective of the parties to a dispute it is what ensures certainty and equality of 
treatment.  However, a blind practice of rigorously following precedent from the past is 
not an appropriate answer because it freezes the law and prevents it from progressing  
and responding to the new demands of society.  A balanced approach is necessary for 
both the judge and arbitrator between necessary certainty and the necessity for evolution 
in the law.    
 In principle, in civil law jurisdictions the situation is rather different and in these 
situations the judge fulfills a different role and he is not allowed to create law.  An 
example is in France as Article 5 of the Civil Code forbids judges to proceed by way of 
arret de reglemant, therefore preventing the judge from establishing a general rule in a 
specific proceeding.875 
 The concept of consistent interpretation with respect to WTO law is relevant 
here.  In the context of seeking guidance on the interpretation of national or regional law 
and where that law allows for different interpretations, that national and regional law 
should be construed as much as possible in a way that is consistent with international 
obligations.876 Given the institutional backing of the WTO and its associated 
jurisprudence in this context, WTO law provides a strong foundation from which 
guidance can be found to ensure the consistent interpretation of national and regional law.  
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Because the WTO rules tend to be more detailed than relevant national provisions, they 
can be used to provide significant guidance on the interpretation of relevant national and 
regional law in a way that contributes to consistency and therefore precedent.  ICSID and 
UNCITRAL dispute settlement systems do not share this level of legitimacy on the 
international context.  In the context of WTO dispute settlement, the concept of 
consistent interpretation can assist WTO members; however, limitations are encountered 
where phrasing and word usage of domestic law cannot be found compatible with 
relevant WTO provisions or case law.877   
B. How is precedent applied? 
Why is it that some decisions carry precedent and others do not?  This distinction can 
only exist if there is some way of identifying a precedent and a method to determine 
whether an event of the past is adequately similar to the present facts to justify essentially 
merging the two events into the same line of reasoning.  No two situations can ever be 
exactly alike.  For a decision to form a precedent for another decision it does not require 
that all the facts of the earlier and latter cases be identical; however, it becomes a value 
judgment for the decision maker to determine when following precedent is appropriate, 
but how is this done?  
In order to assess what is a precedent for what, the decision maker must engage 
in a determination of the relevant similarities between the two events.  This becomes a 
judgment analysis and the rules of relevance are what guide this determination of the 
precedential from the irrelevant.  Precedent relies upon such rules and these rules 
themselves are contingent upon time, context and culture.878  It is important to note here 
that conducting the precedent analysis requires the decision maker to consider the 
precedential effect in the future, or to worry that a specific future event will be analogized 
to the case of today.  This therefore assumes that there exists some rule of relevance.  
However, at this point in the decision making process, rarely does the decision maker 
tend to expect that the same facts will occur again.  The more common thought is that this 
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decision will establish a precedent for some different array of facts, one that contains 
some points identical with the facts currently under consideration.879   
C. Potential concerns in applying precedent 
In order to consider the degree of value reliance on precedent brings to a dispute 
settlement system it is essential to look at the consequences of adopting a system of 
precedent.  A significant consequence to precedence is that a decision maker constrained 
by precedent will feel sometimes compelled to make a decision contrary to the one she 
would have made had there been no precedent to be followed.880  Even without an 
existing precedent, the decision maker must acknowledge that future decision makers will 
look at  their decision of today as precedent.  This responsibility has the potential to limit 
considerably possible decisions about the case at hand.   
If the future is constrained to treat what we do now as binding precedent, then 
our current decision must judge not only what is best for now, but also how the current 
decision will affect the decision of other and future cases.881  Moreover, the decision 
maker of today must also consider the best option for some different but similar events to 
come tomorrow.  The decision maker must then decide on the basis of that which is best 
for all possible cases in the future - today's decision makers are obliged to decide not only 
today's case, but tomorrow's as well.882   
When the best solution to the case of today is the same as the best solution for 
tomorrow's different but similar facts, no problem arises.  However, when the situation 
occurs where what is best for today's situation might not be best for a different situation, 
then the need to consider the future as well as the present will result in at least some 
decisions taken that are not ideal.883  Accepting the limitations of precedent therefore 
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requires taking into consideration broad spectrums of instances that are wider than the 
one immediately before the decision maker.  This results in the fact that in some cases 
decisions will be taken that are less than optimal had that case been considered alone.   It 
therefore becomes clear that adopting a strategy of reliance on precedent is inherently 
risk averse, in that it requires the giving up of the possibility of the optimal result in every 
case in exchange for diminishing the possibility of bad results in some cases.884  Further, 
if the conclusions of one case apply to a wide set of analogies, and such analogies are 
encouraged by the system to be made by the decision maker, then the constraints of 
precedent are reasonably significant.  For better or worse, the original decision maker 
will feel a greater obligation in making a decision with such far-reaching implications; 
but similarly, a broad set of future decision makers will also feel the impact of the initial 
decision.  Reasonably then, the larger the group of cases that the initial decision maker is 
in effect deciding, the more constraining will be the requirement to address all of those 
cases similarly.  Taken in the reverse, if the scope of cases affected is relatively small, the 
decision maker needs to only consider a few cases beyond the current case and therefore 
the constraints of precedence will be rather small. 
D. WTO and an inconsistent approach to prima facie standard in  
jurisprudence885 
In WTO dispute settlement the strict application of a prima facie case places upon the 
complaining party the burden of proof and requires that, to satisfy the prima facie 
standard, that party must provide evidence which discharges the burden such that in the 
absence of evidence in rebuttal, the decision-maker must determine the case in its 
favour.886    
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 Although not the traditional method of applying the prima facie standard and the 
burden of production, the Appellate Body through case law, has utilised the concept of a 
prima facie standard to set the duty on the party who must satisfy the decision-maker that 
it is entitled to succeed in its complaint. The Appellate Body tends not to make a clear 
distinction between the burden of persuasion and the burden of production, and further 
seems to focus mainly on the burden to meet the prima facie standard, a concept unique 
to WTO jurisprudence which diverges from traditional interpretations of the various 
burdens of proof. Therefore, a complaining party that is unable to present the prima facie 
case runs the risk of failure.   
  
 Conversely, a defending party that believes the complaining party has not met the 
prima facie standard and, as a result, decides to forgo presentation of a defence also risks 
failure. In practice, however, both parties undertake to present cases which not only meet 
the prima facie standard as the burden of proof, but which meet the ultimate standard of 
proof, or the burden of persuasion, for their particular claims. This tendency for parties to 
undertake to present cases which meet the burden of persuasion, combined with the fact 
that procedurally there is no opportunity for the WTO panel to transparently consider and 
communicate to the parties the outcome of the application of the prima facie standard, 
along with inconsistency in WTO Appellate Body case law on this subject that ultimately 
leads to the confusion which surrounds the burden of proof issue in WTO dispute 
settlement and highlights the importance of consistency.  
  
 At this point, a review of WTO jurisprudence related to the prima facie standard and 
burden shifting is necessary, particularly as no such analysis exists in UNCITRAL or 
ICSID jurisprudence.  The WTO approach to this subject, and the inherent complexities, 
is important also because the fundamental principles and reasoning applies to the analysis 
undertaken by UNCITRAL and ICSID tribunals as well.  Although the UNCITRAL and 
ICSID systems take approaches that are significantly different from that of the WTO, 
because all international dispute settlement systems are undertaking to dispense justice 
they must be held to an international standard to secure legitimacy.  Further, the approach 





directly correlates to how a party will prepare their case and to whether a party has been 
given adequate opportunity to be heard and present their case.       
 
The Appellate Body's holding in EC – Hormones887 serves a dual purpose: first, 
to clarify its intention regarding the application of the prima facie standard to burden 
shifting in all cases, and second, to clarify that a prima facie case must be established 
before a responding party is required to rebut.  
 
According to the Appellate Body, it follows that whether the defending party is 
able to refute evidence presented by the claimant should have no effect on the initial 
determination of whether the complainant was able to satisfy the standard of proof, i.e. 
establishing a prima facie case. A failure by the defendant to adequately refute the prima 
facie case presented by the claimant will mean that the complaining party has 
successfully discharged its burden of proof or satisfied its burden of persuasion, but 
should have no effect on the initial determination of whether the complainant established 
a prima facie case in the first place. Otherwise, benefits from conducting the prima facie 
analysis seem to be of little consequence. 
 
At this point it is important to recall that although the Appellate Body in EC - 
Hormones explains that, procedurally under the Working Procedures in DSU Appendix 
3, a prima facie case must first be established before the responding party is required to 
rebut; however, because all arguments must be submitted at once, the respondent does 
not have time to begin preparation and presentation of rebuttal arguments and there is no 
time when the panel informs the parties of the outcome of the prima facie standard 
analysis. All submissions are made prior to the panel releasing its preliminary report.  
 
The prima facie analysis is therefore a purely internal analysis and this 
distinction that a prima facie case must first be established before the responding party is 
required to rebut, adds an additional layer of confusion to the burden-shifting analysis. 
 





Parties are required to address the prima facie analysis as a sub-section of their 
submissions along with the presentation of their entire case. This fact alone directly 
undermines the necessity and value-added from conducting the prima facie analysis.   
 
1. What evidence should be considered in determining whether the prima facie 
standard has been attained? 
The WTO DSU was not drafted to contain an explicit standard of review. The Appellate 
Body has explained, however, “that the issue of failure to apply an appropriate standard 
of review ... resolves itself into the issue of whether or not the panel . . . made an 
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the 
facts”888   While panels must employ DSU Article 11 which addresses the function of the 
panel, they have not developed the jurisprudence of its legal content. This task has been 
left to the Appellate Body as it decides claims where panels have failed to make an 
objective assessment of the relevant issues, as required by Article 11.889   There are those 
who consider regrettable the Appellate Body’s engagement in judicial law-making and 
that this translates into a form of judicial activism that strays from the boundaries of its 
institutional mandate. Others argue gap-filling and the clarification of ambiguity to be an 
intrinsic requirement to the Appellate Body’s interpretative role.890     
  
 Repeatedly, the Appellate Body has indicated that the burden of proof shifts to the 
other party once a prima facie case has been established by the complainant. The 
substantial investigative authority given to panels under DSU Article 13 cannot be used 
by a panel to rule in favour of a complaining party that has not first established a prima 
facie case of WTO inconsistency based upon specific legal claims asserted by it.891    
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 Regarding the elements necessary to meet the prima facie standard, the Appellate 
Body in US – Gambling explained “[t]he evidence and arguments underlying a prima 
facie case . . . must be sufficient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, 
identify the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and explain the 
basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure with that provision”892   However, the 
Appellate Body has not maintained consistency with respect to exactly what evidence 
should be considered by the panel in deciding whether a prima facie case has indeed been 
presented. Because the prima facie burden-shifting analysis is conducted internally by the 
panel after all evidence is submitted, panels have been known to consider outside 
information submitted by experts as well as arguments presented by opposing and third 
parties to the dispute.  
 
 The fact that panels consider information in addition to that provided by the 
complaining party seems to cut against traditional notions of a prima facie analysis for 
the purposes of the burden of production and the Appellate Body's determination in EC - 
Hormones that the burden of proof may shift only once the panel has conducted an 
analysis to determine that the requisite prima facie standard has been achieved by the 
complaining party.  
    
2. The WTO panel considering outside information when conducting the prima 
facie analysis 
As established in DSU Article 13, “Right to Seek Information”, a panel is entitled to seek 
outside information and guidance from experts and any other relevant source. However, 
as interpreted by the Appellate Body, the purpose of this mandate is only to help the 
panel to understand and evaluate the evidence submitted and the arguments asserted by 
the parties and this is not a mandate for the panel to make a case on behalf of a 
complaining party. Below is an analysis of the relevant WTO case law.   
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i. WTO Cases, Japan – Agriculture and Canada –Aircraft 
 
In February 1999 the Appellate Body in Japan – Measures Affecting Agriculture 
Products cited EC – Hormones to establish the prima facie standard and burden shifting. 
The Appellate Body then continued to explain that it is an abuse of authority for a panel 
to investigate under its own initiative and then to nevertheless rule in favour of a 
complaining party which fails to meet the prima facie standard. The Appellate Body thus 
indirectly imposed limitations upon evidence which the panel may consider during the 
application of the prima facie standard and the burden-shifting analysis. The Appellate 
Body explained: 
 
“[P]anels have a significant investigative authority. However, this authority 
cannot be used by a panel to rule in favour of a complaining party which has not 
established a prima facie case of inconsistency based on specific legal claims 
asserted by it. A panel is entitled to seek information and advice from experts and 
from any other relevant source it chooses . . . but not to make the case for a 
complaining party.893    
 
The Appellate Body continued:  
 
“The Panel erred, however, when it used that expert information and advice as 
the basis for a finding of inconsistency with Article 5.6, since the United States 
did not establish a prima facie case of inconsistency.894  
 
In Japan – Agriculture, the Appellate Body seems to be following the EC – Hormones 
interpretation of the prima facie analysis and burden shifting with respect to requiring a 
panel to begin the analysis of each legal provision by examining whether the complaining 
party has presented evidence and sufficient legal argumentation to reach the prima facie 
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threshold, or put another way, whether the complaining party has met its burden of 
production. This is consistent because outside information that is not presented by the 
complaining party should not be considered by the panel when applying the prima facie 
standard to the shifting of the burden of proof. This is also consistent with traditionally-
accepted interpretations of a prima facie standard and the burden of production and 
makes a clear difference between the burden of production and the ultimate burden of 
persuasion.   
 
In a later opinion, however, the Appellate Body directly reversed itself with 
respect to restraints upon a panel regarding evidence it considers during the application of 
the prima facie standard to burden shifting. In August 1999, the Appellate Body in 
Canada – Measures Affecting The Export of Civilian Aircrafts determined that a panel is 
free to request and consider information from parties or anyone else, and specifically the 
panel is under no obligation to wait until the complaining party presents a prima facie 
case before it is able to conduct its own investigation. Furthermore, the Appellate Body 
explained that outside information requested at the prerogative of the panel may indeed 
be necessary for the panel to determine whether the complaining party has presented a 
prima facie case: 
“[A] panel is vested with ample and extensive discretionary authority to 
determine when it needs information to resolve a dispute and what information it 
needs. A panel may need such information before or after a complaining or a 
responding Member has established its complaint or defence on a prima facie 
basis. A panel may, in fact, need the information sought in order to evaluate 
evidence already before it in the course of determining whether the claiming or 
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 Additionally, in paragraph 194 of the Canada – Aircraft report, the Appellate Body 
declared itself consistent with its holding in Japan – Agriculture. However, this is not 
clearly apparent because the Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft seems to have 
contradicted its statements in Japan – Agriculture with respect to a panel's ability to 
freely conduct an independent investigation during the application of the prima facie 
standard for the purposes of the burden of production. Moreover, it would seem that the 
Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft has diverged from its initial interpretation of the 
prima facie standard as applied to burden shifting, namely that it is for the complaining 
party alone to carry the initial burden of proof (recall that this interpretation was 
advanced by the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones and upheld by it in Japan – 
Agriculture).  
 
 If a panel is free to seek outside information to assist it in the analysis of whether the 
prima facie standard has been met by the complaining party, the value and necessity for a 
panel to consider whether a party has initially met the prima facie standard becomes less 
apparent. Additionally, allowing the panel to consider outside information cuts against 
traditional definitions of a prima facie standard as related to the burden of production. 
The Appellate Body thus seems to be creating its own novel version of a prima facie 
standard.  
  
3. The WTO panel considering argumentation of opposing parties when 
conducting the prima facie analysis  
Under the Working Procedures of DSU Appendix 3, because the panel process requires 
the parties to present all submissions, rebuttals, questions and answers, as well as to 
conduct all oral hearings before the panel releases its interim report to the parties, it is 
possible for the panel to consider the arguments of opposing and third parties while 
applying the prima facie standard to the burden-shifting analysis. This further undermines 
the necessity for the panel to apply the prima facie standard. If the panel does not 
constrain itself to the arguments of the complaining party when applying the prima facie 
standard, the utility of considering the prima facie standard in the first place is greatly 






i. WTO Cases, India – Quantitative Restrictions and EC – Bed 
Linen 
 
Confusion and inconsistency becomes further evident with the Appellate Body's 1999 
opinion in India – Quantitative Restrictions. In addressing whether the US reached the 
prima facie standard, the Panel followed the Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft and 
considered evidence provided by outside experts, in this case the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). However, the panel additionally considered rebuttal arguments provided by 
India in response to initial claims made by the United States. In reviewing the Panel's 
decision, the Appellate Body explained: 
 
“[T]he Panel did not explicitly find that the United States had made a prima facie 
case before it considered the answers of the IMF and the responses of India to the 
arguments of the United States. As mentioned above, the Panel stated that it 
would consider the position of the United States in light of India”.896    
 
The Appellate Body continued: 
  
“We do not interpret the above statement as requiring a panel to conclude that a 
prima facie case is made before it considers the views of the IMF or any other 
experts that it consults. Such consideration may be useful in order to determine 
whether a prima facie case has been made. Moreover, we do not find it 
objectionable that the Panel took into account, in assuming whether the United 
States had made a prima facie case, the responses of India to the arguments of the 
United States.897 
       
 
896 Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions On Imports Of Agricultural, Textile 
And Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R (23 August 1999) para. 141.  





In addition the Appellate Body in the 2003 EC – Bed Linen case also held that all 
submitted evidence should be considered by a panel during the analysis of the prima facie 
standard and burden shifting. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's decision and 
explained: 
 
“India asserts that the Panel should have shifted the burden to the European 
Communities once India had established a prima facie case. There is nothing in 
the Panel's reasoning, however, to suggest that the Panel premised its ultimate 
conclusion on whether or not India had presented a prima facie case. From our 
perspective, the Panel assessed and weighed all the evidence before it – which 
was put forward by both India and the European Communities – and, having 
done so, ultimately, was persuaded that the European Communities did, in fact, 
have information before it on all relevant economic factors listed in Article 3.4 of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.898 
 
The Appellate Body in EC – Bed Linen seems to be advocating a more liberal 
approach to a panel's investigative authority. Moreover it appears to be moving away 
from its original concept of the prima facie burden-shifting doctrine, something more 
similar to the burden of production, as supported in EC – Hormones, to a more complex 
type of prima facie consideration where all evidence is considered, similar to the ultimate 
burden of persuasion, as advanced by it in Canada - Aircraft. The Appellate Body in EC 
– Bed Linen continued: 
 
“India has not persuaded us that the Panel in this case exceeded its discretion as 
the trier of facts. In our view, the Panel assessed and weighed the evidence 
submitted by both parties . . . It is not "an error, let alone an egregious error", for 
the Panel to have declined to accord to the evidence the weight that India sought 
to have accorded to it. We, therefore, reject India's argument that, by failing to 
 
898 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties On Imports Of Cotton-





shift the burden of proof, the Panel did not properly discharge its duty to assess 
objectively the facts of the case as required by Article 11 of the DSU.899     
 
4. The confusion and problems created 
Confusion and inconsistency is apparent in the different methods that the Appellate Body 
uses to define and apply the prima facie standard to the burden of proof-shifting analysis. 
In India – Quantitative Restrictions and EC – Bed Linen the Appellate Body seems to 
advocate that a panel conduct its own analysis considering all evidence presented 
simultaneously, in line with Canada - Aircraft, rather than conducting an analysis of the 
prima facie standard and burden shifting where a panel initially limits itself to the 
consideration of evidence proffered by the complainant, as was previously advanced by 
the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones and US – Shirts and Blouses.  
 
However, the Appellate Body does still find value in the original analysis of the 
prima facie standard and burden shifting as is evidenced by its continued practice of 
basing its definition of the prima facie standard and burden shifting upon the US – Shirts 
and Blouses and EC – Hormones standards. It would therefore seem prudent for the 
Appellate Body to clearly define requirements under the prima facie standard which 
reconcile the above-mentioned diverging case law.  
 
More recently, in the 2003 Japan – Apples and the 2006 US – Zeroing cases, the 
Appellate Body again addressed evidence considered by the panel in determining 
whether the prima facie standard had been met by the complaining party. In Japan – 
Apples, the Appellate Body cited and followed its previous holding in India – 
Quantitative Restrictions, reiterating that a panel should conduct its own analysis and 
consider outside information in determining whether a prima facie case had been 
presented by the complaining party. Again, this interpretation of the prima facie standard 
is inconsistent with traditional interpretations and with the holdings of the Appellate 
Body in US - Shirts and Blouses and EC - Hormones. The Appellate Body explains: 
 






“In order to assess whether the United States had established a prima facie case, 
the Panel was entitled to take into account the views of the experts. Indeed, in 
India – Quantitative Restrictions, the Appellate Body indicated that it may be 
useful for a panel to consider the views of the experts it consults in order to 
determine whether a prima facie case has been made. Moreover, on several 
occasions, including disputes involving the evaluation of scientific evidence, the 
Appellate Body has stated that panels enjoy discretion as the trier of facts;900 they 
enjoy "a margin of discretion in assessing the value of the evidence, and the 
weight to be ascribed to that evidence"901 
 
In US – Zeroing, the Appellate Body further reiterates, in line with Japan – 
Apples, Canada – Aircraft, India – Quantitative Restrictions and EC – Bed Linen, that a 
panel should conduct its own analysis considering all evidence presented by all parties 
before deciding whether prima facie has been reached: 
 
“[T]he panel rightly conducted its own assessment of the evidence and 
arguments, rather than simply accepting the assertions of either party.902   In 
doing so, the Panel took into account and carefully examined the evidence and 
arguments presented by the European Communities and the United States.903 
 
 
900Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 India), paras. 170, 177 and 180; Appellate 
Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 299; Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones para. 132; 
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II para. 140-142; Appellate Body Report, 
Korea – Dairy paras. 137-138.  
901 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting The Importation Of Apples, 
WT/DS254/AB/R  (26 November 2003) para. 166.  
902Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 166; and Appellate Body Report, Dominican 
 Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 82.  
903 Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations And Methodology For Calculating 





The Appellate Body seems to be thus instructing a panel to bundle all evidence put 
forward by both parties and outside experts, and then consider whether the prima facie 
standard has been reached by the complaining party, similar to that which would be 
conducted during the consideration of the ultimate burden of persuasion; rather than first 
constraining itself to the submissions of the complaining party for the purposes of the 
prima facie standard analysis and burden of proof shifting, which would be more similar 
to the burden of production.  
 
This method of evidence-bundling by the panel is actually favoured by the 
procedural structure of the panel process. Because all evidence is submitted by the parties 
before the panel releases its interim report, it stands to reason that the panel would have a 
natural tendency to consider all evidence presented when conducting every step of its 
analysis. To strictly apply to the prima facie standard the panel would first be required to 
exclude evidence not provided by the complaining party, apply the prima facie standard, 
then, regardless of the outcome from the application of the prima facie analysis, continue 
to consider all submitted evidence while weighing the merits of the case and considering 
the ultimate burden of persuasion. When considering the procedural aspects of the panel 
process, the strict application of the prima facie standard becomes, at best, cumbersome.      
 
i. WTO Case, US – Gambling 
 
Evidence-bundling by the panel is inconsistent with traditional interpretations of the 
prima facie standard as well as Appellate Body interpretations of the traditional prima 
facie standard as established by it in the US - Shirts and Blouses and EC – Hormones 
cases. It would be reasonable to conclude that the Appellate Body is simply moving away 
from the application of the prima facie standard; however, the 2005 US – Gambling case 
indicates that the Appellate Body intends to strictly enforce the requirement that the 





“Where the complaining party has established its prima facie case, it is then for 
the responding party to rebut it. A panel errs when it rules on a claim for which 
the complaining party has failed to make a prima facie case.904 
 
The Appellate Body continues:  
“. . .at a minimum, the evidence and arguments underlying a prima facie case 
must be sufficient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, 
identify the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and 
explain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure with that 
provision.905  
 
 Considering the above language from US – Gambling, it appears that in order for a 
panel to determine whether the complaining party has made a prima facie case, it is 
indeed necessary for it to constrain itself to the evidence and argumentation put forward 
only by the complaining party while conducting the initial analysis of the prima facie 
standard and burden shifting. In US – Gambling, the Appellate Body has returned to 
traditional interpretations of the prima facie standard, similar to the burden of production, 
as originally advanced by it in the US - Shirts and Blouses and EC – Hormones cases; 
however, in doing so, the Appellate Body has created inconsistency in the relevant 
jurisprudence which leads to substantial confusion, particularly in such a system as the 
WTO that places significant emphasis on precedent.  
 
ii. WTO Case, China - IP rights 
 
On 26 January 2009, the China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights (China - IP Rights) was released by the Panel. In China - IP 
Rights, the Panel considers the application of the prima facie standard and the 
complaining party's obligation to present prima facie evidence in sufficient amount so 
that particular claims may be brought.  
 
904 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 141.  






 In this case, China alleged that the United States failed to make a prima facie case 
with respect to its claim that copyright protection in China is contingent upon a review of 
the material's content. China explained that according to well-established Appellate Body 
interpretation, the complaining party must both properly assert and prove its claim and 
that should such proof be absent or deficient, then the responding party has no burden to 
progress with that particular claim. China explained that the complaining party must 
present and substantiate its prima facie case and that in the absence of evidence other 
than that which has been comprehensively rebutted, it cannot be held that the 
complaining party has met its burden.906  
 
 In considering this issue, the Panel in China - IP Rights explained that although the 
United States provided several exhibits, "the information in the exhibits would not 
necessarily have been sufficient and, even if it were, it would not be appropriate for the 
Panel to trawl them for evidence to which the United States did not refer to make the 
United States' case for it"907 The Panel continued by citing the precedent established by 
the Appellate Body in the US - Gambling case: 
 
“A prima facie case must be based on 'evidence and legal argument' put forward by 
the complaining party in relation to each of the elements of the claim. A 
complaining party may not simply submit evidence and expect the panel to divine 
from it a claim of WTO-inconsistency. Nor may a complaining party simply allege 
facts without relating them to its legal arguments"908        
 
 With this opinion, the Panel has continued in the same line as laid out by the 
Appellate Body in the US - Gambling case: in order for a panel to complete the 
determination of whether the complaining party has presented a prima facie case 
 
906 Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights ("China -IP Rights"), WT/DSU362/R, (26 January 2009). 
907 Ibid at para. 7.631. 





necessary to take the claim forward, the panel must constrain itself to the evidence 
presented by the complaining party. In the traditional context, the Panel has returned to 
the application of the prima facie standard as related to the burden of production.  
 
 Further, the Panel in China - IP Rights seems to take an additional step in restricting 
evidence which a panel may consider when conducting the prima facie analysis in stating 
that it is not sufficient for the complaining party to merely submit information and 
exhibits which it considers relevant to its case; however, the complaining party has the 
further obligation to present clear argumentation as to how and why the submitted 
evidence and exhibits bolster their claims and contribute to their presentation of a prima 
facie case. Although this concept was referred to by the Appellate Body in the US - 
Gambling case, the Panel in China - IP Rights presented this additional aspect with 
clarity.     
5. Attempts to reconcile WTO jurisprudence 
In considering all available WTO jurisprudence, it continues to remain largely unclear as 
to how the Appellate Body envisions a panel to conduct the analysis of the prima facie 
standard and its application to burden shifting. Is a panel justified in considering outside 
evidence and argumentation presented by both parties while conducting the analysis of 
the prima facie standard, as advocated by the Appellate Body in Zeroing, Apples, 
Quantitative Restrictions and Bed Linen, effectively treating the prima facie analysis as 
the analysis of the ultimate burden of persuasion? Or is a panel required to consider only 
evidence proffered by the complainant, as laid out by the Appellate Body in US - Shirts 
and Blouses and EC – Hormones and advanced by it in US – Gambling, therefore 
applying the prima facie standard consistently with the burden of production? The latter 
case is the more traditionally-accepted approach to an application of the prima facie 
standard. Clarification is necessary.   
  
 Appellate Body member Yasuhei Taniguchi explains that "the point in time at which 





normally mentioned in the panel reports"909   Taniguchi continues to explain that the 
"Appellate Body has found that a panel is not required to make a specific finding, in each 
and every instance, that a complainant has met its burden to establish a prima facie case 
in respect of a particular claim, or that the respondent has effectively rebutted a prima 
facie case."910   Moreover, Taniguchi explains that the Appellate Body has held that "a 
panel is not required to make a finding, either implicitly or explicitly, regarding whether 
the complainant has established a prima facie case before it examines the respondent's 
arguments and evidence . . . and it is clear that whether a prima face case has been made 
is normally determined when the proceedings are concluded, although the panel is not 
prevented from indicating at any time before the conclusion of the proceedings that, in 
the panel's view, the complainant has successfully made a prima facie case and the 
respondent should properly rebut"911     
  
 In following this line of reasoning, it would seem reasonable for a panel to conduct a 
non-transparent determination of whether the prima facie standard has been met when 
considering whether the complaining party has presented sufficient evidence; however, 
non-transparent determinations have negative effects and further contribute to diverging 
and inconsistent WTO jurisprudence because the panel is not required to clearly explain 
how it arrived at its conclusions regarding the prima facie standard. Hypothetically the 
panel may opt to adjudicate all the merits of the case first, come to a decision, and then 
during the drafting of the opinion go back and apply the prima facie standard with a 
predetermined outcome as a technicality. In this situation, no benefit is derived from 
considering the prima facie standard while substantial risk of confusion in the opinion is 
incurred. Additionally, the Appellate Body has not objected consistently when panels 
have overlooked the application of the prima facie standard altogether and instead have 
opted to consider all the evidence presented, or, in other words, resorted to the 
 
909 Yasuhei Taniguchi, “The WTO Dispute Settlement as Seen by a Proceduralist” (2009) 42 







application of a preponderance of the evidence standard.912   A traditional preponderance 
of the evidence standard entails the consideration of all submitted evidence and then 
renders a decision based upon which of the two parties provides evidence carrying the 
most weight913   
  
 In practice, although panels regularly adopt the language of the Appellate Body, at 
times they seem to only superficially consider the prima facie standard and burden 
shifting as described above. McGovern explains that in actuality, panels more often rely 
on a “weighing up of the evidence” approach, or a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, as demonstrated in Zeroing, Apples, Quantitative Restrictions and Bed Linen.914    
  
 Additionally, some panels have even avoided employing the language of the 
Appellate Body completely, thus denying that the prima facie standard exists at all.915   
Panels seem to use the preponderance of the evidence approach to bundle all the evidence 
presented by all parties and then use it to establish whether the proponent has 
successfully presented a prima facie case for the purpose of shifting the burden of 
proof.916   Moreover, panels then use this same evidence bundle to determine whether the 
proponent has discharged its obligation to satisfy the standard of proof in general, or met 
the ultimate burden of persuasion. As explained above, this evidence bundling by the 
panel is inconsistent with traditional interpretations of the prima facie standard as 
associated with the burden of production and undermines the necessity of applying the 
 
912 McGovern, Edmond, International Trade Regulation (New York: Globefield Press, 2006) 
2.23-75.  
913 Kazazi, supra note 228 at 24( indicates that the most common standard of proof applied in 
international tribunals is the preponderance of evidence standard). 
914 McGovern, supra note 924 at 2.23-74.  
915 Ibid.  
916 Cameron, James and Orava, Stephen J., “GATT/WTO Panels Between Recording and Finding 
Facts: Issues of Due Process, Evidence, Burden of Proof, and Standard of Review in GATT/WTO 
Dispute Settlement” in Weiss, Friedl (Ed) Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues 
& Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts & Tribunals (London: Cameron May, 





prima facie standard at all. McGovern explains, “if all the evidence has been considered 
then it is no longer meaningful to speak of a prima facie case”917    
      
Interestingly, given the significant reliance on precedence in WTO dispute 
settlement, combined with the very strong role of the Appellate Body in developing 
precedence, it is important to note that much of the confusion surrounding the prima facie 
standard during the preliminary analysis of burden shifting is from the Appellate Body’s 
inability to take a clear decision on the matter and maintain consistency over time.  This 
situation highlights the potential for an appellate entity to make a whole dispute 
settlement system more cumbersome.  
 
E. Current practice in UNCITRAL and ICSID 
As the WTO system has a strong tradition of respecting precedent which has gone a long 
way to solidify the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and this 
tradition can be an example for the UNCTIRAL and ICSID systems because currently the 
role of precedent is not clearly articulated within their respective jurisprudence.  The 
tribunal in the 2008 ICSID case Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of 
Guatemala,918 presented the ICSID position with respect to the binding nature of 
precedent when it clarified that “precedents (in ICSID case law) reflect the experience of 
recognized professionals in the field and draw their strength from their intrinsic merit and 
persuasive value rather than from their binding character.”919  This is a very different 
approach than that taken in WTO dispute settlement.  Ad hoc ICSID arbitration tribunals 
are established for each case and apply close to 3200 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
of varying quality and texts.  With respect to reference to past precedent for the ad hoc 
tribunals when attempting to apply the substantive rules which very significantly from 
BIT to BIT, the ICSID Convention and the Arbitration Rules contain no provision 
addressing the relationship between decisions of different ICSID tribunals or on the use 
 
917 McGovern, supra note 924 at 2.23-52.  
918 ICISD Case No. ARB/07/23, October 15, 2008.  





of case law as an interpretive argument. Further, limited to no guidance is provided with 
respect to the role of precedent relating to the ICSID rules themselves in procedural 
terms.  Ad hoc ICSID arbitration tribunals of first instance seem to be left on their own.   
An interesting contrast is with respect to ICSID annulment proceedings and the 
tides for establishing a system of precedent might be shifting towards recognition of its 
importance and intrinsic value. In this context, investment protection treaties vary in 
content and therefore do not allow for a strict precedential effect.  The specific wording 
of each treaty’s text must be considered and interpreted independently, leading to 
potential ambiguity and confusion.  In the 2011 case Continental v. Argentina,920 the only 
ICSID annulment decision rendered in 2011, the tribunal emphasized two aspects in the 
annulment process.  First, while it noted the limited function of an annulment committee 
(assessing only the legitimacy of the award rather than its correctness), the ad hoc 
committee noted that it is “to be expected that the ad hoc committee will have regard to 
relevant previous ICSID awards and decisions, including other annulment decisions, as 
well as to other relevant persuasive authorities.”921  In the view of the committee, the 
emergence in the longer term of a jurisprudence constant in relation to annulment 
proceedings “may be a desirable goal.”922    
 A main purpose of the ICSID system is to offer potential litigants an international 
dispute settlement mechanism that is more effective and predictable than the courts they 
would otherwise be faced within host countries.  As there is no way to appeal decisions 
of ICSID tribunals on substantive grounds, from the perspective of investors, an arguable 
main priority for ICSID tribunals should be to ensure consistency and predictability; 
however without clear adherence to precedent and previous case law, is this aspiration 
even possible? 
 
920 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on the Application for Partial Annulment of Continental 
Casualty Company and the Application for Partial Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 16 
September 2011, para 84. 
921 Ibid. 





 As the esteemed scholar Professor Schreuer has pointed out: 
Reliance on past decisions is a fundamental feature of any orderly decision 
process.  Drawing on the experience of past decisions plays an important role in 
securing the necessary uniformity and stability of the law.  The need for a 
coherent case law is evident.  It strengthens the predictability of decisions . . . 923   
 A number of ICSID decisions do contain general statements with regard to their use of 
case law as interpretative arguments but there is no clear and binding position.  One 
representative example can be found in the ICSID case ADC v. Hungary:924 
The Parties to the present case have also debated the relevance of international 
case law relating to expropriation.  It is true that arbitral awards do not constitute 
binding precedent.  It is also true that a number of cases are fact-driven and that 
the findings in those cases cannot be transposed in and of themselves to other 
cases.  
Further, many ICSID tribunals have pointed out that the issues under each case must be 
determined on their own merits and that the tribunals remain free to deviate from 
previous case law.925 The tribunal in ICSID case SGS v. Philippines, went so far as to 
argue that there is no good reason for allowing the first tribunal in time to resolve issues 
for later tribunals.926 This is a clear statement against the importance of precedent.  
Many ICSID tribunals have specifically deviated from previous ICSID case law.  
In his work, Professor Schreuer has identified four specific situations in which he found 
 
923C.H. Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, 
3(2) Transnational Dispute Settlement (2006) I. 
924 At para. 293.  See also Camuzzi v. Argentina 2, at para. 19, El Paso v. Argentina, at para. 39, 
SGS v. Philippines, at para. 97, Feldman v. Mexico, at para. 107, and Pan American v. Argentina, 
at para. 42. 
925 AES v. Argentina, at paras. 23-33, Bayindir v. Pakistan, at para. 76, Nul v. Egypt, at paras. 63-
64, and Metalpar v. Argentina, at para. 50.    





that “tribunals sitting in different cases have come to conflicting conclusions on identical 
questions.”927  Schreuer explained:  
in some cases tribunals did not follow earlier decisions but adopted different 
solutions. At times they simply adopted a different solution without distancing 
themselves from the earlier decision.  At other times they referred to the earlier 
decision and pointed out that they were unconvinced by what another tribunal 
had said and that, therefore, their decision departed from the one adopted earlier . 
. .928  
 An important question at this point is: what is the role of precedent in ICSID?  As 
a starting point it is important to recall that Article 53 of the Washington Convention 
which established the ICSID states that “the award shall be binding on the parties” and 
that the stare decisis rule is no more applied in ICSID than it is in other international 
jurisdictional instances.929 This weakness in jurisprudence is not ideal and becomes 
difficult to accept when identical issues, concerning the same State, are decided 
differently by different ICSID ad hoc arbitration tribunals, as was the exact situation in 
the case regarding the Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic.930  ICSID tribunals do 
seem to be slowly starting to make more reference to past case law than they did in the 
past however.   
Reference to customary international law in ICSID opinions could be another 
means for tribunals to contribute to predictability and uniformity of jurisprudence.  
ICSID tribunals are faced with the application of customary international law and general 
 
927 C.H. Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, 
3(2) Transnational Dispute Settlement (2006) I at 16-17.  See Aguas v. Bolivia, at paras. 276-279, 
CGE v. Argentina, at para 22, Mondev v. US, at para 69. 
928 Ibid.  
929 El Paso Energy International v. Argintine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15 27 April 2006, 
para. 39. 
930 ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, see also Enron v. Argentine Republic State, ICSID 





principles of law where there is a reference to such rules in a relevant treaty or BIT,931 
where the treaty does not address specifically the issue in question, and where customary 
international law replaces a clause in a treaty, for example it develops after the treaty has 
been concluded.932   
Currently, the only reference to customary international law and general 
principles of law under the ICSID Convention is the instruction that tribunals shall apply 
“such rules of international law as may be applicable” where the parties to the dispute 
have failed to agree on the rules to be applied.933  Further complicating the matter is the 
fact that there is no generally established distinction between customary international law 
and general principles of law.  ICSID tribunals tend to use customary international law as 
a separate basis and their use of such rules tends to depend heavily upon the arguments of 
the parties to the dispute.  ICSID tribunals  have tended to consider customary law in 
relation to a broad range of issues including: jurisdictional issues,934 procedural issues,935 
substantive issues,936 and issues concerning so-called “secondary rules of international 
law.”937   
 In general, ICSID tribunals tend to base their findings with regard to the 
existence and content of rules of customary international law on references to case law 
from the ICJ, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and arbitral tribunals, 
references to treaties, references to documents adopted by the International Law 
Commission, and references to the legal doctrine.  Where there is a reference to 
customary international law in a treaty in question, it could be reasonable to ask whether 
tribunals are to apply customary international law as it was at the time of conclusion of 
 
931 Mihaly v. Sri Lanka, paras 33 and 58. 
932 Ibid.  
933 ICSID Article 42(1). 
934CSOB v. Slovakia at para. 31; Maffezini v. Spain at para. 29. 
935 Gruslin v. Malaysia at para. 20; Camuzzi v. Argentina 2 at para 64. 
936 Feldman v. Mexico (award) at paras. 115 – 116; Tecnicas v. Mexico at paras. 116 and 139. 






the treaty or at the time of the dispute.  Statements in case law seem to indicate that 
tribunals generally prefer customary international law at the time of the dispute.  In 
Tecnicas v. Mexico, where the tribunal used customary international law to clarify the 
concept of indirect expropriation, it applied “customary international law, not as frozen in 
time, but in [its] evolution.”938 This is an important application of customary international 
law. 
One of the challenges facing the international legal community in the handling of 
case law will be obtaining the correct balance between civil and common law traditions 
and the determination as to how case law is to be weighed and selected to drive 
uniformity and predictability.  This challenge is significantly compounded when the 
impact and active role of domestic courts in UNCITRAL dispute settlement is 
considered.  Common law cases are much more discursive than civil law cases.  They 
often present the history of relevant case law as to thereby anchor the decision in 
historical legitimacy.  At the UNCITRAL trial level, opinions tend to contain exhaustive 
statements of the facts, largely to avoid the need for any retrial if a higher court reverses 
the decision on a point of law.    
In contrast to the common law approach, with respect to the UNCITRAL system, 
when considering the variety of approaches taken by national courts, be they common 
law or civil law jurisdictions, many cases considering UNCITRAL case law give very 
sparse reasoning for their decisions and often assert propositions in a conclusive rather 
than reasoned way.939  In practice, the effect of this limited case law is that rather than 
detailed presentation in legal commentary, it tends to be merely referenced in an 
occasional footnote.  Should more detailed presentation of tribunal legal analysis be 
presented in the holdings, the respective jurisprudence would be enriched and the weight 
of the legal culture surrounding the UNCITRAL system would be increased.940 Currently, 
 
938 At para. 116.  See also ADF v. US, at para. 179 and Mondev v. US, at para. 125. 
939 Bridge, Michael G., Issues Arising Under Articles 64, 72 and 73 of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods at 407. 





much of the case law from the UNCITRAL system cannot be discussed in any significant 
detail retrospectively simply because it actually says very little and is very much 
dependent upon the special facts of each case.    
F. The value of Consistency 
Hand-in-hand with considering the value of precedent comes the value of considering 
consistency.  Consistency is an essential component to the legitimacy of any dispute 
settlement mechanism because it contributes to the predictability of outcomes and 
enables potential parties to better understand what to expect during the preparation of and 
adjudication process for their case.  Consistency directly contributes to effective due 
process protections in that it enables parties to effectively understand the steps they need 
to take to be heard and effectively present their case.   
 
 Consistency can be treated separately from following precedent because in order to 
be consistent it is not necessary to have an established obligation that rises to the level of 
precedent; however, what is needed is the conscientious effort on the part of the decision 
maker to consider similar situations similarly.  A lack of consistency throughout the 
jurisprudence of any dispute settlement mechanism has the potential to create significant 
confusion that is detrimental.   
 
 The WTO has very developed jurisprudence and a clear approach to precedent.  
However, as demonstrated in the case study presented below in Annex 1, despite the best 
intentions to provide fully developed case law to supplement the rules as articulated in 
the WTO DSU, if consistency is not maintained by both the panel and the Appellate 
Body, significant confusion results.  See Annex 1 below for a case study considering the 
inconsistent approach in WTO jurisprudence towards the application of the prima facie 
standard.  This case study is intended to exemplify potential pitfalls that exist when 
consistency is not proactively maintained in the case law of an international dispute 
settlement system.  Given the significant reliance on precedence in WTO dispute 
settlement, combined with the very strong role of the Appellate Body in developing 





standard during the preliminary analysis of burden shifting demonstrates challenges faced 
by the Appellate Body in taking clear decisions that maintain consistency over time.  
 
When considering that the UNCITRAL and ICSID systems, in contrast to the 
WTO approach, do not rely on precedent and do not have anything that functions 
similarly to that of the WTO Appellate Body, in this specific situation with respect to 
consistency, perhaps theirs is the simpler path.  While the drafters of the ICSID 
Convention have been considering whether to develop and appellate mechanism, it will 
be important that they fully consider both the positive and negative aspects of such a 
change.     
G. Developing policy on consistent precedent 
Typically, as international dispute settlement tribunals, apart from the WTO Appellate 
Body, are constituted on an ad hoc basis for each individual arbitration, this lack of 
permanence can lead to judgments of variable quality.941  Further complicating matters is 
the fact that not all international dispute settlement mechanisms require their decisions to 
be made public and therefore the tribunals do not have through knowledge of all 
decisions previously rendered by that particular mechanism.  For this reason, in 
international arbitration precedent tends to be viewed with limited importance and as a 
result legal coherence and predictability sometimes suffer. 
As it is essential to due process for parties to be given adequate opportunity to be 
heard and present their case, it is important for there to be a degree of consistency and 
predictability to a dispute settlement system to enable a party to adequately anticipate 
how to effectively present the merits of their case and supporting evidence.  This is 
particularly highlighted in situations, such as in the UNCITRAL and ICSID, where 
procedures are laid out to ensure significant discretion is retained by the ad hoc tribunal 
and parties to the case at hand.  If discretion enables procedural aspects to change for 
 
941 Jan Paulsson, “The Role of Precedent in Investment Arbitration” in Katia Yannaca-Small, 






every case, then parties have nothing else to refer to during their preparations than the 
outcomes of previous cases and in particular the way similar issues were handled in the 
past.    
 Dispute settlement systems that maintain a high degree of tribunal discretion and 
flexibility, combined with an approach that does not strongly value the role of 
precedence, open themselves to criticism in that they do not adequately protect the due 
process of parties.  This results from the fact that if a party is not able to predict how their 
case will be handled by the decision makers, there is potential for their right to due 
process to be violated in that they will not know how to prepare their case effectively and 
will therefore not be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and present their case.          
While flexibility and tribunal discretion should not be eliminated entirely from 
the UNCITRAL and ICISD systems, and in fact it is these characteristics that oftentimes 
make UNCITRAL and ICSID dispute settlement attractive to parties, this discretion and 
flexibility should not be ad hoc or completely unbridled.  It is the uncertainty that comes 
from ad hoc and unbridled tribunal discretion and flexibility that directly contributes to 
the potential for violations of due process.  By developing policies that seek to 
institutionalize or at least take steps to increase the prominence of precedent, the 
UNCITRAL and ICSID systems would automatically provide guidance to future decision 
makers on how to exercise their discretion effectively and in a way that protects due 
process for the parities rather than endangering it.   
The question then becomes how should policies in the international community 
be developed to push the UNCITRAL and ICSID towards a more established tradition of 
precedent and consistency?  Would it be effective to simply draft a new rule that clarifies 
that past case law should be considered in future decision making?  Perhaps this would be 
something for a new appellate mechanism to undertake, similar to the approach taken by 
the WTO.  How will issues of differentiability due to the fact that cases tend to be highly 
tailored to their specific issues be addressed?  This will not be an easy or fast process.  





decisions firmly on precedent, the challenge will be about how to prevent inconsistencies 
in WTO jurisprudence from creating unintended confusion.   
        
Chapter 10       Policy options for the protection of due process in international 
dispute settlement 
 
The core purpose behind the development of policy options for the international 
community to consider to ensure the protection of due process in international dispute 
settlement when amending existing or establishing new international dispute settlement 
mechanisms, and this entire work more broadly, has been to analyze the motivations of 
parties in submitting their claims to international dispute settlement, to identify strengths 
and weaknesses in three specific international dispute settlement systems, and to develop 
practical policy options to address weaknesses identified and to eventually contribute to 
the systematic protection of due process and ultimately the overall legitimacy of each 
respective system.  We must recall that in the international context there exist no clear 
guidelines or a single body of common law to establish clearly what is required 
procedurally and systemically to ensure the effective protection of due process, 
particularly with respect to the right of a party to be heard and to fully present their case.  
Interestingly, we have seen that increased detail in dispute settlement rules and guidelines 
do not necessarily guarantee a perfect system and that similar challenges in this regard 
exist across systems with varying degrees of flexibility.   
 
While we have seen that flexibility of international dispute settlement systems 
and the ability to specifically tailor the procedures to the particular case at hand are 
underlying factors identified by potential parties as attractive when determining where to 
submit their case on the international stage, this flexibility must be balanced with the 
need to protect fundamental due process and the right for parties to be heard.  We must 
recall that while domestic jurisdictions grapple with the interpretation of fundamental 





more complex at the international level as a single international legislative authority does 
not exist to provide clarity.  Further, safeguards for the protection of due process found in 
national law derived from historical and societal influences and national public policy do 
not exist at the international level in a cohesive and easily digestible manner – arguably 
significantly weakening international dispute settlement mechanisms more broadly.      
  
Each of the above articulated policy options to support the protection of due 
process in the international context, when taken together have the potential to 
significantly bolster the legitimacy and rigor of the respective systems and highlights the 
importance of ensuring the equitable protection of each party’s fundamental rights.  
When considering more broadly the role of international dispute settlement and the 
increasing number of cases but also the increasing diversity of parties, from a public 
policy perspective, the need to ensure the protection of due process in the international 
environment becomes more urgent, particularly for parties lacking substantial experience 
litigating in this domain.  This becomes more apparent when parties from developing and 
least-developed countries attempt to pursue claims against larger, stronger and more 
experienced parties, inherent imbalances of power are therefore compounded.  The 
weaker and more inexperienced parties will be at a disadvantage as a result of the 
inherent complexities and uncertainties around due process protections linked to tensions 
between maintaining a degree of procedural flexibility and the need for parties to 
effectively be heard and present their case.  Such an unfortunate side effect could then 
contribute to undermining parties’ from developing and least-developed countries 
confidence in the whole concept of international dispute settlement.  We therefore run the 
risk of international dispute settlement becoming an option or playground only for the 
rich, powerful and experienced – this is not equity.       
Reference in Article 28.1(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice to 
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” has contributed to the 
development of rich international law and the demands of due process are present in 
relation to any decision made by an arbitrator or international decision maker during the 
adjudication of international dispute settlement proceedings.  Commonly, however, 





a rather threatening way, implying that if a decision maker does not accept their 
proposals on procedure the result would violate due process – such lawyers do not 
hesitate to draw attention to the consequences of a breach of due process.   
International decision makers, when faced with the harshness of potential 
violations of due process in this way, are forced to seek their own justification through 
case law from a variety of sources as there currently exists no single and universally 
accepted common law on international fairness and due process in international dispute 
settlement, be it commercial, interstate or private. While case law exists in the various 
relevant sectors, there is no single overarching agreement on a body of common law that 
brings them all together.  The proposed policy options for the protection of due process in 
international dispute settlement is an attempt to identify cross cutting systemic issues and 
propose possible solutions applicable to all types of international dispute settlement in an 
effort to strengthen the international dispute settlement system more broadly.  Strong 
international dispute settlement mechanisms will enable decision makers to better 
withstand pressures applied by overzealous attorneys.  The proposed policy options for 
the protection of due process in international dispute settlement seek to assist with 
strengthening these systems.       
CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout the process of developing policy guidance for the protection of due process 
in the international context, this work has sought to provide the international community 
with practical and effective options to consider when attempting to strengthen existing 
mechanisms or when establishing new systems for international dispute settlement.  
Based upon the analysis of how the three considered dispute settlement mechanisms 
address the protection of due process, the development of common rules relating to 
discovery in an effort to ensure that all evidence is made available to the decision maker 
is identified as the primary existing gap to be addressed. Additional policy options 
developed highlight the benefits of a clearly defined substantive appeals mechanism and 






This work seeks to encourage the international community to consider 
developing treaty or negotiation-based policy towards common practice related to 
discovery and the production of evidence.  In the context of the analysis of the ICSID, 
UNCITRAL and WTO systems, such policy could contain aspects that empower the 
respective parties to a case to seek out evidence from other parties but also from external 
sources.  In contrast to the German or civil law approach, where the adjudicator alone 
decides which documents to request, providing parties with the power to specifically 
request the production of documents would be a significant step towards ensuring that the 
trier of fact is fully informed before a decision is made.  In contrast to the approach taken 
in the United States, in the international context, a degree of restraint on the scope of 
potential discovery would be appropriate here.  In the United States, the fact that a party 
can request information through discovery that is not admissible in the particular case 
combined with the fact that the United States system allows for a party to request a broad 
spectrum of information, information that they are not required to describe with any 
degree of particularity, is too broad for an international dispute settlement setting, 
particularly for the WTO, UNCITRAL and ICSID systems considered here.  This 
unnecessarily broad scope to discovery would heighten the adversarial nature in a 
particular mechanism to a potentially undesirable level in the international context that is 
overall more diplomatic in nature.  
 
Reasonably limiting the scope of what is discoverable in the international dispute 
settlement context is feasible and can be as simple as clarifying in the policy articulation 
that the scope of information that is discoverable requires that the party requesting the 
information to be presented be familiar enough with that information to describe it in 
detail.  This could be achieved through policy requiring effective substantiation by the 
requesting party of discovery production.  This approach is based on the German system 
and follows the concept that a party should not be forced to provide evidence to make the 
case of their opposing party.  In requiring substantiation, the requesting party would be 





Additionally, in effect the substantiation requirement forces a degree of specificity upon 
the requesting party because in order to substantiate that evidence is needed, that 
evidence must be described with a degree of specificity.   
Another option to effectively limit the scope of discoverable information could 
be to limit discovery to the “discovery of admissible evidence.”  This is in sharp contrast 
to the United States approach where discovery is considered acceptable if it is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of other evidence that would be admissible and far 
more appropriate for the international context.  This limitation to discovery policy would 
significantly constrain the scope of discoverable evidence in that a party would only be 
able to request the production of evidence that would be admissible to the international 
dispute settlement mechanism they are participating in and not enable parties to request 
production of any information, admissible or not.  As established above, discovery can be 
a very powerful tool to ensure that the decision maker is fully informed before the 
decision is made; however, discovery without limitation has the potential for abuse, 
delay, unnecessary expense and a means to justify harassment and fishing expeditions.   
 
The decision maker simply cannot make a decision without sufficient evidence to 
educate themselves and upon which to base a decision.  We have seen that international 
dispute settlement mechanisms generally rely upon the parties to voluntarily provide all 
the evidence they need to justify a decision in their favour; however, this often results in 
gaps in the evidence base for a particular case.  Ensuring therefore that all evidence 
necessary to make a decision is made available to the decision makers through a system 
employing detailed discovery mechanisms becomes a very important component in 
ensuring the full extent of due process protections to the parties.  In effect, the decision 
maker must have the ability to engage in effective evidence-based decision making which 
requires adequate evidence upon which to make the decision.  While the different legal 
traditions commonly found in international dispute settlement compound the 
complexities when seeking a middle ground to develop an approach toward discovery 
and the production of evidence, assurances that sufficient evidence will be supplied 






The development of common policy on the value of a substantive appeals process 
in the international context, particularly around the establishment of a WTO-type 
appellate mechanism, perhaps similar to the CETA Appellate Tribunal, in both the ICSID 
and UNCTIRAL systems would be an elegant solution to addressing concerns 
surrounding the integrity of ad hoc tribunals and the fact that both the ICSID and 
UNCITRAL systems do not currently offer potential users a review mechanism that 
considers substantive and legal issues.  Common policy around the value of a substantive 
appeals process would directly contribute to the protection of due process in the 
international context in that parties would be provided with a mechanism of last resort to 
appeal to if they feel their fundamental rights have been violated.    
 
It must be noted that although the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems do allow for 
annulment of an award based on a claim of procedural violation, such justifications for 
appeal do not include substantive components or concerns about the issued decision 
based upon the merits of the case.  In general, the UNCITRAL and ICSID systems 
establish a one-tiered system where awards are automatically considered final, subject to 
very limited grounds to contest enforcement.   In contrast, proceedings in domestic courts 
for example are a matter of public record, the public can have access to the pleadings, 
judges are neutrally rostered and parties have the clear right to appeal.  UNCITRAL and 
ICSID arbitrations lack such basic accountability mechanisms. This is troubling because 
in any legitimate process making decisions that weigh private against public interest, 
tribunals must be accountable for what they do and therefore the establishment of a 
substantive appellate mechanism for the UNCITRAL and ICSID systems would be a 
useful addition to overall legitimacy and analytical rigor.  
 
An option to develop a substantive appeal process in both the UNCITRAL and 
ICSID systems would be to adopt policy that follows the WTO approach and takes steps 
to establish a WTO-type of appellate body, and then gives it the mandate to develop its 
own working procedure based on the current needs which could also develop as 





is a matter for the Appellate Body itself and this could be effective in both the 
UNICTRAL and ICSID contexts.  A potential UNCITRAL or ICSID appellate 
mechanism could easily follow the lead of the WTO Appellate Body.  The initial 
mandate establishing an UNCITRAL or ICSID appellate mechanism could provide for 
judicial-type proceedings and a court-like appeals body.  The appellate process could be 
mandated to have a high standard of practice, as compared with the more flexible 
standard of practice common to party-controlled tribunal proceedings.  Further, and 
continuing with the WTO example, appeals could be limited to issues of law covered in 
the initial opinion and legal interpretations the initial tribunal develops.  Like WTO, 
findings of fact by the initial tribunal could also be excluded from the scope of 
UNCITRAL or ICSID appellate review.   
 
A substantive appellate mechanism institutionalized in all international dispute 
settlement mechanisms will create an effective safety net should the initial decision 
maker make mistakes.  No matter how swift an international adjudication process might 
strive to be, no human decision maker is immune from the potential to make errors, 
particularly when faced with a vast array of complex and technical factual disputes.  A 
robust international appellate mechanism that considers both issues of fact and issues of 
substance, similar to that of WTO, provides the system with the ability to self-correct 
errors before they become enforceable at the national levels by enabling a defeated party 
dissatisfied with an outcome to seek to set it aside on substantive grounds.  An appellate 
mechanism, similar to that of WTO, also strengthens transparency and accountability 
within a particular system and provides an option to address actual or perceived conflicts 
of interest.   
 
Finally, we consider policies to develop a common approach to the use of past 
precedent in making future decisions and the systemic value of predictability and equality 
in international dispute settlement by seeking consistency.  Surprisingly, each of the three 
systems analyzed view and approach the value of precedent differently and it is important 
to consider all sides as well as the value in applying past case law with consistency.  The 





solidify the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and this tradition can 
be an example for future development of the UNCTIRAL and ICSID systems because 
currently the role of precedent is not clearly articulated within their respective 
jurisprudence or policy.  By developing policies that seek to institutionalize or at least 
take steps to increase the prominence of precedent, the UNCITRAL and ICSID systems 
would automatically provide guidance to future decision makers on how to exercise their 
discretion effectively and in a way that protects due process for the parities rather than 
endangering it.   
 
  A significant consequence to precedent is when a decision maker feels 
constrained and is compelled to make a decision based on precedent which is contrary to 
a decision, they would have made had there been no relevant precedent.  If us in the 
future are forced to treat our actions of today as precedent, then current decisions must 
consider not only what is appropriate now, but also what will be appropriate for all 
further possibilities – this is an incredible responsibility.  However, in systems where 
there is no reliance on precedent, the decision maker may find themselves alone, charting 
new paths at every step and without sufficient justification upon which to base their 
decision.  International dispute settlement policy favoring some type of balanced 
approach would be ideal.   
 
Further contributing is the value of consistency, as demonstrated by an analysis 
of WTO jurisprudence on the prima facie standard presented earlier.  Importantly, 
through this case study we have seen that despite the robustness of the WTO DSU and 
the relevant jurisprudence, no system is perfect and even the WTO Appellate Body 
grapples with how to manage the precedent set out in their past decisions and how to 
effectively apply this precedent to new situations that occur in the future.  This is further 
heightened when the WTO Appellate Body does not always follow the precedent they set 
in past opinions.  Despite various approaches to precedent, dispute settlement systems 
maintaining a high degree of tribunal discretion and flexibility, combined with an 
approach that does not strongly consider precedent, open themselves to criticism in that 





parties to be given adequate opportunity to be heard and present their case and therefore 
there must exist a degree of consistency and predictability to a dispute settlement 
mechanism to enable to party to adequately anticipate how to effectively present the 
merits of their case and supporting evidence.          
 
Over the last fifty years there has been a steady increase in the number of 
developing countries and parties from developing countries participating actively in the 
international community and in all forms of international dispute settlement.  This is 
combined with related improvement in the overall quality of international dispute 
settlement that can be associated with value added from consideration of different 
perspectives from such diverse participation.  This substantially broadened engagement 
has raised new challenges for all parties seeking to actively engage in international 
dispute settlement.  As cases presented before the various international dispute settlement 
mechanisms become ever more complex, technical and far-reaching, adjudication of 
international disputes cannot be meaningful without the transparent and consistent 
protection of due process.  This is fundamental to all forms of dispute settlement and the 
formalization of how exactly procedural due process protection should be ensured 
remains unclear and parties from developing and least-developed countries should watch 
with particular attention as the practices relating to due process protection in the 
international context are further developed and refined.  This will by no means be easy or 
fast; however, it is important for this issue to be put on the agenda and discussed.  
Perhaps the consideration of the policy options for the protection of due process and their 
application can spark such a dialogue, thus making a valuable contribution to this process 
and to the overall legitimacy of international dispute settlement in general. 
 
At this point it is important to pull back to consider the broader importance of the 
protection of due process and the way it relates to the rule of law from the perspective of 
international public policy and efforts to foster and encourage sustainable development.  





the law.942 Without access to effective or legitimate justice institutions to ensure their 
fundamental protection – be they domestic or international, these people can be easily 
cheated by employers, driven from their land, and intimidated by violence.  These men, 
women, youth and children often live at or below the poverty line, and face institutional, 
legal and administrative barriers that limit their ability to participate in society on equal 
terms. Despite reduction in overall poverty, it has been recognized that challenges to 
today’s human development are largely shaped by growing inequalities across income 
and other factors, which in turn are linked to marginalization of certain groups, such as 
women and ethnic minorities.   
 
 As established throughout this work, the protection of due process is a 
fundamental requirement that cuts across any dispute settlement mechanism, be it 
international or domestic, be it in developed or developing jurisdictions.  While this work 
focuses on the protection of due process in the international context, it is important to 
recall that these same principles apply to the domestic systems and contributes to the 
robustness of the rule of law in general.  Further, countries have varying levels of 
development and sophistication when it comes to domestic legal systems and often look 
to the international community for guidance.  This is particularly true for developing and 
least developed countries and it is important to consider the broader context within which 
international dispute settlement is viewed and functions.  Without these broader 
considerations, international dispute settlement risks isolation and the potential to become 
an option only for the rich and powerful, further contributing to inequality and 
marginalization.  We must therefore all work to break down barriers and strive to achieve 
equitable access to robust and legitimate legal systems that protect due process at all 
levels.  Over the past few years, the world has been given the unique opportunity to take 
steps to address these and other issues as the international community works towards the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs).  Understanding the links between the 
protection of due process, the rule of law and sustainable development will be essential if 
 






the world is to make meaningful strides toward inequality reduction and eventual 
elimination.   
 
 To be successful and to meaningfully transform our world, the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development must enable every nation to realize its own hopes and plans and 
effective due process protection is an essential component.  The world has learned that 
global targets are only effectively executed when they are locally-owned and embedded 
in national plans as national targets.   
 
 Today’s leaders, whether from government, business, academia or civil society, 
must be as ambitious and practical about the implementation of the new 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development which the world has worked so hard to develop over the past 
several years. They must embrace a dynamic, innovative approach if we as a unified 
world are to fulfill the hopes and expectations of humanity.  Together we face a historic 
opportunity.  Not only to end poverty, but also to tackle the challenges to people and 
planet so that we can end extreme poverty and inequality in all its forms irreversibly in 
the context of sustainable development.  What a humbling responsibility but nonetheless 
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